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Introduction 
Corporate Entrepreneurship is important for company’s profitability and 
growth. Corporate Entrepreneurship refers to the activities a firm undertakes to 
stimulate innovation and encourage calculated risk taking throughout its 
operations (Zahra, Filatotchev and Wright, 2009). Given its potential 
contributions, scholars have identified various factors that promote Corporate 
Entrepreneurship. Among the most important of these factors is board support of 
Corporate Entrepreneurship (Zahra 1996; Zahra et al., 2000, 2009). Despite its 
relevance, prior studies have produced partial results by focusing only on the 
monitoring and control functions of boards (Keasey and Wright, 1993; Beuselinck 
and Manigart, 2007; Scholes et al., 2007). A board of directors has also an 
entrepreneurial function in guiding managers to increase shareholders’ wealth 
(Zahra and Pearce 1989; Filatotchev and Wright 2005; Uhlaner et al., 2007; 
Brunninge et al., 2007; Zahra et al., 2009). A board can create new wealth by 
ensuring that managers develop and pursue a viable strategy, working with them 
to identify viable opportunities for growth and promoting attention to Corporate 
Entrepreneurship (Zahra et al., 2009). 
In this dissertation we propose to understand the elements that affect both 
board functions and their impact on Corporate Entrepreneurship. We highlight 
two key variables that influence boards’ entrepreneurial function and their 
involvement in Corporate Entrepreneurship: board attributes and major 
shareholder type. To investigate how these elements draws on role of board and 
Corporate Entrepreneurship we apply agency theory, resource dependence theory 
and social network theory. 
Board attributes include composition, characteristics, structure and process.  
Board composition refers to the size of board and the mix of inside and outside 
directors. Characteristics consist of directors’ background. and reflect the age, 
educational background, value and experience of directors. Board structure covers 
the number and types of committees, committee membership, the flow of 
information among these committees and board leadership. Process signifies the 
approach that boards take in making their decision and involves the frequency and 
  
6 
 
length of meetings, CEO-board interface, the formality of board proceedings and 
the extent to which boards evaluate themselves. All these influence the 
entrepreneurial and monitoring roles of boards. Some boards may not always do a 
good job in performing both roles and may suffer from poor board structure, 
inappropriate composition or wrong processes (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Prior 
studies have investigated how board composition influences Corporate 
Entrepreneurship (Zahra, 1996; Zahra et al., 2000). Less attention has been given 
to evaluating the impact of characteristics, structure and process. However, 
researchers suggest that having a board with the right mix of skills and 
connections can improve Corporate Entrepreneurship activity (Zahra et al., 2009). 
Researchers have also suggested that committees, flow of information and 
frequent meetings can improve the involvement of boards in strategic decision 
making (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). We propose to investigate how all these 
attributes influence the role of boards in sustaining Corporate Entrepreneurship. 
Major shareholder type (La Porta et al., 1999) affects Corporate 
Entrepreneurship (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Zahra, 1996; Zahra et al., 2000; 
Munari et al., 2010). Agency theorists propose that large investors have a major 
incentive to monitor CEO decisions and commitments to Corporate 
Entrepreneurship (Bird and Wiersema, 1996). Further, social network theory 
suggests that board composition reflects the social network of the principal 
stakeholder (Lynall et al., 2003). Therefore there is a strong relationship between 
the mayor shareholder and the board’s role (Uhlaner et al., 2007). Scholars have 
focused on the relationship between institutional stock ownership and Corporate 
Entrepreneurship (Zahra, 1996; Zahra et al., 2000) and on the relationship 
between family or state ownership and the level of a firm’s R&D investments 
(Munari et al., 2010). However, the results of these studies are contradictory. In 
this work we would understand how different types of major shareholders may 
influence the entrepreneurial and monitoring functions of boards and their impact 
on Corporate Entrepreneurship. 
The following figure (Figure 1) summarizes the framework that has driven 
our research on board attributes, major shareholders and Corporate 
Entrepreneurship. 
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Figure 1. The research framework 
 
 
In an attempt to analyze the influence of board attributes and major 
shareholders on board role in Corporate Entrepreneurship, we have structured our 
work as follows. In the first chapter we introduce the concept of Corporate 
Entrepreneurship and we describe the attributes and elements that characterize the 
phenomenon. In particular, we felt the need to first investigate the historical origin 
of the meaning of Corporate Entrepreneurship. After recognizing the field of 
Corporate Entrepreneurship as the link between entrepreneurship research and 
corporate management, we discuss the main traits of Corporate Entrepreneurship 
and the process through which a firm can nurture the level of entrepreneurship. 
We then focus on the “firm actors” that can contribute to the diffusion of 
entrepreneurship within the firm. After a brief literature review on employees, 
middle managers and top management contributions to Corporate 
Entrepreneurship activities, we focus our attention on the true research interest of 
this work: the investigation of how board attributes and major shareholders can 
influence a board’s role in Corporate Entrepreneurship. Thus, the second and 
third chapters concern the literature review of this specific stream of research and 
the attempt to explain the causal link that binds these elements. In particular, we 
focus on each category of board attributes (composition, characteristics, structure 
Board’s attributes 
Type of major 
shareholder 
 Board’s role in 
Wealth Creation 
Corporate 
Entrepreneurship 
Board’s role in 
Wealth Protection 
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and process) and on the three different types of major shareholder (family, other 
corporation and state).  
Finally, we attempt to support our discussion with empirical evidence, using 
a multiple case studies method. Thus, we have selected four different firms, with 
which we have conducted interviews. We have also collected data from these 
companies’ websites and from public reports. The analysis of the data collected 
provides empirical evidence that supports our thesis. In particular, case study 
analysis suggests that different major shareholders influence boards’ role in 
Corporate Entrepreneurship, particularly because different major shareholders 
correspond to different board attributes.  
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Chapter 1. Corporate Entrepreneurship: concepts and 
theories 
1.1. The concept of Corporate Entrepreneurship: an 
introduction 
In recent years, the entrepreneurial capabilities (Penrose, 1959) of corporate 
organizations have become a very important topic of discussion both among 
practitioners and academicians (Sharma and Chrisman, 1999). Several researchers 
have suggested that the entrepreneurial attitudes of risk taking, innovativeness and 
proactiveness (Miller, 1983) can be applied to the corporate process as well as to 
new independent ventures (Covin and Slevin, 1991). For this reason, several 
authors have proposed to use the term “Corporate Entrepreneurship” to 
indicate entrepreneurial behavior and the pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunities 
by existing firms (Burgelman, 1983a, b; Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990; Zahra, 
1993). Corporate Entrepreneurship may sound like a contradiction in terms (Phan 
et al., 2009); however, the main traits generally associated with entrepreneurship - 
as growth, profitability and innovation - are also desirable for large corporations 
(Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990). Researchers’ increasing interest in this field in 
recent years has produced a great deal of literature that attempts to explain 
entrepreneurial activity in existing firms. Authors have used terms such as 
“corporate venturing” (Biggadike, 1979), “intrepreneuring” (Pinchot, 1985), 
“internal entrepreneurship” (Vesper, 1984), “strategic renewal” (Guth and  
Ginsberg, 1990) to describe the development of new business within established 
firms and the renewal of the key ideas on which organizations are built (Table 1). 
Considering the definitions used in the literature as described in Table 1 we can 
observe that many researchers use different terms to explain the same 
phenomenon. Following Sharma and Chrisman (1999) we consider that the 
concept of Corporate Entrepreneurship encompasses many phenomena that prior 
authors have considered separate. In particular, following these authors, we define 
Corporate Entrepreneurship as the process whereby an individual or a group of 
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individuals, in association with an existing organization, create a new business 
or originate a strategic renewal or an innovation within that organization. 
Table 1. Existing definitions 
Authors Definitions of Corporate Entrepreneurship 
Burgelman (1983) 
 
 
 
Covin & Sievin (1991) 
 
 
Guth & Ginsberg (1990) 
 
 
 
Zahra (1995; 1996) 
Corporate entrepreneurship refers to the process whereby the 
firms engage in diversification through internal development. 
Such diversification requires new resource combinations lo 
extend the firm's activities in areas unrelated, or marginally 
related, to its current domain of competence and 
corresponding opportunity set (p. 1349). 
 
Corporate entrepreneurship involves extending the firm's 
domain of competence and corresponding opportunity set 
through internally generated new resource combinations (p. 
7. quoting Burgelman, 1984. p. 154). 
 
Corporate entrepreneurship encompasses two types of 
phenomena and the processes surrounding them: (1) the birth 
of new businesses within existing organizations, i.e.. internal 
innovation or venturing; and (2) the transformation of 
organizations through renewal of the key ideas on which they 
are built, i.e. strategic renewal (p. 5). 
 
Corporate entrepreneurship — the sum of a company's 
innovation, renewal, and venturing efforts. Innovation 
involves creating and introducing products, production 
processes, and organizational systems. Renewal means 
revitalizing the company's operations by changing the scope 
of its business, its competitive approaches or both. It also 
means building or acquiring new capabilities and then 
creatively leveraging them to add value for shareholders. 
Venturing means that the firm will enter new businesses by 
expanding operations in existing or new markets (1995, p. 
227; 1996, p.l715). 
 Definition of corporate venturing 
Block & MacMillan (1993) 
 
 
 
Ellis & Taylor (1987) 
A project is a Corporate venture when it (a) involves an 
activity new to the organization, (b) is initiated or conducted 
internally, (c) involves significantly higher risk of failure or 
large losses than the organization's ba.se business, (d) is 
characterized by greater uncertainty than the base business, 
(e) will be managed separately at some time during its life, 
(f) is undertaken for the purpose of increasing sales, profit, 
productivity, or quality (p, 14). 
Corporate venturing was postulated to pursue a strategy of 
  
11 
 
un-relatedness to present activities, to adopt the structure of 
an independent unit and to involve a process of assembling 
and configuring novel resources (p, 528). 
 Definition of intrepreneuring 
Nielson, Peters, & Hisrich (1985) 
 
 
 
 
Pinchot III (1985) 
Intrapreneurship is the development within a large 
organization of internal markets and relatively small and 
independent units designed to create, internally test-market, 
and expand improved and/or innovative staff services, 
technologies or methods within the organization. This is 
different from the large organization 
entrepreneurship/venture units whose purpose is to develop 
profitable positions in external markets (p. 181). 
Intrapreneurs are any of the "dreamers who do." Those who 
take hands-on responsibility for creating innovation of any 
kind within an organization. They may be the creators or 
inventors but are always ihe dreamers who figure out how to 
tum an idea into a profitable reality (p. ix). 
 
Definition of strategic renewal 
Guth& Ginsburg (1990) 
 
Zahra (1993, 1995, 1996) 
Strategic renewal involves the creation of new wealth 
through new combinations of resources (p. 6). 
Renewal means revitalizing a company's business through 
innovation and changing its competitive profile. It means 
revitalizing the company's operations by changing ihe scope 
of its business, its competitive approaches or both. II also 
means building or acquiring new capabilities and then 
creatively leveraging them to add value for shareholders. 
(1995, p. 227; 1996, p. 1715). 
Renewal has many facets, including the redefinition of the 
business concept, reorganization and the introduction of 
system-wide changes for innovation ... . Renewal is achieved 
through the redefinition of a firm's mission through the 
creative redeployment of resources, leading to new 
combinations of products and technologies (1993, p, 321), 
Source: Our elaboration  based on Sharma and Chrisman (1999) 
 
It may be that the existence of different streams of research and ambiguity 
in the definition of Corporate Entrepreneurship are the result of the process 
through which this field was born and developed. Indeed we maintain that 
Corporate Entrepreneurship represents the linkage between entrepreneurship and 
corporate management research (Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990). In the next session, 
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before entering into the heart of the Corporate Entrepreneurship field, we try to 
briefly investigate the existence of this link and explain how in this historical 
period the construct of Corporate Entrepreneurship can be appropriate to explain 
the survival and growth of firms (Covin and Slevin, 1991; Drucker, 1985; 
Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Miller, 1983; Zahra, 1993; Zahra et al., 2009). 
1.1.1. Corporate Entrepreneurship as the link among 
entrepreneurship theory and corporate management1 
Studies on entrepreneurship have a long history, particularly because they 
are very close to the theory of economic growth and to the development of 
capitalism2.  
The first economist to ascribe to the entrepreneur the main role in the 
development of economic society was Richard Cantillon (1680-1734)3. He argued 
that the organizer of production is neither the owner of a firm nor the people that 
provides work, but rather the entrepreneur. He described the entrepreneur as the 
“creator,” the “starter” with an uncertain income4. After him, Say (1767-1832) 
resumed the discussion about entrepreneurship5. In the hundred years that separate 
Cantillon and Say we find the development of the English economics policy 
school. Smith (1723-1790)6 and Ricardo (1772-1823)7, the main economists of 
                                                          
1
 In this section we will make only brief mentions no claim to comprehensively deepen the 
doctrinal evolution of a theme so vast. 
2
 Cft. Berta, L’imprenditore, Venezia, Marsilio Editori, 2004. 
3
 Cft. Luigi Enaudi, Introduzione, a Richard Cantillon, Saggio sulla natura del commercio in 
generale [1755], a cura di Sergio Cotta e Antonio Giolitti, Torino, Enaudi, 1974. 
4
 Schumpeter write: “Cantillon had a clear conception of the function of entrepreneur. It was quite 
general, but he analyzed it with particular care for the case of the farmer. The farmer pays out 
contractual incomes, which are therefore “certain”, to landlords and labors; he sell at price that are 
“uncertain”. So do drapers and other “merchants”: they all commit themselves to certain payments 
in expectation of uncertain receipts and are therefore risk-bearing directors of production and 
trade, competition tending to reduce their remuneration to the normal value of their service”. 
Schumpeter, History of economic analysis, New York, Oxford University Press, 1954, cit. page 
222. 
5
 “J.B. Say, moving along in the French tradition, was the first to assign to the entrepreneur a 
definite position in the schema of economic process. His contribution is summed up in the pithy 
statement that the entrepreneur’s function is to combine the factors of production in to a producing 
organism”. Schumpeter, History of economic analysis, New York, Oxford University Press, 1954, 
cit. page 555. 
6
 Smith focused on the capital as the decisive element in economic development. He argued that 
the function of entrepreneur was conflated with that of the capitalist. He viewed the profit that 
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this school, focused their attention on the availability of capital, denying any role 
for the economic agent or the entrepreneur. In the books “The wealth of nations” 
(Smith, 1776) and “Principles” (Ricardo, 1817), we find the manufacturer, the 
employer, the undertaker, and the projector, but when authors introduce a strong 
economic role they still refer to the capitalist8. The perspective of economic 
policy is that firms require mainly capital to survive and grow. The governance of 
the firm is a job like any other (Marx, 1818-1883), and the profit that a firm 
produces is a surplus for its employees. Marx, in his book “Capital”, argues that 
the capitalist takes part of the  surplus distribution because he has worked in the 
firm, not because he is a capitalist (1867). The economic policy that was 
developed in Grain Britain particularly lacks any form of subjectivism, and the 
personal characteristics of individuals are not related to the firm development.  
A different perspective was developed in Continental Europe. The 
Frenchman Say and the Italian Gioja (1767-1829) agree that the success of 
industrial firms depends on the entrepreneurial ability of the main agent of 
production9. The entrepreneur may be endowed with the capabilities of judgment, 
perseverance and firmness, and may be able to dominate every step of the 
production process. These authors, in contrast to English researchers, focus their 
attention on the subjective characteristics of the people who may govern firms. 
 Actually, at the middle of ‘800, even in the UK some economists have 
introduced a debate on the entrepreneur, based on the concept that for the 
                                                                                                                                                              
accrues to the entrepreneur not as a form of wage arising from the execution of directorial duties, 
but as the consequence of the level of the investment made. 
7
 Ricardo ignored the notion of entrepreneurial elements in his writings. He expounded the basic 
tenants of the capitalist system, describing the effect of market forces on capital. Ricardo (1962, 
pages 112-4) argued that the role of a capitalist is prominent in the working of economy, in the 
sense that a capitalist moves his capital to new sources of production in response to external 
changes in the environment, such as trade opportunities, shift in market demand, or the distressed 
produced in an economy after a protracted period of war.  
8
 “The role of manufacturer is to invest his capital in the business according to the demand of his 
products. If demand falls off then he may dismiss some of his workman and cease to borrow from 
the bankers and moneyed man. The reverse will be the case where the demand increase,” Ricardo 
(1962), The Principles of Economy and Taxations, cit. page 49. The word undertaker, employer, 
projector were used interchangeably with the term entrepreneur in the sense of an adventurer being 
some who seeks occasion of hazard and puts himself in the hand of chance. 
9
 See J.B. Say (1803), “A Treatise on Political Economy” and M. Gioja (1815-1819), “Nuovo 
prospetto delle scienze economiche,” (1819), “Sulle manifatture nazionali,” and (1822) 
“L’ideologia.” 
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generation of a surplus both capital and the knowledge that people have 
accumulated in their careers are important. The first contribution  on this topic is 
Mill’s (1806-1873)10 position about profit. Mill argues that profit must be 
separated into three different categories. The first is the remuneration for the 
abstinence that the capitalist bears; the second is the remuneration for risk-taking, 
and the third is the remuneration for work done and for the capability of 
supervision. The difference between remuneration for abstinence and profit is the 
recompense for the entrepreneur. Mill bemoans the lack of an appropriate term in 
English; he uses the term undertaker to designate a person who shares the risk of 
the firm as well as the trouble of business.  
However, is with the approach of Bagehot that the businessman, the 
entrepreneur, receives due focus. The author argues that the entrepreneur became 
the “motive power in the modern production”11 because he must decide which 
goods should be produced and marketed. Bagehot’s entrepreneur works as a 
general: he plans the operations, organizes funds and supervises production. This 
relatively new position on entrepreneurship is actually a consequence of the 
increasing complexity of business in recent years. The author believes that this 
complexity requires the leadership of a single businessman characterized by the 
power of decision. Thus, Bagehot becomes one of the major exponents of the new 
perspective of economic policy, in which the single nature of each economic actor 
involved is considered as an important variable in understanding the science of 
business.  
The evolution of economic policy thought from the simple figure of the 
capitalist to the complex role of the entrepreneur suggests how each economic 
theory is closely connected to the economic sociology of the period in which each 
author lived12. When businesses were relatively simple and a firm was a enterprise 
that belonged to a single person who provided capital, the role of the capitalist 
was sufficient to account for the administration of all resources involved. With the 
                                                          
10
 See J.S.Mills, (1848). “Principles of Political Economy.” 
11
 Walter Bagehot, Economics Studies, in The Collected Works of Walter Bagehot, a cura di 
Norman St. Jonh Stevas, vol. XI, London, The Economist, 1978 
12
 Angelo Pagani, La formazione dell’imprenditorialità, Volume 22 di studi e ricerche di Scienze 
Sociali, Edizioni di Comunità, 1964. 
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increasing complexity and size of the firms and the introduction of different forms 
of corporate governance, new figures and roles were required. The entrepreneur 
model of Say and Bagehot is only an example. Successive authors have discussed 
entrepreneurial function and about which figures within a firm would be able to 
fulfill this role.  
To this end, we like to mention the contributions of Marshall (1842-1924) 
and Sombart (1863-1941). Marshall wrote that the employer (the entrepreneur) “is 
the mastermind of the whole”13. He is responsible for decision making about what 
kinds of job have to be done, how, and by whom. Marshall acknowledges that, 
over time, entrepreneurial function has become more complex. This increasing 
complexity has led to the delegation of entrepreneurial activity to other firm 
employees. Marshall recognizes in the manager the figure most suitable 
engineering firm activities. He places both the entrepreneur and the managers at 
the heart of the economics system, and identifies a number of figures that assist 
the “employer” in his decision making and engineering activities. Thus these 
authors were among the first to note the increasing separation between governance 
and control, and introduced the role of management in entrepreneurial activity to 
bridge this gap. 
After Marshall, Sombart considered the separation between entrepreneurial 
function and “capitalist property,” which is a natural consequence of the evolution 
from individual firms to public companies. Sombart acknowledges that the 
capitalist is not always the figure on which the future of the firm depends. Indeed, 
to explain entrepreneurial function, Sombart identifies three different roles that 
the modern captain of industry must carry out. Each figure corresponds to an ideal 
character that is important for entrepreneurial activity, because in Sombart’s 
thinking, not all people have the characteristics to become entrepreneurs. These 
are (i) the entrepreneur-expert (ii) the entrepreneur-merchant (iii) and the 
entrepreneur-financier14. The entrepreneur of Sombart’s time is often a 
                                                          
13
 Marshall, The economics of industry, London, Macmillan and Co., 1879, p.51. 
14
 W. Sombart wrote, “We may distinguish among them  three different types: the expert, the 
merchant or the business man, and the financier. The expert centers his interest in his particular 
product. He is definitely tied down to a single branch of production, as is seen most clearly in the 
case of entrepreneur who is also a technical inventor. The inventor-entrepreneur aims to bring 
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combination of two of these types. The particular combination depends on the 
different opportunities that different branches of business offer. For example, 
Sombart write, “Industries requiring great mechanical precision in the 
manufacturing process are fertile soil for the expert; the merchant thrives in 
industries dominated by mass production; and the financier exploits such 
opportunities as the promotion of new railways.15” With Sombart we assist at an 
integration of function and a democratization of the functions of command. The 
“old single capitalist/entrepreneur” does not accurately represent modern 
entrepreneurial activity and does not explain who, really, decides within an 
organization. 
Additionally Schumpeter (1883-1950), one of the most important 
researchers in the entrepreneurship field and the author of “The Theory of 
Economic Development” (1961), recognized the ideal type of entrepreneur in the 
captain of industry. Schumpeter’s entrepreneur is completely different from all 
other capitalists. He exalts his individual qualities and personal characteristics. 
This, along with his behavior, breaks the equilibrium of the market. The 
entrepreneur has the function to carry out new combinations16. The position that 
such people have in a company does not matter: he could be a manger, a member 
of the board of directors, or a simple employee. And as it is the carrying out of 
                                                                                                                                                              
about widespread adoption of his invention by producing on as large a scale as possible. The 
merchant’s starting point is the market demand; he is determined to supply the products which he 
considers most saleable. Anticipating future demand, which he stimulates with cleaver 
propaganda, the ideal merchant creates wants and proceeds to supply the means for their 
satisfaction. The financier’s important activity is the creation and accumulation of capital by 
technical manipulation in the stock market. His appropriate milieu is the capital market and his 
creative powers are expressed in the promotion of new companies or mergers, holding companies 
and other financial aggregations.” Economic Life in the modern age, Transaction Publishers, 2001, 
page 20. 
15
 W. Sombart, Economic life in the modern age, Transaction Publishers, 2001, page 21. 
16
 “The concept covers the following five cases: (1) The introduction of new good […] or of a new 
quality of a good. (2) The introduction of a new method of production, that is one not yet tested by 
experience in the branch of manufacture concerned, which need by no means be founded upon a 
discovery scientifically new […]. (3) The opening of a new market, that is a market into which the 
particular branch of manufacture of the country in question has not previously entered, whether or 
not this market has existed before. (4) The conquest of a new source of supply of raw materials or 
half-manufactured goods […]. (5)  the carrying out of a new organization of any industry, like the 
creation of a monopoly position[…] or the breaking up of a monopoly position.” Schumpeter, The 
Theory of Economic Development, New York, Oxford University Press, 1961, page 66. 
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new combinations that defines the entrepreneur, it is not necessary for him to be 
permanently connected with an individual firm. Thus, the requirements of 
property and membership fail, as does the risk component. “Risk obviously 
always falls on the owner of the means of production or of the money-capital 
which was paid for them, hence never on the entrepreneur as such. A shareholder 
may be an entrepreneur. He may even owe to his holding a controlling interest the 
power to act as an entrepreneur. Shareholders per se, however, are never 
entrepreneurs, but merely capitalists, who in consideration of their submitting to 
certain risk participate in profits.17” Furthermore, because being an entrepreneur is 
not a profession and, as a rule, is not a lasting condition, entrepreneurs do not 
form a social class. The entrepreneur of Schumpeter has a “creative soul” and is 
an entrepreneur because he recognizes the potential to create new opportunities 
and carries out innovation. The entrepreneur is an innovator, and profit is the 
fundamental criterion in determining the innovative character of a new 
combination. It represents the prize for the introduction of new combination.  The 
entrepreneur of Schumpeter is either the capitalist or a manager. The 
entrepreneurial class does not exist because entrepreneurship is a temporary and 
individual condition. Moreover the entrepreneur is not involved in the 
management of a firm; he is responsible for his creation.  
While the approach of Schumpeter, still represents the perspective of many 
scholars in the field of entrepreneurship, it has received a great deal of criticism. 
Such authors as Cole, Redlich18, and Evans have argued that is essential to define 
                                                          
17
 J. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development, New York, Oxford University Press, 
1961, page 75. Knight has a different perspective on risk component: “The responsibility and risk 
of proprietorship is the essential attributes of entrepreneurship. the entrepreneur is the owner of all 
real wealth, and ownership involves, risk; the coordinator make decision, but is the entrepreneurs 
who accepts the consequences of decisions,” See, Frank K. Knight, Risk Uncertainty and Profit, 
Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1971 (first ed. 1921), page. 45. S. Bianchi Martini wrote, “Si 
può più in particolare rilevare che, negli studi di impostazione quantitativa, la nozione di rischio 
viene normalmente riferita a quelle situazioni aleatorie nelle quali sia possibile determinare 
(oggettivamente o, per taluni autori, anche soggettivamente) i risultati degli eventi possibili e le 
connesse probabilità o, quanto meno, assimilare la “distribuzione di probabilità degli eventi” a 
distribuzioni note nei parametri caratteristici (es. distribuzione normale).” La politica dei rischi nel 
sistema delle decisioni finanziarie d’azienda, 1996, Pisa, IlBorghetto. See also, Umberto Bertini, 
Introduzione allo studio dei rischi nell’economia aziendale, Giuffrè, Milano, 1987, Prefazione. 
18
 F. Redlich, Entrepreneurship in the Initial Stages of Industrialization (with special reference to 
Germany),  Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 75: 59-103 (1955), pp. 59- 62. 
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entrepreneurship in reference to firm decisions. Thus, these authors highlight the 
role of the entrepreneur as decision-maker19. Entrepreneurial function is not 
realized only with innovation, but also in direction and the decision-making 
process. The entrepreneur is responsible for the strategic decisions of a firm20. 
Evans identified three different entrepreneurial roles within the firm that can 
correspond to different decision making process. The first is the “innovating 
entrepreneur,” who decides how to combine means of production in new ways. 
The second is the “managing entrepreneur,” who carries out the more routine 
aspects of management. The last is the “controlling entrepreneur,” who exercises 
continuing control. “He gives the go-ahead or the stop signals to the innovating 
entrepreneur or entrepreneurs in his organization; he approves or disapproves of 
the policies of the managing entrepreneur – sometimes going so far as to oust the 
managing entrepreneur or to spur him into becoming an innovating 
entrepreneur”21. Each entrepreneur and sometimes all entrepreneurs together must 
make decisions about the choice of products, methods of production, 
determination of the current input and output, the size and location of plants, the 
mobility of investments, relations with competitors, marketing procedures, 
relations with the government, and relations between entrepreneurs within a single 
business. These decisions cannot be expected to be the same in all situations. This 
highlights most complicated problem: there may be more than one figure who 
makes decisions within a firm. 
Thus, Cole introduces the concept of the entrepreneurial team, defined as 
“those who make, and are responsible for the strategic decisions of a profit-
oriented enterprise” (Cole, 1959). Evans acknowledges that the three types of 
entrepreneur can consist in one person as well as in different employees within an 
organization. Dobb (1900-1976), a young English radical economist, also 
                                                          
19
 Cole defines the entrepreneurial function as “the purposeful activity (including an integrated 
sequence of decision) of an individual or group of associated individuals, undertaken to initiate, 
maintain, or aggrandize a profit-oriented business unit for the production or distribution of 
economic goods and services.” A. Cole, Business Enterprise in Its Social Setting, Cambridge MA, 
Harvard University Press, 1959, page 233. 
20
 Cole, Business Enterprise in its Social Setting, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1959. 
21
 G.H. Evans, The Entrepreuner and Economic Theory: a Historical and Analytical Approach, 
American Economic Review, May 1949, Vol. 39, Issue 3, p. 336-348. 
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identified three different types of entrepreneur: the “industrial,” the “financier,” 
and the “commercial.” These functions are carried out by a group of individuals 
including a manager and a major shareholder. 
 In the same period the Italian tradition is concentrate on the concept of 
‘soggetto economico’22. Zappa and Pantaleoni argued that the entrepreneur is an 
abstract figure that does not exist in a real firm as a single person involved in the 
governance and management of a company. Rather many people are involved in 
the organization and direction of the production of goods. Indeed, many subjects 
within a single business have certain entrepreneurial characteristics. All people 
with these characteristics become part of the ‘soggetto economico.’ Thus, the 
‘soggetto economico’ represents the group of people that actually practice the 
“supreme power” in a firm (Onida, 1975), as they are major shareholders, or 
financiers or they have some business relationship with the firm23. It is the organ 
in which the power of decision is centralized. The source of its power the capital 
but this does not correspond with the supremacy of owners. ‘Soggetto economico’ 
is represented by the major shareholders that own the majority of voting stock. 
Masini24 defined ‘soggetto economico’ as the group of people that holds the 
interest of the development and growth of a firm, and includes those responsible 
for the management of the firm. It must make decisions about strategy and the 
                                                          
22
 Cavalieri and Franceschi (2010) wrote, “L’economia aziendale classica in Italia fin dalle sue 
origini ha affrontato la problematica del soggetto economico e del soggetto giuridico individuando 
il primo in base al criterio della prevalenza dell’interesse, a suo tempo richiamato da Zappa (1956, 
I, page 86): ‘Il soggetto economico ce esercita il controllo dell’azienda è la persona fisica o il 
gruppo delle persone nel cui prevalente interesse l’azienda è amministrata.’ Il primo aspetto su cui 
la predetta concezione si sofferma riguarda la necessità che ogni combinazione economica esista 
una persona fisica o comunque una entità unitaria che eserciti il controllo delle sue scelte 
fondamentali, la governi, la indirizzi, le imprima quel moto che è condizione indispensabile per 
confrontarsi con il dinamismo dei mercati e dell’ambiente.” Economia Aziendale, Vol. 1, Torino, 
Giappichelli Editore, page 81. Bertini (1994) sees ‘soggetto economico’ as “un’oligarchia formata 
dagli esponenti più rappresentativi del capitale e dai dirigenti di grado più elevato.” Il sistema 
d’azienda. Schema di analisi, Torino, Giappichelli Editore, page 26. Cavalieri and Franceschi 
(2010: 84) argued on this perspective, “[Bertini] accosta al criterio della prevalenza dell’interesse 
un altro importante criterio: quello della competenza professionale e della disponibilità delle 
informazioni indispensabili per manovrare consapevolmente le leve del governo aziendale”. 
23
 Amaduzzi, L’azienda nel suo sistema e nell’ordine delle sue rilevazioni, 1978. Page 65.  
24
 This definition is in accord with the view of the authors about firms. Indeed he defines a firm as 
an economic institute in which converge a lot of interest. Actually, the aim of the firm is the 
satisfaction of internal interest of people involved in the governance of the firm. Masini, La 
struttura dell’impresa, Milano, Giuffrè, 1964. 
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renewal of the organization. It is the figure that owns the control function of the 
managers of the firm. Giannessi (1979) considered the ‘soggetto economico’ to be 
responsible for the success or failure of a firm. It represents not only those who 
invest capital and take the risks but also those who create combinations, decide 
about operations, and bear the consequences of these decisions25. Thus, concepts 
of the entrepreneurial team, definitions of  ‘soggetto economico’ and the three 
different conceptualizations of the entrepreneur have in common the fact that it is 
difficult to trace to a single person the carrying out of all entrepreneurial function. 
In particular, with increasing firm size and the evolution of a more organized form 
of capitalism, the success or failure of the entrepreneur and his firm depends less 
on his personal characteristics or his capability to discover opportunity. The firm 
leader is still involved in the decision making process, but in different way. Now 
the firm leader is not free to make decisions unilaterally, but must consider the 
ideas and work of his colleagues. The adoption of innovation was a special 
function of prior entrepreneurs. Today innovation is imposed by the engineers of a 
firm or by other employees who are able to discover new opportunities in the 
market or new ways to combine means of production (Schumpeter, 1929).  
In the second half of the twentieth century the figure of the entrepreneur 
weakened further, and was difficult to recognize within the firm. In the USA, this 
perspective was already widely diffused by the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Taylor’s about the exclusion of any form of personalization and the search for 
firm success in a series of organizational rules and administration behavior were 
the main traits by which the transformation of the American firm was analyzed. 
Like Schumpeter, Taylor focused on innovation. However, in this new perspective 
innovation is the result of organization. “In the past the man has been first; in the 
future the system must be first,” Taylor wrote in “The Principles of Scientific 
                                                          
25
 “Giannessi rileva che il soggetto economico è colui per conto del quale si svolge l’attività 
aziendale e, soffermandosi sul compenso che ad esso compete per l’attività svolta, compenso 
sempre proporzionale ai risultati che sono stati raggiunti, osserva che tale soggetto non è soltanto 
colui che investe il proprio capital esponendolo a rischio di perdita, ma in genere, chi da vita alla 
coordinazione economica, determina le linee operative fondamentali e ne subisce le conseguenze, 
cioè si assume il rischio economico.” Cavalieri and Franceschi (2010: 83). 
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Management” (1911). The system26 is directed by management, which is 
responsible for the direction of the firm and is, in Taylor view, the real author of 
the organization. Management is a sort of “corporate innovator” that changes and 
revolutionizes work, thinking, and the planning of firm activity27. Thus, these 
considerations lead to a critical question: what is the real function of the 
entrepreneur in this kind of firm? (Veblen, 1904). This question is particular 
relevant, as the perspective of scientific management assigns to management 
governance and control of the firm.  
We can understand the position of Taylor and American scholars, in 
considering the evolution of corporate governance, first in the USA and then in 
the rest of the world28. In the beginning of nineteenth century, entrepreneurs were 
able to manage their businesses by making use of different models of  the 
governance system. None allowed the guaranty of limited liability for the debt of 
the firm, so the interest of a possible shareholder in the firm was limited. As a 
consequence, in this kind of company, the capitalist and the manager overlap in 
the figure of entrepreneur. This changed in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, when new laws allowed entrepreneurs to create entities with legal status. 
These companies could undertake rights and responsibilities that previously only 
individuals could assume. This was a very important judicial innovation because it 
allowed shareholders the guaranty of limited liability and provided entrepreneurs 
with easier acquisition of the financial resources useful to feed the growth and 
development of firms.  
                                                          
26
 Italian research is characterized for a great number of contributes on system theory of the firm. 
Bertini (1994) wrote, “Il carattere sistematico dell’azienda dipende dalla stessa natura delle 
operazioni di gestione che risultano intimamente legate tra loro da un rapporto del tipo ‘da causa 
ad effetto’. Nel loro insieme tutte le manifestazione del mondo aziendale costituiscono un corpo 
unico di fenomeni retti da leggi identiche e orientati da fini comuni. Si delinea pertanto una 
struttura di ordine superiore alla quale è possibile dare il nome di sistema.” Il sistema aziendale 
delle idee, page 16. 
27
 This definition of management is completely different from the meaning that European scholars 
attributed to it at the beginning of the twentieth century. Berta wrote: “Nulla di più lontano, perciò 
dal management inteso come gestione consuetudinaria dell’impresa, come routine, come prassi 
amministrativa consolidata o neutra gestione di un business, secondo l’uso che di questo termine 
era invalso in Europa.” in L’imprenditore, Un Enigma tra Economia e Storia, Venezia, Marsilio 
Editori, 2004, page 79. 
28
 Zattoni, Assetti Proprietari e Corporate Governance, Milano: Egea, 2006. 
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At the beginning of twentieth century, another major event contributed to 
the evolution of corporate governance field. Some American and English 
companies decided to list their stocks in the stock exchange market. This decision 
had two important effects. First, the number of shareholders that owned stock in 
these companies increased considerably. Second, the link between the 
shareholders and the entrepreneurs and managers that directed these companies 
become less intense. Thus, listing in the stock exchange was related to the birth of 
the modern public company. The main characteristic of such a company is the 
separation between who grants capital – the shareholders – and who manages and 
controls the firm – the management. The birth of the public company began the 
phenomenon of separation between ownership and control. An interest study 
conducted by Berle and Means in the early 1930s in the USA confirmed the 
importance of the phenomenon. Analyzing the ownership structure of three large 
American corporations in 1929, they found that in each company, the major 
shareholder owned less than one percent of the company’s stock. These data 
suggest how the life of a firm, in the beginning of the twentieth century, depended 
on the decisions of the people who managed the company, the person who 
directed the firm or served on the board, is a salaried manger did not own stock in 
the firm. 
The separation between ownership and control gives a lot of power to 
management and debunks the myths of the autonomy of a single entrepreneur. 
Thus, in the middle of the twentieth century, capitalism underwent a managerial 
transformation, in which managers became most authentic representation. This 
transformation was interpreted  in different ways by different scholars. Some 
researchers considered the advent of large corporation as the beginning of the 
bureaucratization pattern of the economy. Others judged the “managerial 
revolution” to be the apex of economic development. One of the most important 
supporters of this perspective is Peter F. Drucker, who defined management as the 
organ responsible for the “policy making” process because it is the organ that 
decides “in which mode the things should be done29.” Management is responsible 
                                                          
29
 Drucker taught that management is “a liberal art,” and he infused his management advice with 
interdisciplinary lessons from history, sociology, psychology, philosophy, culture and religion. He 
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for the strategic development of the firm, for its renewal, and for its growth. 
Drucker identified three different responsibilities of a firm’s top management 
team: (i) to make decision about what kind of activity the firm should be involved 
in and in what products and markets; (ii) to make decision about how to allocate 
human resources within the firm to achieve good performance; (iii) and to ensure 
the continuity of firm life. 
Thus, in this perspective, entrepreneurial function is a consequence of the 
cooperation of the whole company. In a large corporation, ideas come from the 
group of people that work within the firm. They represent the great expression of 
the group of people involved in the direction of the firm30. Ferrero (1987) argued 
that top management must manage business operations and explore and exploit 
market opportunities. Chandler, in two important books about the history of 
management, found in executives the great expression of entrepreneurship. 
Chandler argued that entrepreneurial function consists of the capability to make 
strategic decisions and manage firm resources to implement long term plans. This 
is the responsibility of top management. Obviously, participation in ownership 
and the consequences of risk-taking still represents allow shareholders to be 
considered as part of the “entrepreneurial subject” (Bertini, 1995)31. However, it is 
                                                                                                                                                              
also believed strongly that all institutions, including those in the private sector, have a 
responsibility to the whole of society. “The fact is,” Drucker wrote in his 1973 Management: 
Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices, “that in modern society there is no other leadership group but 
managers. If the managers of our major institutions, and especially of business, do not take 
responsibility for the common good, no one else can or will.” page, 325. 
30
 Bianchi Martini (2009) wrote, “In termini economico-aziendali possiamo affermare che il 
processo di governo, pur nella sua articolata composizione e nella relazione dinamica tra schemi 
mentali individuali e mappe cognitive collettive, è orientate e sorretto da un insieme, normalmente 
abbastanza circoscritto di idée guida. Le idee guida sono idee dominanti che tratteggiano gli 
orientamenti alla base della logica di governo, ponendosi come bussola per le decisioni e, se 
adeguatamente comunicate e fatte proprio dal sistema umano, come catalizzatore delle energie 
umane. Le idee guida si articolano ai diversi livelli dell’organizzazione.” Introduzione all’analisi 
strategica, Torino, Giappichelli. Concerning the role of ideas, Bertini (1995) wrote, “ Sebbene 
siano le idee imprenditoriali a caratterizzare la gestione in senso politico e quelle manageriali e 
esecutive a definirla in senso operativo, l’economicità aziendale dipende globalmente da queste tre 
classi di idee, in quanto tutte ugualmente funzionali alla vita del sistema.” Scritti di politica 
aziendale, Torino, Giappichelli.  
31
 U. Bertini (1995) wrote, “Riesce difficile definire uno schema in cui la qualifica imprenditoriale 
venga attribuita a determinati soggetti e quella manageriale a determinati altri, in modo 
inequivocabile; altrettanto, e forse ancora di più, è la delimitazione dei rispettivi compiti in modo 
appropriato. Si è detto infatti che sia il capitale di comando, sia la direzione aziendale, unitamente 
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not sufficient to exhaust the flow of entrepreneurial function. Being an 
entrepreneur means managing change and innovation and in the modern 
corporation, there are many subjects involved in these tasks. Thus, the key 
concept of this new perspective is the distribution of entrepreneurial tasks 
between different bodies of top management. Each task has its origin in the main 
characteristics that were usually attributed to the entrepreneur: (i) contributions in 
ownership; (ii) contributions in free business initiatives; (iii) and contributions in 
directional-organizational activities (Ferrero, 1968; Invernizzi, 1993; Bertini, 
1993; 1995). 
Considering the diffusion of entrepreneurial tasks, many authors have 
abandoned the concept of the entrepreneur, introducing instead the concept of 
entrepreneurship. And since the entrepreneur’s responsibilities may be carried out 
by different subjects within firm, it would be more correct to speak of Corporate 
Entrepreneurship (Burgelman, 1983, Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990, Zahra 1993; 
1996). Corporate Entrepreneurship refers to the efforts of corporations to generate 
new business, to introduce products or process innovation, and to strategically 
renew the firm (Sharma and Chrisman, 1999). Corporate Entrepreneurship refers 
to the activities a firm undertakes to stimulate innovation and encourage 
calculated risk taking throughout its operations (Zahra, Filatotchev and Wright, 
2009). It is the result of the related entrepreneurial activities undertaken by 
multiple firm participants (Bergelman, 1983).  
Thus, Corporate Entrepreneurship involves the participation of several 
subjects in entrepreneurial activity and consequently the loss of the individual 
dimension of entrepreneurship. According to Stevenson and Jarillo (1990) the 
field of Corporate Entrepreneurship can contribute to theory about 
                                                                                                                                                              
alle forze politico-sociali condizionanti l’azienda, appartengono all’area del potere aziendale: ciò 
anche in relazione al fatto che oggi imprenditori puri, in senso classico, così come alti dirigenti 
puri, non esistono più. In pratica molti ‘imprenditori’ finiscono per svolgere funzioni manageriali e 
molti ‘manager’ debbono cimentarsi nella soluzione di problemi imprenditoriali. E siccome il 
capitale di rischio  pur sempre la primaria fonte di potere aziendale, molti dirigenti, specialmente 
nelle aziende di medie dimensioni, finiscono per sottoscrivere partecipazioni minoritarie al solo 
scopo di rafforzare la propria posizione di controllo sulla gestione. Si hanno così non di rado figure 
di ‘imprenditori-manager’ e ‘manager-imprenditori.’” Scritti di Politica Aziendale, Torino, 
Giappichelli Editore.  
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entrepreneurship and corporate management, and finding in the innovative 
behaviour of the whole firm a source of development and growth for the 
company. 
1.1.2. The main traits of Corporate entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurship involves the identification of market opportunities and the 
creation of combinations of resources to pursue them (Schumpeter, 1934; Kirzner, 
1973; Guth and Ginsberg, 1990). The strategy literature identifies three types of 
Corporate Entrepreneurship (Stopford and Baden Fuller, 1994). One is the 
creation of new business within an existing organization. Literature calls this 
phenomenon corporate venturing or intrapreneurship (Burgelman, 1983; Pinchot; 
1985; Block and MacMillan, 1993). Another  is the transformation or strategic 
renewal of existing organizations (Kanter, 1983). The last is the changing of the 
“rules of competition” for the industry, as suggested by Schumpeter (1934).  
Scholars have argued that each type of Corporate Entrepreneurship has 
different characteristics that require separate considerations (Guth and Ginsberg, 
1990). In particular, corporate venturing is the result of an entrepreneurial group 
of individuals inside an organization that is capable of persuading others to alter 
their behavior, thus influencing the creation of new corporate resources 
(Burgelman 1983). This follows from innovations that exploit new markets or 
new product offerings, or both (Sharma and Chrisman, 1999). It is a special mode 
of entrepreneurial development that is able to generate new activities, exploiting 
all firm competencies (Invernizzi et al., 1988). These venturing efforts may or 
may not lead to the formation of new organizational divisions, that are distinct 
from the existing organization in structural meaning (Sharma and Chrisman, 
1999).  
Strategic renewal refers to the revitalizing of a firm through innovation and 
changing its competitive profile. It means refreshing the company’s activity by 
changing the scope of its business, its competitive approaches, or both. It also 
means building or acquiring new capabilities and innovatively leveraging them to 
add value for shareholders (Zahra 1995; 1996). Strategic renewal is achieved 
through the redefinition of the business concept and firm’s mission through the 
  
26 
 
reorganization and introduction of system-wide changes for innovation (Zahra, 
1993). These changes alter pre-existing relationships within the firm or between 
the firm and its environment and in most cases will involve some sort of 
innovation (Sharma and Chrisman, 1999).  
The last  type, changing the rules of competition, refers to an organization 
that introduces an innovation that is able to break and change the “game rules” 
(Schumpeter, 1934; Stevenson and Gumpert, 1985). It can a consequence of the 
capabilities of an entrepreneurial firm to detect and fill gaps between what 
markets really desire and what the organization currently offers, and exploring 
and exploiting the entrepreneurial capabilities that exist in the market (Hult et al., 
2003). In this case, the entrepreneurial behavior of a firm must transform not only 
the enterprise but also the competitive environment or industry into something 
significantly different from what it was (Stopford and Baden Fuller, 1994). 
 
 
 
These different types of entrepreneurship can exist in the same firm at the 
same time. Moreover, all types, even if with some differences, have some 
characteristics in common (Stopford and Baden-Fuller, 1994). First of all, many 
authors have argued that all kinds of entrepreneurship are based on innovations 
that require changes in the pattern of resource deployment and the creation of new 
capabilities (Baumol, 1986; Sirmon et al., 2007). Moreover literature on 
Figure 1. The three types of Corporate Entrepreneurship 
Corporate 
Entrepreneurship 
Corporate  
Venturing 
Strategic  
Renewal 
 
Innovation 
Reference. Adapted from Sharma and Chrisman, 1999 
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entrepreneurship suggests five attributes common to all types of entrepreneurship. 
They are: 
• Proactiveness; 
• Aspirations beyond current capabilities; 
• Team orientation; 
• Capabilities to resolve dilemma; 
• Learning capabilities. 
The first attribute discussed by researchers is proactiveness (Miller and 
Friesen, 1978). “Individual entrepreneurialism is associate in the literature with 
freedom to conduct experiments (Handy, 1989), and renewal with more extensive 
experimentation by groups. Likewise, the idea of frame-breaking innovation, 
albeit sketchy in the literature, is essentially successful experimental behavior 
(Hisrich and Peters, 1986) by the whole organization. Unlike Miller (1983), we do 
not regard proactiveness as necessarily meaning being the first in an industry to 
do something. Firms can be proactive in renewal, when they borrow others' ideas 
as a means of breaking from past behaviors” (Stopford and Baden-Fuller, 1994: 
523). Entrepreneurial organizations must be simultaneously innovative and 
financially risk-averse, and must spread and minimize risks by initiating many 
different projects (Stevenson and Gumpert, 1985). However, this proactive 
behavior does not mean taking high risks without any form of convenience.  
The second attribute is aspirations beyond current capability, which 
indicates the aim of continuous improvement by finding better combinations of 
resources. Stevenson and Jarillo (1990) defined entrepreneurship as the process by 
which individuals pursue opportunities without regard for the resources they 
currently control. This attribute is essential to seek industry leadership and frame-
breaking change (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989).  
The third attribute is team orientation, which highlights the crucial role 
that top and middle managers must play in promoting and supporting innovative 
ideas and creative individuals (Bower, 1970; Hornsby et al., 2002; Zahra 1996). 
In the rest of this work we will analyze this attribute, concentrating especially on 
the board’s role in sustaining and promoting Corporate Entrepreneurship. Scholars 
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argued that 'vertical' teams can help improve both decision making and 
implementation.  
The fourth and fifth attributes proposed by Stopford and Baden-Fuller 
(1994) are the capabilities to resolve dilemmas and learning capability. The 
first refers to the aspiration of a firm to surmount challenges that previously 
appeared impossible to renew the organization or introduce a disruptive 
innovation (Hampden-Turner, 1990). The second one, learning capability, is 
generally ignored in the entrepreneurship field. However it seems to be an 
essential entrepreneurial skills because the capability to explore and exploit 
market opportunities is reliant on practice and results from training and 
experience accumulated over time (Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990; Senge 1990)32. 
For this reason, firms that extensively develop Corporate Entrepreneurship can be 
expected to make a sustained investment in the learning environment (Stopford 
and Baden-Fuller, 1994). 
Following this review of the common traits of different forms of Corporate 
Entrepreneurship, one more question must be resolved: what must an 
entrepreneurial firm do to acquire these attributes? We can easily answer this 
question by considering the paper of Shane and Venkataraman (2000), who 
argued that to have entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial opportunities were first 
required. Thus, a firm characterized by all these attributes is entrepreneurial. In 
other words, it is able to pursue entrepreneurial opportunities. Casson (1982) 
defined entrepreneurial opportunities as situations in which new goods, services 
and organization methods can be introduced and sold at a price higher than the 
                                                          
32
 Bianchi Martini (2010) wrote, “[è importante] accennare allo stretto legame che esiste tra 
“apprendimento”, “affermazione di nuove idée” ed “innovazione imprenditoriale”. Se intendiamo 
infatti l’apprendimento non come passivo assorbimento di conoscenze, ma piuttosto nel suo 
moderno significato di learning, si può intendere lo stesso come un processo attivo che implica 
sperimentazione ed uso creativo dell’esperienze diretta ed indiretta.” Introduzione all’analisi 
strategica, cit. page 30. Concerning this point, Warglien (1990) wrote: “[Apprendere] non 
significa soltanto accrescere il proprio repertorio di conoscenze, ma anche mettere in moto un 
processo di esplorazione di nuove alternative e di nuovi comportamenti, di ricombinazione del 
proprio patrimonio conoscitivo, di attivazione di nuove esperienze. Il processo innovativo, quindi, 
se da un lato è debitore dei risultati passati dell’apprendimento, che costituisce la materia grezza su 
cui essa opera, appare per un altro verso uno dei processi del ciclo dell’apprendimento stesso.” 
Innovazione ed impresa evolutiva. Processi di scoperta e apprendimento di un sistema di routines, 
Padova, Cedam, cit. page 10. 
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cost of production. Although their recognition is a subjective process, the 
opportunities themselves are objective phenomena that may not be known to all 
people at all times. For example, Smartphone have created many opportunities for 
service providers, whether or not people are able to discover them. 
Entrepreneurial opportunities differ from other opportunities for profit. The latter 
group has the aim to enhance the efficiency of existing goods, services and 
organization methods; entrepreneurial opportunities33 instead require new 
combinations of means or new action strategies (Schumpeter, 1934; Kirzner, 
1973). Prior research has shown that entrepreneurial opportunities exist because 
different people have different beliefs about the value of resources and the 
potential to transform them into a different state. This leads people to make 
different assumptions about the price at which a good can be sold or about what 
new markets could be created in the future (Schumpeter, 1934). An 
entrepreneurial discovery occurs when someone conjectures that a set of resources 
could be used better (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). If this conjecture is 
correct, people (a firm) can earn entrepreneurial profit. Thus, the existence of 
entrepreneurial opportunities depends on asymmetries of information and 
differing beliefs34. 
 The existence of entrepreneurial opportunities is not a sufficient condition 
for Corporate Entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship requires action (McMullen and 
Sheperd, 2006). The second important step is the discovery and exploitation of 
entrepreneurial opportunity (March, 1991). Only if this step is carried out can we 
                                                          
33
 Shane and Venkataraman wrote, “Entrepreneurial opportunities come in a variety of forms. 
Although the focus in most prior research has been on opportunities in product markets 
(Venkataraman, 1997) opportunities also exist in factors market, as in the case of discovery of new 
materials (Schumpeter, 1934). Moreover, within product market entrepreneurship Druker (1985) 
has described three different categories of opportunities: (1) the creation of new information, as 
occurs with the invention of new technologies; (2) the exploration of market inefficiencies that 
result from information asymmetry, as occurs across time and geography; and (3) the reaction to 
shifts in the relative cost and benefits of alternative uses for resources, as occurs with political, 
regulatory, or demographic changes,” The promise of entrepreneurship as a field of research, 
Academy of Management Review, 2000. 
34
 Different beliefs are a consequence of the fact that people make decisions on the basis of 
hunches, intuition, and accurate or inaccurate information which can cause incorrect decisions 
(Kirzner, 1973). Asymmetries of information are a consequence of a continuous state of 
disequilibrium in which economies operate and an imperfect distribution of information about 
technological, political, social and regulatory changes (Schumpeter, 1934).  
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speak about an entrepreneurial firm. Pursuing entrepreneurial opportunities 
constitutes the core of Corporate Entrepreneurship. An entrepreneurial 
organization is one that pursues opportunities, regardless of the resources 
currently controlled, or the success or failure of the initiative (Stevenson and 
Jarillo, 1990). Thus, an environment that fosters the detection of opportunities, the 
motivation to pursue them, and their facilitation are three key parameters of 
entrepreneurial behavior. 
The impact of Corporate Entrepreneurship on firm profitability and growth 
(Zahra et al., 2009) has attracted researchers to investigate the organizational 
factors that can promote or obstruct entrepreneurial behavior and thus, the 
exploration and exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunity (Zahra, 1991; Zahra 
and Covin, 1995). Recent research appears to center on five factors that can affect 
a company’s pursuit of Corporate Entrepreneurship (Hornsby et al., 2002). 
The first dimension is the availability of resources for entrepreneurial 
activity. Employees must perceive the availability of resources in order to feel free 
to pursue innovative activities. Resources are a key element for the exploitation of 
opportunities. Thus, individuals within an organization must have the time, 
knowledge, budget, information and other important resources for 
experimentation and risk-taking behaviors (Burgelman and Sayles, 1986; Slevin 
and Covin, 1997). To consider acting in entrepreneurial ways employees must 
perceive that resources are accessible for Corporate Entrepreneurship activities 
(Pinchot, 1985; Kreiser et al., 2002). For new and innovative ideas, individuals 
require time to develop their ideas. Organizations should be reasonable in 
assigning employees workloads and allow employees work with each other on 
long term projects. In an entrepreneurial work environment, employees are 
allowed to conduct creative and entrepreneurial experiments in order to exploit 
new opportunities (Morris, 1998). 
 The second factor is the presence of a supportive organizational 
structure (Guth and Ginsberg, 1990; Covin and Slevin, 1991; Zahra, 1991, 1993; 
Hornsby et al., 1993). A supportive organizational structure provides the 
administrative mechanism by which ideas are evaluated, chosen and implemented 
(Burgelman and Sayles, 1986; Goosen 2002). Organizations should avoid having 
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standard operating procedures for all major aspects of jobs and should reduce 
dependence on job descriptions and rigid performance standards (Kuratko et al., 
1990; Hornsby et al., 2002).  
The third dimension is risk taking, which indicates management’s 
willingness to take risks and show tolerance for related failure. This is a very 
important dimension because, despite the potential contributions of 
entrepreneurial activities to value creation, management may not support them. 
Careerism and short term-based reward systems may discourage management's 
pursuits of corporate entrepreneurship (Jacobs, 1991). Although investors can 
usually reduce their risk by holding diversified stock portfolios, top management 
cannot always diversify their risk, and some entrepreneurial activities have a high 
probability of failure (Zahra and Covin, 1995), which can depress a company's 
short-term performance and decrease executive compensation. As entrepreneurial 
failures can also damage executives' reputations and increase their risk of 
unemployment, managerial risk aversion may occur (Zahra, 1996). Thus, it is 
important for Corporate Entrepreneurship that top management be willing to take 
moderate risks.  
The fourth factor is the appropriate use of rewards (Sykes, 1992; 
Barringer and Milkovic, 1998). Rewards can increase the motivation of 
individuals to engage in innovative, proactive and moderate risk-taking behaviors. 
An effective reward system that spurs entrepreneurial activity must consider 
goals, provide feedback, and emphasize individual responsibilities. The use of 
appropriate rewards can also enhance mangers’ willingness to assume the risk 
associated with entrepreneurial activity.  
The last important dimension is management support, the willingness of 
managers to facilitate and promote entrepreneurial activities in the firm. This 
support can take many forms including championing innovative ideas, providing 
necessary resources or expertise, or institutionalizing the entrepreneurial activity 
within the firm’s system and process (Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990; Kuratko et al., 
1993; Pearce et al., 1997; Hornsby et al., 2002). This dimension has received a 
great deal of attention in the literature. Many scholars have highlighted 
management support as one of most important factors for promoting Corporate 
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Entrepreneurship (Zahra 1996; Zahra et al., 2000, 2009). Success in Corporate 
Entrepreneurship requires strong managerial support and the creation of an 
organizational context in which innovations can increase (Covin and Slevin, 1991; 
Kuratko et al., 1997). In the next chapters we carefully analyze this dimension, 
focusing on the board’s role in sustaining Corporate Entrepreneurship.  
A large body of research has been produced in recent years in the field of 
Corporate Entrepreneurship. Scholars have found many antecedents and 
consequences in the formation of an entrepreneurial firms. It is not the aim of this 
dissertation to analyze all the literature in the field of Corporate Entrepreneurship, 
however, following Guth and Ginsberg (1990) we propose four classes of 
contributions in the Corporate Entrepreneurship literature. The first focused on the 
influence of environment on Corporate Entrepreneurship. The main finding on 
this topic is that a strong and dynamic environment positively influences 
innovativeness and entrepreneurship within the firm (Miller, 1983; Sharma and 
Vredenburg, 1998; Dibrell et al., 2011). Industry structure affects opportunities 
for successful new product development (Cooper, 1979). For example Zahra 
(1996) found that industries vary considerably in their technological opportunities 
(Geroski, 1990), (that is an executive's perceptions of his firm’s ability to support 
and generate growth opportunities through product and process innovations). 
Industries with high levels of perceived technological opportunities are usually 
characterized by rapid and frequent product and process technology introductions 
and high levels of R&D spending and patenting. Conversely, industries low in 
technological opportunities are usually limited in their growth potential and report 
modest levels of R&D investment. Other scholars have found that competitive 
intensity, technological change, and product market domain evolution can be 
conducive to the emergence of entrepreneurial opportunities. These particular 
environment conditions are positively related to the probability that organizational 
members will recognize entrepreneurial opportunities (Ireland et al., 2009). 
The second area of contributions that we want to underline deals with the 
influence of strategic leaders on corporate entrepreneurship. Many scholars have 
argued that the level of Corporate Entrepreneurship within a firm depends on the 
characteristics, values, beliefs and vision of their strategic leaders (Guth and 
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Ginsberg, 1990; Zahra, 1996; Zahra et al., 2000; Gabrielsson and Winlund, 2000; 
Zahra et al., 2009). The main contribution of this area is that management style 
affects the level and performance of new corporate ventures (Kanter, 1983). 
However, Porter highlighted the importance of considering the influence of 
governance and ownership on Corporate Entrepreneurship, as it can involve 
opposite interest of different people within a firm. Other scholars have found that 
top management, particulary the board of directors can affect the strategy of a 
firm (Friegener, 2005). Boards influence strategy indirectly through “decision 
control” activities such as evaluating past decisions made by top management, 
performing high-level reviews of strategic plans, and monitoring executive and 
firm performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Boards can also influence strategy 
through “decision management” activities such as ratifying strategic proposals, 
asking probing questions about important issues, and helping to formulate, assess, 
and decide upon strategic alternatives (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992). This field of 
research is quite large; in the next chapter we more thoroughly investigate the 
important link between Corporate Entrepreneurship and the role of the board of 
directors. 
The third area of research concerns the influence of organization form on 
Corporate Entrepreneurship. Bureaucratic structures and management processes 
are considered barries to innovation and change within organizations. Dess et al. 
(1999) argued that designing organizations that reduce internal boundaries is 
critical for successful Corporate Entrepreneurship. Established companies must 
modernize their bureaucratic structure and processes, which can lead to slow 
decision making and an inability to adapt to new situations, find new 
combinations of resources and exploit new entrepreneurial opportunities (Hammer 
and Champy, 1994; Schmelter et al., 2010). Firms must create organizational 
architectures in which entrepreneurial initiatives flourish spontaneously (Miles 
and Snow, 1978). Creating an effective architecture is often the most difficult part 
of crafting a successful Corporate Entrepreneurship (Garvin 2002). 
The last area of research focuses on the relationship between Corporate 
Entrepreneurship and performance. In this field there are stream two different 
lines of contribution. The first regards the study of the influence of organizational 
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performance on Corporate Entrepreneurship. Scholars have argued that successful 
firms make more radical and more frequent product and process innovations than 
unsuccessful firms (Mansfield, 1963; Knight, 1967). The second concerns the 
influence of Corporate Entrepreneurship on firm performance. Empirical studies 
have largely found that firms with greater entrepreneurial orientation perform 
better (Zahra, 1991; Zahra and Covin, 1995; Wiklund, 1999). Covin and Slevin 
(1991) suggested that growing interest in the study of entrepreneurship is a 
response to the belief that such activity can lead to improved performance in 
established organizations. Peters and Waterman (1982) found that undertaking 
Corporate Entrepreneurship activity can improve a company’s financial 
performance. Similarly, Zahra et al. (2000) found a positive relationship between 
Corporate Entrepreneurship and firm performance. However, established firms 
must balance their exploration and exploitation activities to achieve superior 
performance (Uotila et al., 2009).  
1.1.3. The process of Corporate Entrepreneurship: how firms nurture 
entrepreneurship 
In the previous subsection we attempted to identify the major traits of 
Corporate Entrepreneurship, focusing on the attributes and internal factors that 
enables firms to achieve high levels of entrepreneurial activities. The question that 
still remains to be investigated is how a firm becomes entrepreneurial. In other 
words, in order to understand the importance of entrepreneurial opportunities, 
organizational structure, and culture in facilitating the recognition of 
entrepreneurial opportunities and their exploitation, we must clarify how the 
process starts, how it takes place and who the subjects are that take part in the 
process. The aim of this subsection is to understand how firms can generate and 
improve their capacity to engage in Corporate Entrepreneurship, extending the 
firm’s domain of competence and corresponding opportunity set through 
internally generated new resource combinations (Burgelman, 1984). In 
investigating the process of Corporate Entrepreneurship we will principally follow 
the Burgelman perspective (1983a, b; 1984), adding a number of other 
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contributions that we consider useful in order to better understand the Corporate 
Entrepreneurship process (Morris et al., 2009). 
The starting point of Burgelman’s view is that strategy formulation and 
implementation are intrinsically intertwined in an incrementally evolving process 
(Murray, 1978; Quinn, 1980). Thus deliberated strategies are often different from 
realized strategies and different organizational contexts are associated with 
different strategic processes (Mintzberg, 1973; 1978). Burgelman proposed to 
explain the gap between deliberated strategies and realized strategies using the 
concept of Corporate Entrepreneurship.  
The author proposes an inductively derived model of the dynamic 
interaction between different categories of strategic behavior, the corporate 
context process, and a firm’s concept of strategy (Bergelman, 1983a). The model 
is presented in Figure 2. 
Figure. 2 Model of the interaction of Strategic Behaviour, Corporate Context and the Concept 
of Strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source. Burgelman, 1983a 
The current concept of corporate strategy represents the explicit articulation 
of the firm’s theory about the basis for its past and current successes and failures. 
It provides a frame of reference for the firm’s actors, and provides the basis for 
the decision-making process concerning the firm’s business portfolio and resource 
allocation. The concept of strategy is the starting point for a large part of the 
strategic activity in the firm. Induced strategic behaviors are the result of the 
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firm’s strategic planning, and take place in relationship to its familiar external 
environments. To the current concept of strategy corresponds a structural context 
aimed at keeping strategic behavior at operational levels in line with the current 
concept of strategy. “Structural context” refers to the various administrative 
mechanisms that top management can use to influence the perceived interest of 
the strategic actors at the operational and middle levels in the organization 
(Burgelman, 1983b). Structural context operates as a sort of selection mechanism 
for induced strategic behavior. However, a firm can also generate autonomous 
strategic behavior that falls outside its current concept of strategy. Through such 
strategic behavior, a firm expand and redefines its environment. This provide the 
basis for strategic renewal and radical innovation. Autonomous strategic behavior 
is conceptually equivalent to entrepreneurial activity. As it takes shape outside the 
current structural context, to be successful, it is important that the organization 
accepts and integrates this strategic behavior into its concept of strategy. The 
process through which these two conditions can be satisfied has been identified in 
the process of strategic context determination. Strategic context refers to the 
political mechanism through which the employees of the firm question the current 
strategy and ask for the opportunity to rationalize successful autonomous strategic 
behavior. With the activation of this process successful autonomous behavior can 
become integrated with the concept of strategy (Burgelman, 1983b).  
Thus, we can identify two different loops. The induced strategic behavior 
loop corresponds to the traditional view of top driven strategic management.  The 
logical consequences of the activation of this loop are includes new product 
development projects for existing business, market development projects for 
existing products, and strategic capital investment projects for existing business.  
The autonomous strategic behavior loop introduces new categories of 
opportunities. This because large resource-rich firms are likely to possess a 
reservoir of entrepreneurial potential at operational levels that can be expressed 
itself in autonomous strategic initiatives. According to Burgelman (1984), the 
process works in this way: entrepreneurial participants at the product market level 
conceive new business opportunities, engage in project championing efforts to 
mobilize corporate resources for these new opportunities, and perform strategic 
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forcing efforts to create momentum for their further development. Mid-level 
managers attempt to formulate strategies for this new business activity and try to 
convince top management to support them. Burgelman has identified the 
autonomous strategic behavior loop with Corporate Entrepreneurship. Thus, 
Corporate Entrepreneurship is the result of the capabilities of operational level 
participants to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities to the extent that corporate 
management that there is a need for entrepreneurship. This is why top 
management will tolerate autonomous strategic behavior. This provides the means 
to extend the frontiers of corporate capabilities and discover addition resource 
combination synergies for the firm. Moreover, entrepreneurial activity may be 
necessary to avoid increasing competitive pressure or to enter or leave a strategic 
group; it is also important for the growth and profitability of the firm (Zahra et al., 
2009). Given the value of strategic autonomous behavior, top management has the 
difficult task of championing the most appropriate entrepreneurial initiatives. 
Burgelman (1984) suggested two key dimensions of the strategic decision-making 
process concerning the selection of autonomous behavior. The first is the strategic 
importance of initiatives for corporate development; the second refers to 
operational relatedness, the degree of relatedness of the core capabilities of the 
corporation. The assessment of strategic importance is one of top management’s 
most important responsibilities. Top management must evaluate how initiatives 
are able to maintain the firm’s capacity to growth and act in areas where major 
current or potential competitor may growth and act. They can help firm create 
new defensible niches and help mobilize the organization. To make this decision 
it is important for top management teams to encourage middle level managers to 
“champion” new proposals based on their own substantive assessments and to 
compare their valuations of different initiatives with the assessments of the top 
management team. This interaction between different levels of management can 
improve top management’s capacity to make strategically sound assessments. 
Additionally, operational relatedness is an important dimension of the strategic 
decision-making process of the top management team as concerns the selection of 
entrepreneurial initiatives. Thus, top management, helped by mid-level managers, 
must determine the key capabilities required to make a project successful; where, 
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when, and how to obtain the missing capabilities and at what cost; and how these 
capabilities could affect the capacities currently employed in the main business. 
Given these related dimensions top management can choose which initiatives to 
exploit and develop within the firm. Finally, having assessed an entrepreneurial 
proposal in terms of strategic importance and operational relatedness, corporate 
management must choose an organization design to structure the relationship 
between the new business and the corporation.  
Coda and Mollona (2006) proposed a more complex and systemic model to 
understand the way firms nurture and develop a high level of entrepreneurship. In 
particular, they focused on the learning processes of top management’s strategic 
intents, the managerial processes in which top management’s actions are made 
clear, and the organizational behavior imposed by companies’ top management or 
developed independently. The authors thus identified four different “motors” that 
should be coordinated to manage entrepreneurial strategies within the firm. “The 
first motor highlights top management’s ability to create, more or less 
efficaciously, managerial actions aimed at achieving the contents of the 
intentional strategy. The second motor refers to top management’s ability to 
update, if required, the strategic intents, taking account of the structural changes 
within the environmental context and company situation. Also by this means, the 
gap is controlled, aiming to keep the level of motivation of collaborators high 
without causing stress. The third motor makes it possible to achieve the potential 
for innovation built into the company’s articulated human and organizational 
chain, to the extent that energy, know-how and creativity are released in the 
direction marked by a productivity and development growth strategy into new 
spaces for entrepreneurial initiative and responsibility. The possibility that this 
strategy can be shaped ‘bottom-up’ increases the company system’s adaptability, 
making it quicker in perceiving the changes under way in the environment and in 
framing suitable responses. Lastly, the fourth motor describes top management’s 
ability to open itself to questions and to learn, challenging its own mental 
patterns” (Coda and Mollona, 2006: 19). According to these authors, in order to 
successfully manage a company’s entrepreneurial strategy, it is necessary to 
  
39 
 
orchestrate the simultaneous operation of the four motors,  import energy into the 
company, and stimulate organizational learning and entrepreneurship processes. 
However, at the origin of autonomous strategic behavior we can individuate 
a basic assumption about human nature and human capabilities. Do company 
executives assume that entrepreneurship is a capability that a chosen few are 
endowed with, and therefore make the decisions to recruit and invest in such 
individuals? Or do they assume that all employees have innate entrepreneurial 
potential, posing the greater challenge of creating a work climate that will enable 
members to discover and act upon that potential35? Based on these assumptions 
we can identify two general approaches regarding how to raise and improve levels 
of entrepreneurship within the firm. The first, “pick the winner,” involves the 
efforts of the firm, which identifies people who are “entrepreneurial and then 
charges them with becoming champions of innovative projects. If there is not 
much entrepreneurial activity within the firm, it is possible assume that employees 
are not very entrepreneurial and so management must look externally in order to 
find the right people for the organization” (Morris et al., 2009). The main problem 
of this approach it is that is very difficult to predict who will be entrepreneurial; 
sometimes people who have done something entrepreneurial in the past are not 
able to do the same in a new context. The approach, “step up to the plate,” is 
based on the assumption that while entrepreneurial behavior on the part of 
individuals is neither controllable nor predictable, it can be fostered and facilitated 
(Morris et al., 2009). Thus, it is important to design the appropriate workplace 
environment, including aspects of strategy, structure, culture, controls, and human 
resource management practices. According to the authors, a key aspect in 
increasing entrepreneurship in the firm is the construction of a climate around the 
principle of balance. The paradox of Corporate Entrepreneurship (Birkinshaw, 
2003) is the result of the simultaneous existence of two inconsistent states, a 
“duality of coexisting tension” (Eisenhardt, 2000). Therefore, a firm must achieve 
balance in terms of strategy, culture, structure, control, and human resources. 
Balancing in terms of strategy means balancing exploration and exploitation. It is 
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 Morris et al., 2009, Properties of balance: a pendulum effect in corporate entrepreneurship, 
Business Horizon, 52, 429-440, p. 430. The questions represent the starting point of their paper. 
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generally assumed that entrepreneurship is associated with exploration, but reality 
suggests that exploitation is also closely connected with Corporate 
Entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship in exploration means discovery, recognition, 
creation of opportunity, translation of opportunity into highly innovative business 
concepts and risk assessment. Entrepreneurship in exploitation refers to creative 
approaches to mitigating and managing risk and leveraging the resources and 
skills associated with implementation of new concept and approaches. In this 
context, the effective entrepreneurial by a firm behavior should balance 
exploration and exploitation, while respecting ethical boundaries in order to avoid 
entrepreneurial excess (Birkinshaw, 2003; Bhuian, et al., 2005; Morris et al., 
2009). Balancing in terms of culture implies the need to balance between 
individual and team initiatives. A central aspect of any entrepreneurial attempt is 
passion which belongs to the individual sphere. However, entrepreneurship also 
requires a motivated and coordinating team of individuals that can contribute to 
entrepreneurial development with their own skills and capabilities (Francis and 
Sandberg, 2002). The ability to achieve sustainable entrepreneurship in a 
company depends on the team’s ability to balance individual initiatives and the 
spirit of cooperation and group ownership of innovation. In other words culture 
must balance individual passion for new opportunities with a commitment to the 
greater objectives of the corporation (Morris et al., 2009). Empirical evidence 
suggests that this kind of balance can be found in highly entrepreneurial firms. In 
terms of structure it is important to balance autonomy and restraint. Companies 
must find a balance whereby discretion co-exists with direction and controls 
(Morris et al., 2009). The ability to bridge the unknown and overcome resistance 
to change is consistent with higher levels of autonomy, wherein employees are 
empowered to exercise discretion and personal initiative in their jobs (Margison, 
2002). In term of control, firms should balance resource tightness and looseness. 
Tightness of resources serves to guarantee accountability while encouraging free 
initiatives, and can lead people to challenge existing ways of doing things. 
Looseness of resources provides room for experimentation and adaptation, 
especially with new concepts that have yet to win managerial approval. Morris et 
al. (2006) found empirical evidence to support the balance of resources tightness 
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and looseness. They highlighted a positive effect on the level of entrepreneurship 
within the organization. They argued that fiscal controls must strongly emphasize 
outcomes and individual accountability, while slack resources permit individuals 
and teams to experiment with free initiatives. To improve the level of 
entrepreneurship, human resource firms should balance incentives and security 
with administrative and entrepreneurial skills. Most compensation and reward 
systems are not designed to promote Corporate Entrepreneurship, and sometimes 
may actually suppress innovative initiatives. Moreover, in many corporations 
there exists a genuine and historically justified fear of failure. Thus, firms must 
create “upside” for managers willing to take calculated risks; this includes 
introducing financial and social incentives, including formal acknowledgement 
from management; allocating company resources to support employee ideas; and, 
to provide security, providing an adequate salary and benefits package at the core 
of compensation. A balance between incentives and the security needed by 
employees can contribute to a work environment of controlled freedom (Morris et 
al., 2009). Additionally, administrative and entrepreneurial skills should co-exist 
within the firm. Entrepreneurial skills are the key to creating a firm’s future, while 
administrative skills are the key to exploiting that future as it is created. Thus, the 
properties of balance have an important effect on the improvement of Corporate 
Entrepreneurship at the firm level.  
Various models of Corporate Entrepreneurship has been proposed in the 
scholarly literature (Ireland et al., 2009)36. For example, in Guth and Ginsberg’s 
(1990) model, Corporate Entrepreneurship is viewed as a set of phenomena that 
exist separate from strategy. Along with structure, process, and core values and 
beliefs, strategy is identified as an organizational-level driver of Corporate 
Entrepreneurship. Dess et al. (2003) based their model on the four forms of 
Corporate Entrepreneurship proposed by Covin and Miles (1999): sustained 
regeneration, organizational rejuvenation, strategic renewal, and domain 
redefinition. The model proposed outlines how acquisitive and experimental 
learning processes mediate the relationship between different forms of Corporate 
                                                          
36
 See also Floyd and Lane (2000), Hornsby et al. (1993), Covin and Slevin (1991), Lumpkin and 
Dess (1996), and Grandori and Gaillard (2011). 
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Entrepreneurship and the emergence of specific types of knowledge (i.e., 
technical, integrative, and exploitive). Kuratko et al. (2004) depicted individuals’ 
and organizations’ evaluations of entrepreneurial outcomes as determinants of 
future individual-level entrepreneurial behavior. Ireland et al. (2009) considered 
Corporate Entrepreneurship as a strategy manifested through three elements: an 
entrepreneurial strategic vision, a pro-entrepreneurship organizational 
architecture, and an entrepreneurial process and behavior as exhibited across the 
organizational hierarchy.  
All these models have contributed a great deal to the development of 
literature about the Corporate Entrepreneurship process. However, we believe that 
Burgelman’s approach still represents one the most appropriate models able to 
explain how a firm can become entrepreneurial.  
1.2. The “firm’s internal actors” of Corporate Entrepreneurship 
Upper echelon theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) suggests that managers’ 
demographic characteristics influence the decisions they make and, therefore, the 
actions adopted by the organizations they lead.  Hambrick and Mason suggested 
that this occurs because demographic characteristics are associated with the many 
cognitive bases, values, and perceptions that influence the decision making of 
managers. Several studies have supported the relationship between upper echelon 
characteristics and organizational strategies and performance. For example, there 
is evidence that top management team (TMT) job-related diversity is related to the 
internationalization of firms (Lee and Park, 2006); TMT diversity in age, tenure, 
and education have been associated with organizational innovation (Camelo-
Ordaz, et al., 2005; Bantel and Jackson, 1989), changes in corporate strategy 
(Wiersema and Bantel, 1992), and information use (Dahlin, et al., 2005). Finally, 
top management team gender diversity interacts with organizational culture and 
growth orientation in affecting organizational performance (Dwyer, et al., 2003). 
Building on this theory, we believe that characteristics, beliefs, values and other 
demographic characteristics of different individuals within an organization can 
influence the level of Corporate Entrepreneurship within the firm. Thus, we 
believe that some characteristics of firm’s stakeholders can be considered as  
“source” for improving the level of Corporate Entrepreneurship within the firm. In 
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particular previous literature have suggested that ownership (Zahra, 1996; Zahra 
et al., 2000), the board of directors (Zahra et al., 2009), the top management team 
(Srivastava and Lee, 2005), middle managers (Hornsby et al., 2002), and 
employees (Campbell et al., 2012) represent the most important categories of 
stakeholders for sustaining and promoting Corporate Entrepreneurship within a 
firm.  
We now briefly analyze these categories of stakeholders. This is simply a 
review of the literature on this topic of research. Indeed, in this section, our aim is 
to introduce the involvement of the different categories of stakeholders in 
Corporate Entrepreneurship activities within the firm, and then concentrate our 
attention on a specific actor: the board of directors.   
Employee involvement with Corporate Entrepreneurship  
Human assets have been recognized as an integral part of value creation 
(Coff, 1997; Campbell et al., 2012). Firms in search of high levels of Corporate 
Entrepreneurship and wealth creation may strengthen research and development, 
collaborate with users or suppliers in open innovation programs, or try to motivate 
employees to innovate (Dos Santos and Spann, 2011). The knowledge and 
initiative of employees are a particularly powerful source of entrepreneurship 
within the firm, but their potential are not often fully utilized (Van Dijik and Van 
den Ende, 2002). To improve the level of Corporate Entrepreneurship within a 
firm, it is important to motivate and enable employees to act as entrepreneurs, use 
collective intelligence to source and select the most valuable innovative ideas, and 
promote their development and commercialization (Dos Santos and Spann, 2011). 
The literature has called this approach “collective corporate entrepreneurship,” 
referring to the entire employee base as a source of ideas, with collective 
intelligence methods for the down-selection of promising ideas and 
entrepreneurship techniques to commercialize these ideas in a corporate setting. 
Thus, this approach is built on the view of employees as a powerful source of new 
product ideas and innovations (Van Dijik and Van den Ende, 2002). Drawing on 
employees for innovations has several benefits: employees are more familiar with 
customer, market problems and the nuances of in-house and external emerging 
  
44 
 
technologies (many from university research or start-up experiences), and are 
often motivated to develop something new for self-fulfillment or career goals 
(Dos Santos and Spann, 2011). Further, using employees as an innovation source 
can be cost-effective and may avoid disclosure and intellectual property that may 
arise in open-innovation initiatives (Chesbrough, 2003).  
Using employees as an innovation source has three challenges: first, the idea 
generation challenge: employees must be motivated to communicate their ideas, 
and must have a channel for this communication (Burt, 2004). Second, the idea 
selection challenge: if the innovation initiative is very successful, it may generate 
so many ideas that the selection of the most promising ones becomes very 
difficult or costly (Ozer, 2002; Toubia, 2006; Dahan et al., 2010). Third, the 
execution challenge: successful Corporate Entrepreneurship requires not only the 
identification of promising innovations but also their development and 
commercialization; thus, it must enable the execution of these ideas (Dos Santos 
and Spann, 2011). 
To solve the idea generation challenge, previous research has suggested 
idea competitions to discover new ideas from employees or customers (Piller and 
Walcher, 2006; Ebner et al., 2009). Solutions to the idea selection challenge in 
the previous literature include the evaluation of potential ideas according to 
selection measures (e.g. newness, fit with competencies, feasibility, and expected 
return on investment (ROI) by management or R&D specialists; Cooper and de 
Brentani, 1984). Further, multiple measures can be aggregated and weighted 
through methods such as the analytic hierarchy process (Calantone et al., 1999) 
and the Delphi process (Rowe and Wright, 1999). Further, prediction markets 
have been proposed to select new product ideas (Stathel et al., 2009; Chen et al., 
2010) and have been applied in combination with idea sourcing. The idea-
selection challenge requires the appropriate design of the response scales for the 
idea selection measures (Riedl et al., 2010), and of the prediction market (Spann 
and Skiera, 2003). Less academic research has been concerned with the execution 
challenge, as this is usually deferred to corporate practice outside of rigorous 
academic interest. This challenge entails mitigating the common inhibitors of 
employees’ entrepreneurial activities, which include employees’ lack of time and 
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entrepreneurial skill. Employees from different divisional and functional areas 
may not have the necessary perspective to successfully develop ideas (Burt, 2004; 
Dos Santos and Spann, 2011). For this reason, the support of middle managers, 
the top management team, and the board of directors is essential to pursuing 
Corporate Entrepreneurship within a firm. 
Middle managers’ contribution to Corporate Entrepreneurship 
Literature has recognized the valuable contributions that middle managers 
can make to the processes of strategic change and organizational renewal and to 
fostering entrepreneurial activities (Hornsby et al., 2002). According to the 
resource mobilization approach (Kanter, 1985), middle managers are the 
vanguards of change and organization-wide innovations (Fulop, 1991). Bower 
(1970) was among the first scholars to draw attention to the importance of middle 
managers as agents of change in contemporary organizations. After him, several 
authors (Drucker, 1985; Kanter, 1983, Peters and Waterman, 1982; Burgelman 
and Sayles, 1986; Pinchott, 1985) discussed different aspects of middle managers’ 
contributions to entrepreneurship. Quinn (1985) was the first to recognize the 
valuable contributions and important roles of middle managers in the innovation 
process in an established company. Noting senior managers’ isolation from actual 
day-to-day activities, Quinn highlighted the crucial importance of the roles middle 
managers can play in fostering communication concerning a company’s mission, 
goals, and priorities. Middle managers interact with wide range of employees, 
which allows them to use both formal and informal approaches to encourage 
innovation and calculated risk taking. Middle managers also communicate their 
ideas for innovations to upper management, thereby creating an opportunity for 
these ideas to be evaluated and considered within the context of the firm’s overall 
strategic priorities (Burgelman, 1983a,b). 
Other writers (e.g., Peters and Waterman, 1982; Pinchott, 1985) have also 
observed the important roles middle managers play in informally encouraging 
employees to innovate and take risks. These middle managers provide political 
and organizational support for “skunk work,” activities that result in innovative 
ventures. Kanter (1985, 1988) and Quinn (1985) also note the importance of 
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middle managers in promoting autonomous or informal Corporate Entrepreneurial 
activities. Middle managers can do this by providing rewards (mostly intrinsic) 
that allow employees to experiment with, and explore the feasibility of, innovative 
ideas. Middle managers can also use different approaches to make the 
organizational structure less resistant to change thereby allowing corporate 
entrepreneurial activities to flourish. 
As noted earlier, some researchers have sought to examine the roles middle 
managers play in their companies’ strategic process. In one such study, Floyd and 
Woolridge (1992) argued that middle managers frequently play pivotal roles in 
championing strategic alternatives and making them accessible to senior 
executives. Middle managers synthesize and integrate information, thereby 
crystallizing the strategic issues facing the company and setting the stage for 
strategic change. They also facilitate adaptability by altering the formal structure, 
and implement formal strategy and provide feedback. Moreover, middle managers 
play a key role in shaping their companies’ strategic agendas by influencing the 
types and intensity of corporate entrepreneurial activities. 
Additionally, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) highlighted the central role of 
middle managers. They suggested that most innovations originate from the middle 
of the organization, and that the promising ones are then sent to upper 
management for further analysis and evaluation. The innovations that meet the 
rigorous standards set by the top management team are then sent back to middle 
managers, who communicate them to the employees. In this model of innovation, 
middle managers actively and diligently gather innovation ideas from within and 
outside the firm. Middle managers work with vendors, observe the market and 
analyze the competition. As a result, they are well suited to observe areas where 
innovation and risk taking are needed. Middle managers also become aware of 
innovation efforts initiated by vendors and competitors. Frequently, middle 
managers transfer this knowledge to others in their company. Another noteworthy 
feature of the Nonaka and Takeuchi model is that it recognizes that middle 
managers frequently work on their ideas, often closely with employees, hoping to 
refine them and determine their potential. This initial, though informal, testing 
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process can help shape the ideas while creating the administrative structure 
needed to foster them. 
Zahra et al. (1999) noted the importance of middle managers in facilitating 
Corporate Entrepreneurship efforts. Through their effective communication and 
use of rewards, middle managers create the social capital and trust needed to 
foster the corporate entrepreneurial process. However, as Bartlett and Ghoshal 
(1996) observed, middle managers can create an environment in their respective 
divisions or subsidiaries in which innovations and entrepreneurial activities can 
flourish. This can enable multinationals to capitalize on the unique resources that 
exist in their markets and respond to their customers effectively. 
The literature also has highlighted several factors that can limit middle 
managers’ willingness or ability to facilitate corporate entrepreneurship. Some 
managers have demanding work schedules that leave little time for innovation and 
experimentation. This is especially true in companies that have initiated 
restructuring programs (Floyd and Woolridge, 1994). Resources available for 
innovations are often constrained, and it can be a challenge for middle managers 
to obtain these resources (Pinchott, 1985). Managers also must work hard to get 
senior executives’ attention and support for promising innovative ideas. They 
must also work through territorial disputes that occur among different units 
(groups) in their companies that fear the consequences of innovation on 
established lines of communication and the possible loss of access to 
organizational resources (Kanter, 1988). These are formidable challenges that can 
stifle middle managers’ efforts to encourage and promote Corporate 
Entrepreneurship. 
To summarize, research has suggested that middle managers can have 
pervasive influences on corporate entrepreneurial activities. This influence can, 
therefore, determine the viability and survival of various corporate ventures and 
other entrepreneurial initiatives (Hornsby et al., 2002). 
The role of the top management team in Corporate 
Entrepreneurship 
Among organizational factors, researchers have recognized the specific role of top 
managers in sustaining Corporate Entrepreneurship (Srivastava and Lee, 2005). 
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Amit et al. (2000) proposed that firms that possess entrepreneurial management 
would successfully create new products more quickly and obtain economic rents. 
Entrepreneurial management promotes an empowering corporate culture, enabling 
firms to develop individuals who think and act with entrepreneurial autonomy. 
Similarly, Miles et al. (2000) suggested that top management must develop and 
institute a strategic vision to promote products or process innovations and 
entrepreneurial activity for all employees. Pisano (1996) emphasized the 
important role of top managers in developing technological capabilities for new 
products. Verona (1999) presented a resource-based view of product development 
in which product development capabilities originate from organizational agents, 
including top managers. Mitchell (1989) contended that managers time their 
actions based on relative resource advantages over their rivals. For example, 
Mitchell noted that the more similar a new product is to existing products, the 
greater will be the threat, and the earlier the response to the new product’s 
introduction will be. In related research, Chen et al. (1992) found that the greater 
the threat presented by a rival’s action, the more likely and the faster a firm will 
respond. Thus, the perception of external threat and internal assessment by top 
management are likely to influence the order and timing of a firm’s new product 
moves. Thus, top managers are recognized as key entrepreneurial resources of the 
firm (Penrose, 1959) that influence the order and timing of new product moves. 
Within the domain of the research on the role of top management in new 
product moves are researchers who have argued that top management support to 
new product development teams is particularly important for innovation. In a 
review of product development literature, Brown and Eisenhardt (1995) identified 
the significant role of top management in the product development process. The 
authors argued that although the product development process may be delegated 
to a cross-functional project team, top management support is critical for the 
timely and successful introduction of a new product. Some studies have also 
found empirical evidence for the importance of top management support and 
monitoring in the effectiveness (Hitt et al., 1999) and innovativeness (Sethi et al., 
2001) of cross-functional new product teams. 
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Similarly, Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1994) recognized the importance of 
top management support for the timeliness of new product introduction. In a more 
recent meta-analysis of the determinants of new product performance, Henard and 
Szymanski (2001) found that senior management support has a positive 
relationship with new product performance. Top management support could come 
in the form of presenting a vision for the future, communicating a distinctive 
product concept, giving approval to a project team to go ahead with a new idea, or 
providing necessary resources. Based on the above research, there seems to be a 
widely shared belief that top management plays a key role in new product 
introduction. In terms of identifying the specific characteristics of top managers 
that could influence the order and timing of new product moves, we refer to the 
study by Murthi et al. (1996) that measured managerial efficiency with respect to 
marketing and production areas and linked it to order of entry. However, in 
addition to the functional (e.g., marketing, production) skills of top management, 
there could be other important characteristics of top management - such as their 
experience, expertise, and cognitive diversity - that could affect their innovation 
and risk-taking capabilities and influence the order and timing of new product 
moves by their firms. Accordingly, previous research (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1990; Jackson, 1992; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992), has demonstrated that the 
skills, market knowledge, and background of the decision maker influence 
strategic choices. Srivastava and Lee (2005) found that certain entrepreneurial 
activity, such as a new product introduction, requires a strategic decision, and it is 
the top management of the firm that decides whether and when to introduce a new 
product. Moreover, the upper echelon perspective links top management 
demography to several important outcomes, such as strategic change (Grimm and 
Smith, 1991; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992), firm performance (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1990; Smith et al., 1994), and innovation (Bantel and Jackson, 1989). 
Thus, research suggests that a top management team that is behaviorally 
integrated, features a decentralization of responsibilities, and is risk inclined and 
characterized by a system of compensation based on long-term performance is 
positively associated with Corporate Entrepreneurship (Ling et al., 2008).  
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The influence of ownership and governance on Corporate 
Entrepreneurship 
Ownership structure of a firm can be investigated from a number of 
perspectives. Commonly ownership structure refers either to ownership 
concentration or to ownership by different groups of blockholders (Lappalainen 
and Niskanen, 2009). Ownership determines a company’s relationship with 
shareholders and its investment horizons. Corporate Entrepreneurship also 
requires a long term view. Thus, when major shareholders own stock in a 
company for a long period, they are in a position to increase executives’ interest 
in Corporate Entrepreneurship. Moreover, the existence of a major shareholder 
leads to better monitoring of executives’ decisions and ensures attention is given 
to Corporate Entrepreneurship (Zahra, 1996). Based on the review of the previous 
literature, the influence of ownership on Corporate Entrepreneurship involves 
investigating how corporate ownership affects managers’ willingness to take risks 
(Jones and Butler, 1992). This is because executives are usually responsible for 
championing, evaluating and integrating entrepreneurial initiatives into a 
company’s formal structure (Burgelman, 1984; Zahra, 1996). As they usually 
have a short term perspective and are usually risk-averse, it is important that 
corporate ownership and firm’s governance system are able to spur and improve 
executives’ interest in Corporate Entrepreneurship activities. Previous research 
has found that positive factors increasing the level of Corporate Entrepreneurship 
within a firm include the ownership of some stakes by executives, ownership by 
an institutional or powerful shareholder, and the involvement of outside directors 
with ownership (Zahra, 1996; Zahra et al., 2000). For example, unwillingness to 
support Corporate Entrepreneurship may stem from executives' lack of ownership 
interest in the companies they manage (Wright et al., 1996). Lack of stock 
ownership may cause executives to behave opportunistically by supporting 
projects that increase their own wealth and further ensure their job security. Lack 
of ownership may also discourage executives from supporting Corporate 
Entrepreneurship projects that may put their salaried positions in jeopardy (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). A way to promote managerial support for Corporate 
Entrepreneurship is to increase managers' ownership stakes in the companies they 
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run. Increased ownership makes executives' wealth more dependent on their 
company's long-term performance, which gives executives the incentive to pursue 
long-term Corporate Entrepreneurship projects (Jenkins and Seiler, 1990). Stock 
ownership can also empower managers to initiate and champion Corporate 
Entrepreneurship activities (Finkelstein and D'Aveni. 1994) such as innovation 
and venturing initiatives designed to increase the long-term value of the firm (Hitt 
et al., 1994). Motivated by their ownership stake and the desire to accumulate 
wealth, these manager-owners will support the Corporate Entrepreneurship 
projects they believe will have the greatest potential impact on their firms’ long-
term financial performance. When the wealth of executives and shareholders are 
closely aligned, the pursuit of innovation and domestic and international venturing 
is expected to increase (Zahra et al., 2000). 
This theme is relevant because Corporate Entrepreneurship can enhance 
shareholders’ value. The creation of new wealth is one of the foundational 
objectives of entrepreneurial activities (Vorzikis et al., 1999; Hitt et al., 2001). An 
important field connected to this is the role of the board in supporting Corporate 
Entrepreneurship activities. This is because a corporate governance system – the 
mechanism that regulates the relationship between executives and shareholders – 
can profoundly shape managers’ commitment to Corporate Entrepreneurship. 
Thus, a strong and vigilant board of directors can encourage managers to support 
and pursue entrepreneurial activity (Zahra, 2006). In the next chapter we will 
concentrate our attention on the role of the board in sustaining Corporate 
Entrepreneurship, considering it as a real source of entrepreneurial activities 
within the firm. 
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Chapter 2. The board of directors’ involvement with 
Corporate Entrepreneurship: the impact of the board’s 
attributes 
2.1. Board’s role in Corporate Entrepreneurship 
Corporate Entrepreneurship is any effort to develop and combine corporate 
resources in new ways, to create a new business or originate a strategic renewal to 
create additional value for a firm (Guth and Ginsberg, 1990; Sharma and 
Chrisman, 1999). Thus, the creation of wealth is the objective of entrepreneurial 
activities (Vorzikis et al., 1999; Hitt et al., 2001) and a board’s support is one of 
the most important factors in encouraging and promoting Corporate 
Entrepreneurship. (Zahra, 1996; Zahra et al., 2000; Zahra et al., 2009)37. This 
important role in sustaining Corporate Entrepreneurship can be understood by 
considering the principal functions that the board must perform within a firm38. 
Research on the role of the board has been guided by four distinct theoretical 
perspectives that represent four different views about what directors should do 
within an organization (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Johnson et al., 1996). 
 The first is the so called legalistic perspective. This approach suggests that 
the main function of boards of directors is carried out their legally mandated 
responsibilities. Thus, boards are responsible for corporate leadership without 
                                                          
37
 Short et al. (1999) wrote, “Building on the arguments advanced by Tricker (1984), Keasey and 
Wright (1993) emphasized the need to view corporate governance as having two broad 
dimensions. First, the monitoring of management performance and ensuring accountability of 
management to shareholders emphasizes the stewardship and accountability dimensions of 
corporate governance. Second, governance structures and processes need to encompass 
mechanisms for motivating managerial behavior towards increasing the wealth of the business; 
that is, to enhance enterprise”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 337-352: 338. 
38
 The Corporate Governance Committee, in the recent review of Corporate Governance Code, 
argue that “Board of Directors has the primary responsibility for determining and pursuing the 
strategic objectives of the issuer and of the group of which it is a member or which it heads.” Thus, 
we can highlight that also the guidelines of Italian Stock Exchange seems assign to the board of 
directors a role in the strategic development of the firm. 
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interfering in day to day activities, that are the responsibility of the CEO and 
senior executives. According to this perspective, the principal tasks of a board 
consist of selecting and replacing the CEO, representing the interests of the firm’s 
shareholders, providing advice and counsel to top management, and serving as a 
control mechanism by monitoring managerial and company performance 
(Carpenter, 1988; Ewing, 1979; Mattar and Ball, 1985; Mueller, 1979; Vance, 
1983; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Thus, the legalistic approach posits that a board 
must perform two primary roles: service and control. The service role involves 
increasing company reputation, establishing contacts with the external 
environment, and actively supporting executives (Louden, 1982; Carpenter, 
1988). The control role involves evaluating the adequacy of the organizational, 
administrative and accounting structure, and the general performance of the 
company and CEO to ensure corporate growth and the protection of shareholder 
interests (Louden, 1982; Chapin, 1986). Hence, according to this approach, a 
board is not expected to initiate strategies or develop policies. Instead it is 
responsible for reviewing and approving managerial initiatives that will determine 
company performance (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
The second perspective is the resource dependence approach. This theory 
views boards as an important source of information for executives. Moreover, 
because of their prestige in their communities, directors are able to obtain 
resources for successful company operation (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). As a 
consequence, the board can enhance the firm’s legitimacy in society and help it 
achieve its efficiency and performance goals (Pfeffer, 1972; 1973, Price 1963). 
Thus, directors can help firms interface with the general and competitive 
environments and collect resources and consensus. The resource dependence 
perspective views board roles more broadly than the legalistic approach. Hence, 
the theory suggests that boards of directors have another important role in addition 
to their control and service roles: a strategic role. In other words, a board may be 
actively involved in the strategic arena by providing counsel and advice to the 
CEO, by initiating its own analyses, or by suggesting alternatives (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989). 
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The third approach is the class hegemony perspective. This approach find 
its roots in Marxist sociology (Mills, 1956; Ratcliff, 1980), and views boards as a 
means of perpetuating the powers of the capitalist elite. According to this theory, 
the board of directors reflects a shared commitment among capitalists to control 
social and economic institutions, and thus wealth (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
Evidence for this principal function of the board is the fact that only the most 
influential and prestigious individuals are invited to participate on a board. As a 
consequence, the exclusion of other social groups allows capitalists to protect 
their values and interests. Disregarding the fact that in the modern ownership 
structure other social groups – such as institutional investors, the state, and 
employees - can own significant blocks of corporate stock, this “negative” 
perspective considers service and control as the principal tasks of a board of 
directors, and in the interest of the capitalist elite.  
The fourth perspective is the agency theory. This approach is among the 
most recognized in the literature on board roles and contributions. This theory 
suggests that agency relationship is the focal point in analyzing corporate 
governance mechanisms. Agency theorists believe that because of the dispersion 
of corporate ownership, executives possess considerable freedom and powers of 
action. Left alone with their short term vision and reward system (Jacobs 1991), 
these executives may pursue objectives that could be conflict with the goals of 
shareholders. According to this perspective, shareholders can use the board of 
directors to monitor executives and ensure a focus on long term value creation 
(Zahra, 1996). The board is seen as the mechanism of corporate control, and its 
principal function is to monitor and reward top executives for maximizing 
shareholders’ wealth. Despite the importance that agency theory ascribes to the 
monitoring function and, thus, to the control role of a board of directors, it is 
important to note that service and strategic roles are also primary tasks of 
directors. In particular, agency theory assigns a premium value to the board’s 
involvement in and contribution to the articulation of the firm’s mission, the 
development of the firm’s strategy, and the setting of guidelines for 
implementation and effective control of the chosen strategy (e.g., acquiring a new 
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firm, divesting a division, or entering a new market) (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; 
Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
There are two other interest approaches that can help in understanding board 
involvement and contributions within a firm: those proposed by institutional 
theory and by social network theory (Lynall et al., 2003). 
 According to institutional theory, organizations reflect the enduring rules 
that have been institutionalized and legitimized by their social environments (Di 
Maggio and Powell, 1983). This perspective suggests that a board’s composition 
and process reflect the prevailing institutionalized norms in the organizational 
field and society. Thus, a board of directors, in performing its tasks, is influenced 
by societal norms (Zayac and Westphal, 1996). While this theory does not 
propose a specific board role, it highlights the selection of the CEO, decisions 
about executives compensation, and explaining the adoption of CEO incentive 
plans to shareholders as the main functions of a board of directors. 
Social network theory (Granovetter, 1985) suggests that demographic 
similarity among board members reflects the social networks of the principal 
stakeholders (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Lynall et al., 2003). According to this 
perspective, the board can enable the firm to create a network without the full cost 
of true vertical integration and benefit from the construction of network exchange 
structures, where different directors – especially the outsiders – are critical 
resource suppliers (Lynall et al., 2003). Thus, this approach emphasizes the 
service role of the board, in view of the importance of network formation on the 
reputation, trust, reciprocity, and mutual interdependence of the firms (Larson, 
1992). 
 We would now concentrate on the board’s specific role in Corporate 
Entrepreneurship, drawing some observations from the different approaches 
discussed above. 
 Literature on a board’s role in Corporate Entrepreneurship suggests various 
tasks in which directors can be involved in order to promote entrepreneurial 
activities39. Thus, on one hand, a board can establish safeguards against 
                                                          
39
 Bianchi Martini et al. (2006) wrote: “Il consiglio di amministrazione è l’organo centrale 
dell’assetto istituzionale delle società italiane e riveste un ruolo primario nel tracciare gli indirizzi 
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managerial opportunism and evaluate managers’ activity in the exploitation of 
entrepreneurial opportunities. To champion and develop entrepreneurial 
initiatives, managers require motivation, opportunity and skills. Corporate 
Entrepreneurship activities are often time consuming, expensive and high risk. 
Hence, some managers may not have the sufficient motivation to cultivate these 
entrepreneurial activity. For this reason, a strong and vigilant board is essential to 
promote Corporate Entrepreneurship within a firm40. A strong and vigilant board 
is able to monitor executives’ strategic decisions and  align the interests of top 
management and shareholders (Zahra and Pierce 1989; Lynall et al., 2003; Zahra 
et al., 2009).  
On the other hand, a board can also serve as a provider of resources that are 
essential for the firm to exploit new opportunities (Zahra and Pierce 1989; Lynall 
et al., 2003; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Zahra et al., 2009). Boards are a potential 
source of cognitive resources that may be valuable in the strategic decision 
                                                                                                                                                              
di sviluppo dell’azienda”, La Governance delle Società Quotate, Milano, Franco Angeli. 
Concerning the role of board A. Melis (2002), wrote: “Sebbene i ruoli e le responsabilità del 
Consiglio di Amministrazione mutano al variare delle concezione di corporate governance proprie 
di ogni prospettiva e contesto, la rilevanza di tale organo nel sistema di corporate governance 
appare essere un vero e proprio principio generalmente accettato. In generale è opportuno 
effettuare una distinzione fra le funzioni di management e quelle di corporate governante. […] 
all’Alta direzione spettano i compiti di management, mentre il Consiglio di Amministrazione 
svolge le funzioni di corporate governante. Nell’ambito delle funzioni di management rientrano le 
aree e le funzioni della gestione operativa delle attività aziendali e della pianificazione delle 
strategie e messa in atto delle politiche aziendali. Tali compiti spettano all’alta direzione (ed agli 
organi ad essa sottoposti). Nell’ambito della corporate governante rientrano le funzioni di 
supervisione dell’operato dell’alta direzione, dell’accountability nei confronti degli stakeholder 
aziendali riconosciuti come legittimi e dell’approvazione delle strategie aziendali. A tali ruoli è, o 
perlomeno dovrebbe essere, preposto il Consiglio di Amministrazione, inteso nel senso ampio del 
termine (ovvero comprendendo eventuali organi di controllo). Entrambi gli organi, Alta direzione 
e Consiglio di Amministrazione, dovrebbero essere coinvolti nel processo strategico […] Il 
Consiglio di Amministrazione, come supremo organo di amministrazione dell’impresa, assume, o 
perlomeno dovrebbe, un ruolo rilevante anche nella formulazione del processo strategico e nella 
implementazione delle conseguenti politiche aziendali”, Creazione di valore e meccanismi di 
corporate governante, Milano, Giuffrè. 
40
 Zattoni, A. (2006), wrote: “Secondo gli studiosi di management, il ruolo del consiglio di 
amministrazione nel processo decisionale strategico comprende varie attività, come 
l’identificazione del piano di azione in cui l’impresa intende operare (la cosiddetta strategia di 
portafoglio), la definizione della vision e della missione aziendale, la selezione delle varie 
alternative strategiche a disposizione dell’azienda. Il coinvolgimento attivo del consiglio nel 
processo decisionale strategico è solitamente considerato un fattore importante ai fini del 
raggiungimento di un solido vantaggio competitivo”, Assetti Proprietari e Corporate Governance, 
Milano, Egea. 
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process (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Rindova, 1999). Because of their 
backgrounds in other firms and industries, outside directors bring new knowledge 
(Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996), fresh perspectives (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992), 
and different problem-solving styles (Rindova, 1999) to the decision-making task 
(Fiegener, 2005). Thus, a board can provide top management with access to 
external resources, and assemble and deploy these resources in combination with 
firm’s existing resources, using these new combinations to explore and exploit 
new entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Furthermore, a board can help a firm’s top management team identify 
opportunities for growth by giving attention to Corporate Entrepreneurship and 
innovation activities (Uhlaner et al., 2007; Zahra et al., 2009). A board can 
encourage Corporate Entrepreneurship activities by focusing management’s 
efforts on the pursuit of a viable long term strategy. Charan (1998) suggested that 
the boardroom is a potential source of creative thinking about new opportunities 
for growth. Directors can also use their different skills and experience to help top 
management discover and champion entrepreneurial opportunities. Thus, a 
director's knowledge and skills represent an important attribute in the board's 
strategic work (Zahra and Pearce, 1990; Huse, 1995). Literature has pointed out 
that directors often lack the appropriate skills to provide counsel or execute 
effective control over the CEO and management (Pearce and Zahra, 1992). 
Consequently, directors require various kinds of knowledge and skills to 
contribute to strategic decision making on the board. Without firm specific 
knowledge, the board can neither question the actions of management nor give 
advice on issues concerning products or the market. Additionally, the existence of 
general knowledge among directors may be a critical component of board's 
service effectiveness (Gabrielsson and Winlun, 2000). 
Prior studies have examined the role of the board in sustaining Corporate 
Entrepreneurship focusing primarily on agency problems (Jones and Butler, 1992; 
Zahra 1996; Zahra et al., 2000; Fiegner, 2005; Brunninge et al., 2007). Agency 
theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) suggests that promoting Corporate 
Entrepreneurship requires a strong and independent board that monitors, evaluates 
and challenges top management team (Zahra et al., 2000). Researchers have 
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investigated board size, representation of outside directors, outside directors’ 
stock ownership and the separation of CEO and chair position as conditions that 
affect the board’s ability to monitor and evaluate management and encourage 
Corporate Entrepreneurship within the firm (Zahra 1996; Zahra et al., 2000; 
Frigener, 2005; Brunnige et al., 2007)41. Therefore attention has been focused 
only on the control function of the board, which requires evaluating company and 
CEO performance to ensure corporate growth and the protection of shareholders’ 
                                                          
41
 Concerning the size of boards of directors Zahra et al. (2000) wrote: “Larger boards usually 
have directors with different functional backgrounds, education, and experiences (Alexander. 
Fennell, & Halpern. 1993; Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker. 1994), which is conducive to CE 
(Kanter, 1986). Larger boards can also effectively connect the company to its competitive 
environment and give the firm information about its domestic and international markets.[..]Beyond 
some point, increasing the size of the board may actually become dysfunctional and reduce CE. As 
the board continues to grow, communications may break down and coordination among directors 
may decline (Clendenin, 1972). This, in turn, reduces directors' abilities to effectively participate 
in board deliberations and adequately monitor management (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998).[..] Given 
the relationship between board size and its ability to process information effectively, CE will 
initially rise as the size of the board increases, but then begin to fall at a point where adding more 
members becomes dysfunctional,” Entrepreneurship in Medium Size Companies: Exploring the 
Effects of Ownership and Governance Systems, Journal of Management, 2000, Vol. 26, No. 5, 
947-976, p. 954. Concerning the representation of outside directors, they wrote, “Some research 
has shown that the proportion of outsiders on a company's board is positively associated with 
directors' strategic involvement (Johnson et al., 1993; Judge & Zeithaml. 1992). This involvement 
usually enables directors to become familiar with the firm's innovation and venturing initiatives. 
Outside directors' knowledge of different companies competing in domestic and international 
markets may further broaden the board's perspective and alert executives to promising CE 
opportunities. In this capacity, outside directors can also serve as active boundary spanners 
between the company and its external environment - a role that can promote CE (Miller, 1983),”  
Entrepreneurship in Medium Size Companies: Exploring the Effects of Ownership and 
Governance Systems, Journal of Management, 2000, Vol. 26, No. 5, 947-976, p. 955. However, 
literature has different beliefs about this relationship. In particular, Judge and Zeithaml (1992) 
suggested that boards can be more effective and involved when insiders are better represented 
because there may have been better information flow within the boardrooms. Concerning 
outsiders’ stock ownership, Zahra et al. wrote: “Increased stock ownership can motivate outside 
directors to become more actively involved in monitoring management and ensuring an effective 
alignment between the interests of executives and shareholders (Kren and Kerr, 1997; Johnson et 
al., 1993). Ownership can also empower outside directors to challenge management (Finklestein, 
1992).” Concerning CEO duality they wrote: “Agency theorists propose that by separating the 
positions of the chair and the CEO, directors will have greater independence in performing their 
roles of monitoring, evaluating, and disciplining the CEO (Daily and Dalton, 1997). When the 
CEO and board chair positions are separated, the CEO is less able to control the agenda of the 
board meeting. Under these conditions, directors can encourage the firm to focus on long-term 
activities by tying executives' rewards and compensation to the pursuit of CE and using support of 
long-term initiatives as a criterion in evaluating CEO performance (Zabra, 1996)., 
Entrepreneurship in Medium Size Companies: Exploring the Effects of Ownership and 
Governance Systems, Journal of Management, 2000, Vol. 26, No. 5, 947-976, p. 955-956. 
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interests (Chapin, 1986). Kuratko et al. (1993) stressed the importance of control 
and evaluation for corporate entrepreneurship. Kanter (1989) also considered 
formal controls essential for corporate entrepreneurship project selection 
(Antoncic and Hisrich, 2004). Thus, the board serves as a keeper of shareholders 
by monitoring management to ensure that shareholders’ interests are pursued 
(Johnson et al., 1996; Lynall et al., 2003). The board serves as a wealth protector 
(Filatotchev and Wright 2005; Zahra et al., 2009). 
From a resource-based perspective (Barney, 1991; Barney et al., 2001) the 
board is a potential provider of resources used to promote Corporate 
Entrepreneurship and create new wealth (Pfeffer, 1972; Zald, 1969; Gabrielsson 
and Winlund, 2000; Filatotchev and Wright, 2005; Zahra et al., 2009). The board 
can provide knowledge and resources that enable executives to pursue 
entrepreneurial opportunities that benefit shareholders through improved firm 
performance (Keasy and Wright, 1993; Zahra et al., 2009). The board can identify 
viable opportunities for growth by giving attention to Corporate Entrepreneurship 
and innovation activities that allow the company to create new wealth; it is also a 
potential source of creative thinking about new opportunities for growth and 
innovative ideas. The board can share useful information for making effective 
strategic choices, and can ensure that members of the top management team have  
the knowledge, skills, and abilities to help the company grow (Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003; Zahra et al., 2009; Tuggle et al., 2010). Finally, the board can align 
the interests of managers and the firm, thereby encouraging wealth creation and 
Corporate Entrepreneurship by providing resources (Huse, 2007).  
The board’s provision of resources involves a variety of specific activities, 
including providing legitimacy to the public image of the firm (Selznick, 1949), 
providing expertise (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990), administering advice and 
counsel (Lorsch and Maclver, 1989; Mintzberg, 1983), linking the firm to 
important stakeholders or other important entities (Hillman et al., 2001), 
facilitating access to resources such as capital (Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988), 
building external relations, diffusing innovation (Haunschild and Beckman, 
1998), and aiding in the formulation of  strategy and other important firm 
decisions (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Lorsch and Maclver, 1989). The theoretical 
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tie between these various activities is that they all focus on the board as a provider 
of resources (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). According to resource based theory 
(Barney, 1991), these resource should ensure a firm’s wealth creation. 
As described above, prior studies have presented different roles for the 
board (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Johnson et al., 1996; Uhlaner et al., 2007; 
Petrovic, 2008). Several theories have been put forward to explain the role of the 
board and its impact on firm performance. Several researchers have indicated that 
the board’s primary roles are service and control (Berle and Means, 1968). 
Service means enhancing the company’s reputation, establishing contact with the 
external environment and giving counsel and advice to executives (Louden, 
1982). The control role involves evaluating the adequacy of the organizational, 
administrative and accounting structure, and the general performance of the 
company and CEO to ensure corporate growth and the protection of shareholder 
wealth (Louden, 1982). Other researchers have suggested that the board may be 
actively involved in strategic decisions through counsel and advice to the CEO, by 
initiating their own analyses, or by suggesting alternatives (Pfeffer, 1972).42  
                                                          
42
 The Corporate Governance Code describes the functions of Board of Directors as follow: “The 
Board of Directors shall: a) examine and approve the strategic, operational and financial plans of 
both the issuer and the corporate group it heads, monitoring periodically the related 
implementation;; it defines the issuer’s corporate governance and the relevant group structure; b) 
define the risk profile, both as to nature and level of risks, in a manner consistent with the issuer’s 
strategic objectives; c) evaluate the adequacy of the organizational, administrative and accounting 
structure of the issuer as well as of its strategically significant subsidiaries in particular with regard 
to the internal control system and risk management; d) specify the frequency, in any case no less 
than once every three months, with which the delegated bodies must report to the Board on the 
activities performed in the exercise of the powers delegated to them; e) evaluate the general 
performance of the company, paying particular attention to the information received from the 
delegated bodies and periodically comparing the results achieved with those planned; f) resolve 
upon transactions to be carried out by the issuer or its controlled companies having a significant 
impact on the issuer’s strategies, profitability, assets and liabilities or financial position; to this 
end, the Board shall establish general criteria for identifying the material transactions; h) perform 
at least annually an evaluation of the performance of the Board of Directors and its committees, as 
well as their size and composition, taking into account the professional competence, experience 
(including managerial experience) gender of its members and number of years as director. Where 
the Board of Directors avails of consultants for such a self-assessment, the Corporate Governance 
Report shall provide information on other services, if any, performed by such consultants to the 
issuer or to companies having a control relationship with the issuer; i) taking into account the 
outcome of the evaluation mentioned under the previous item g), report its view to shareholders on 
the professional profiles deemed appropriate for the composition of the Board of Directors, prior to 
its nomination; j) provide information in the Corporate Governance Report on (1) its composition, 
  
62 
 
We consider that all these functions may be encapsulated in two main roles. 
The first role is control and monitoring function. According to this perspective, 
one of the main tasks of the board is to protect shareholders’ wealth by ensuring 
manager accountability and minimizing agency cost (Zahra et al., 2009). The 
second is the “entrepreneurial” function (Uhlnaer et al., 2007). Thus, the second 
main task of directors is to create new wealth by providing new knowledge and 
resources, giving advice to executives to promote innovative activities, aiding in 
the strategy’s formulation and giving attention to Corporate Entrepreneurship 
(Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Short et al., 1999; Filatotchev and Wright, 2005; 
Zahra et al., 2009; Tuggle et al., 2010). Thus, the board of directors should 
balance between wealth protection and wealth creation in order to ensure, 
encourage and promote Corporate Entrepreneurship within the firm43.  
This approach leads to some important questions: (i) how should a board of 
directors that must balance minimizing agency problems and creating new wealth 
be structured? (ii) how should a board designed to balance these important tasks 
function? (iii) What structural and functional differences might there be between a 
board designed to protect shareholders’ value, and a board designed to create new 
wealth (Filatotchev and Wright, 2005)? 
                                                                                                                                                              
indicating for each member the relevant role held within the Board of Directors (including by way 
of example, chairman or chief executive officer, as defined by article 2), the main professional 
characteristics as well as the duration of his/her office since the first appointment; (2) the 
application of article 1 of this Code and, in particular, on the number and average duration of 
meetings of the Board and of the executive committee, if any, held during the fiscal year, as well 
as the related percentage of attendance of each director; (3) how the self-assessment procedure as 
at previous item g) has developed; k) in order to ensure the correct handling of corporate 
information, adopt, upon proposal of the managing director or the chairman of the Board of 
Directors, internal procedures for the internal handling and disclosure to third parties of 
information concerning the issuer, having special regard to price sensitive information”. 
43
 The need for this balancing effect originates from a series of compromises that a firm mast make 
to ensure an adequate level of Corporate Entrepreneurship. In particular, we refer to compromises 
concerning level of strategy, culture, structure, control, and human resources, as discussed in the 
first chapter. For example, Antoncic and Hisrich (2004) argued that formal controls for monitoring  
entrepreneurial activities are positively associated with Corporate Entrepreneurship, but may, 
when excessive, inhibit Corporate Entrepreneurship and wealth creation, Corporate 
entrepreneurship contingencies and organizational wealth creation, Journal of Management 
Development, 2004, Vol. 23, I. 6, p. 518-550). 
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In the next section we attempt to examine how board’s composition, 
characteristics, structure and process may influence wealth creation and wealth 
protection.  
2.2. The board’s attributes and their influence on Corporate 
Entrepreneurship 
Zahra and Pearce (1989), after a review of the principal theoretical 
perspectives, identified four “board attributes”44: composition, characteristics 
(demographic characteristics and board personality), structure and process.  
Board composition includes the size of the board and the mix of director 
types. Size refers to the number of directors in the board room. Type refers to the 
widely recognized dichotomy between inside and outside directors45 and the 
                                                          
44
 Attributes determine a board’s undertaking of its role and, ultimately, its contributions to 
company performance. They are the results of the review conducted by Zahra and Pearce (1989) of 
the theoretical perspective on the roles of board of directors and described in the previous page of 
this work. 
45
 The Italian Corporate Governance Code sets that “2.P.1. The Board of Directors shall be made 
up of executive and non-executive directors, who should be adequately competent and 
professional. 2.P.2. Non-executive directors shall bring their specific expertise to Board 
discussions and contribute to the adoption of fully informed decisions paying particular care to the 
areas where conflicts of interest may exist. 2.P.3. The number, competence, authority and time 
availability of non-executive directors shall be such as to ensure that their judgment may have a 
significant impact on the taking of Board’s decisions. 3.P.1. An adequate number of non-executive 
directors shall be independent, in the sense that they do not maintain, directly or indirectly or on 
behalf of third parties, nor have recently maintained any business relationships with the issuer or 
persons linked to the issuer, of such a significance as to influence their autonomous judgment”. 
The UK Combined Code of Corporate Governance recognizes a specific task of non executive 
directors, pointed that “Non-executive directors should scrutinize the performance of management 
in meeting agreed goals and objectives and monitor the reporting of performance. They should 
satisfy themselves on the integrity of financial information and that financial controls and systems 
of risk management are robust and defensible. They are responsible for determining appropriate 
levels of remuneration of executive directors and have a prime role in appointing and, where 
necessary, removing executive directors, and in succession planning” (A.4). Moreover, the Code 
highlights that “The board should appoint one of the independent non-executive directors to be the 
senior independent director to provide a sounding board for the chairman and to serve as an 
intermediary for the other directors when necessary. The senior independent director should be 
available to shareholders if they have concerns which contact through the normal channels of 
chairman, chief executive or other executive directors has failed to resolve or for which such 
contact is inappropriate” (A.4.1). Concerning the board composition and the definition of insider 
and outsider Fortuna F. (2002) wrote: “La composizione del Board si caratterizza per la 
contemporanea presenza di amministratori esecutivi e non esecutivi, tra i quali quelli indipendenti. 
Ai primi sono attribuiti deleghe e funzioni direttive; gli amministratori non esecutivi, invece 
contribuiscono, con le proprie competenze, alla predisposizione di opportune azioni strategiche e 
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representation of minorities. Outsiders46 are not members of the top management 
team, their associates, or families; are not employees of the firm or its 
subsidiaries; and are not members of the immediate past top management group 
(Jones & Goldberg, 1982). They also have contacts outside a firm and typically 
bring a broader range of experience because of their contacts with different 
companies and industries (Kesner, 1988). Insiders are board members who are 
current or former employees of a firm or who are otherwise closely affiliated with 
the firm (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992). Minority representation refers to the status 
of ethnic minorities and the representation of females on the board. These 
directors are presumed to reflect the values of society at large, not only those of 
shareholders (Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  
Characteristics consists of two components. The first, directors' 
background, includes the age, educational background, values and experience of 
directors. These qualities manifest themselves in the choices that directors make 
(Hambrick, 1987). Literature concerns “demographic characteristics” (Petrovic, 
2008). Previous scholars have highlighted a positive link between directors’ 
demographic similarity and interpersonal trust, which results in a more open 
communication among board members, more frequent informal social interaction 
among them, and greater willingness to share concerns about strategy in board 
meetings (Westphal and Bednar, 2005).  
The second component concerns those qualities that go beyond directors' 
individual or collective characteristics and reflect the "personality" of the board. 
Board scholars have suggested that boards develop their own personalities, with 
                                                                                                                                                              
di controllo”, Corporate Governance – Soggetti, Modelli e Sistemi, Milano, Franco Angeli. 
Actually the importance of a right mix of insider and outsider appears also in the Corporate 
Governance code that maintain “The non-executive directors enrich the Board’s discussion with 
competences  formed outside the company, having a general strategic character or a specific 
technical one. Such competences permit to analyze the different matters under discussion from 
different standpoints and, therefore, contribute to nourish the dialectics that is the distinctive 
precondition for a meditated informed corporate decision. The contribution of non-executive 
directors appears to be useful on such subject matters in which the interests of executive directors 
and those of the shareholders may not coincide, such as the remuneration of the executive directors 
and in relation to the internal control and risk management systems”. 
46 Outsider can be non executive or independent directors, see Zattoni, A. (2006), Assetti 
Proprietari e Corporate Governance, Milano, Egea. 
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distinct styles or modes of operation (Lynch, 1979; Mueller, 1981). This 
personality reflects a board's disposition to focus on internal issue, such as 
efficiency, rather than external issues (Pearce, 1983); the level of directors' 
independence from management influence (Geneen, 1984); and directors’ vested 
interest in the firm as evidenced by stock ownership (Kesner, 1987). Board 
personality is believed to be more enduring than the characteristics of individual 
directors (Lynch, 1979). This personality is thought to change only if a quantum 
change occurs in board composition and directors' background variables (Zahra 
and Pearce, 1989). 
 Board structure refers to the dimensions of the board's organization. Most 
decision making by directors takes place in smaller groups or committees (Bacon 
and Brown, 1973). The Corporate Governance Code and the Supervisory Agency 
(e.g. SEC, and Consob) have considered these subgroups an important tool for 
monitoring corporate activity. Furthermore, members of these groups tend to hold 
the greatest power and influence over corporate affairs (Kesner, 1988). Thus, 
research on board structure covers the number and types of committees, 
committee membership, the flow of information among these committees, board 
leadership, and patterns of committee membership.  
Process involves the approach the board takes in making decisions. Past 
research shows that the board process embodies five elements: the frequency and 
length of meetings, CEO-board interface, level of consensus among directors on 
issues at hand, formality of board proceedings, and the extent to which the board 
is involved in evaluating itself (Mueller, 1979; Vance, 1983). Researchers have 
argued that the context of a board’s meeting—its degree of formality or 
informality—can shape the board in a way that either enhances or constrains the 
discussion of entrepreneurial issues. Meetings can be structured and run in a 
formal environment, reducing open communication. Alternately, meetings can be 
loosely structured and run informally in a casual environment, facilitating more 
open communication. Informal relationships can create a greater capacity for 
information sharing and mutual problem solving (Hansen and Lovas, 2004; 
Tuggle et al., 2010). In the following sections we will analyze how each attribute 
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can affect Corporate Entrepreneurship activity within the firm, and impact the 
board’s ability to protect and create new wealth. 
Figure 3. The influence of the board’s attributes on Corporate Entrepreneurship 
2.2.1. Board composition: size and types of director 
As mentioned above, the attribute of composition mostly concerns the size 
of the board and the mix of director types.  
Board size is a well-studied board characteristic. Researchers have found 
empirical evidence that the number of directors may influence how the board 
functions, and, thus, corporate performance. It may also influence the way 
directors perform their tasks (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and determine their abilities 
to promote Corporate Entrepreneurship (Van de Berghe and Levrau, 2004; Zahra 
et al., 2000; Dalton et al., 1999). In particular, the size of the board can affect 
directors' ability to quickly and effectively process information about Corporate 
Entrepreneurship (Haleblian and Finkeistein, 1993) and their motivation to focus 
on entrepreneurial issue. However, the same researchers have proposed different 
and conflicting results, as they have argued that board size can have both positive 
and negative effects on board performance. 
Resource theory has been the primary foundation for the concept that larger 
boards will be associated with higher levels of firm performance (Mintzberg, 
1983; Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). According to this view, 
board size could be a measure of an organization's ability to form environmental 
links to secure critical resources (Coodstein et al., 1994). Expanding the number 
of directors provides an increased pool of expertise because larger boards are 
Board composition 
Board characteristics 
Board structure 
Board process 
 Board’s role in 
Wealth Creation 
Corporate 
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likely to have more knowledge and skills at their disposal. Additionally, large 
boards may be able to draw on a variety of perspectives on corporate strategy and 
may reduce domination by the CEO47 (Van de Berghe and Levrau, 2004). 
Consequently board size has been found to be positively related to company size, 
diversification (Pearce and Zhara, 1992) and internationalization (Sanders and 
Carpenter, 1998). These findings imply that larger boards are better able to make 
significant contributions in strategy development because they integrate multiple 
perspectives and are able to develop more holistic alternative solutions (Ruigrok 
et al., 2006). Thus, larger boards are able to actively engage in the exploration and 
exploitation of new entrepreneurial opportunities, using the different networks of 
resources, knowledge and skills that directors are part of. As a board continues to 
grow, communication may break down and coordination among directors may 
decline (Clendenin, 1972). This, in turn, reduces directors' ability to effectively 
participate in board deliberations and adequately monitor management (Sanders 
and Carpenter, 1998). Increasing board size might significantly inhibit board 
processes because of potential group dynamic problems associated with large 
groups. Larger boards are more difficult to coordinate and may experience 
problems with communication and organization. Furthermore, large boards may 
face decreased levels of motivation and participation and may be prone to 
developing factions and coalitions (Van de Berghe and Levrau, 2004). Research 
on group processes has suggested that larger groups are associated with 
significant coordination costs (Ruigrok et al., 2006). These cost may come from a 
number of sources: it has been suggested that larger boards have more difficulty 
meeting frequently. The greater number of perspectives in larger boards might 
lead to conflict among directors, which can produce distrust, hostility and 
decreased motivation (Amason and Sapienza, 1997). Communication might be 
more formal; if so informal methods of coordination may be less effective (Cohen 
and Bailey, 1997). As a result, larger boards tend to be slower in decision making 
                                                          
47
 Concerning the way that board of directors can use to reduce the nomination of CEO, Forbes 
and Milliken (1999), for example, argue that a strong and cohesive board can require CEOs to 
explain, justify and possibly modify their position on important strategic issues and to entertain 
alternative perspective, or can more easily decide for a CEO replacement. 
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and less cohesive (Mueller and Baker, 1997). Additionally in larger groups, there 
is less time during board meetings for individual directors to speak. Therefore, 
individual members can more easily act as free riders and minimize their 
contributions (Golden and Zajac, 2001). An agency perspective would imply that 
large boards are more easily controlled by the CEO, who can use tactics like 
coalition building and selective provision of information ( Jensen, 1993). These 
considerations suggest that smaller boards may work better. 
 In effect, a smaller board can enhance directors' sense of participation and 
allow them to communicate more freely and frequently with the firm's senior 
executives. This participation often promotes cohesion among directors as they 
monitor and evaluate the CEO. For example, Jensen observed "When boards get 
beyond seven or eight people they are less likely to function effectively and are 
easier for the CEO to control" (1993: 865). Literature has also highlighted the fact 
that firms with greater growth opportunities tend to have smaller boards (Denis 
and Sarin, 1999). Moreover, prior scholars have shown that strategic board 
involvement requires active and cohesive directors who are able to intensely 
discuss and evaluate strategic opportunities during board meetings. 
 Thus, this stream of literature suggests that to protect shareholders’ wealth,  
a smaller board can make the group of directors more cohesiveness, participative, 
and able to reach consensus (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Dalton et al., 1999). This 
cohesion can increase board vigilance over the CEO’s decision making and curtail 
potential managerial opportunism (Yermack, 1996), and hence can increase the 
protection of shareholders’ wealth. Thus, a smaller board is better able to support 
Corporate Entrepreneurship activities, and drae the attention of the CEO and 
executives to the exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunity, which that can 
ensure a certain level of wealth for the firm’s shareholders.  
However, to create new wealth for shareholders, a larger board may enable 
access to useful resources (Dalton et al., 1999), may operate as a potential source 
of creative thinking about new opportunities for growth (Tuggle et al., 2010), and 
may increase the ability of directors to process information about environmental 
and entrepreneurial opportunities to create wealth. Thus, a larger board may be 
better able to spur Corporate Entrepreneurship activities and advise and suggest 
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the exploration of new entrepreneurial opportunities to the CEO and Top 
Management Team. The exploitation of these activities can create new wealth for 
corporate shareholders. 
Despite these considerations, we must recognize that a minimum number of 
directors is needed to guarantee the required balance between shareholder wealth 
protection and wealth creation and, thus, allow the board to fulfil its role in 
promoting and sustaining Corporate Entrepreneurship within the firm.  
However, literature has highlighted some other important aspects that could 
complicate the evaluation of the influence of board composition on Corporate 
Entrepreneurship. For example, according to Fiegener et al., (2000) smaller 
boards composed of a large proportion of directors who are somehow dependent 
upon the CEO via personal, professional, or economic relationships should be less 
powerful and less effective in the control role by virtue of the CEO's ability to 
influence individual directors (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Chaganti, Mahajan, 
and Sharma, 1985). Conversely, larger boards that are composed predominantly 
of really independent directors should be more effective monitors of executive 
self-interest because these directors focus more on financial performance (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Johnson et al., 1993), have an incentive to maintain their 
reputation (Fama and Jensen, 1983), and are not so indebted to the CEO (Patton 
and Baker, 1987).  
These considerations show the need to consider other dimension of board 
composition: the mix of different types of directors. The proportions of 
insider/outsider representation on a board is the most studied variable in corporate 
governance literature (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992). Studies focusing on agency 
theory have suggested that outside directors may play an important monitoring 
function on the top management team (Clarysse et al., 2007). Outsiders48 can 
                                                          
48
 Bianchi Martini et al. (2006) wrote: “Viene infatti stabilito che tale organo [that is the Board of 
Directors] si compone di membri esecutivi (amministratori delegate ed amministratori con 
incarichi direttivi) e non esecutivi (amministratori non titolari di deleghe e che non ricoprono 
funzioni direttive). I Consiglieri non esecutivi devono essere inoltre, per numero ed autorevolezza, 
tali da garantire che il loro giudizio possa avere un peso rilevante nelle decisioni del Consiglio. Gli 
amministratori non esecutivi, in virtù della loro estraneità alla gestione aziendale, dovrebbero poter 
valutare con maggior distacco le proposte e l’operato dei delegati. Inoltre , sempre secondo il 
codice, un numero adeguato di amministratori non esecutivi devono avere la qualifica di 
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ensure the pursuit of long term wealth creation by monitoring executives and 
encouraging Corporate Entrepreneurship. They can also bring awareness of 
innovations and new opportunities from their own industries into a firm’s 
boardroom (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Tuggle et al., 2010). Moreover, literature 
has suggested that outsiders are able to provide more objective oversight on 
strategic decision making than insiders (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992). From a 
resource based perspective, outsiders can better provide access to scarce or 
strategic resources (Lynall et al., 2003, Tuggle et al., 2010).  
These capabilities suggest that outsider directors play a crucial role in 
wealth protection and creation, but a question remains: how and by whom are 
outsiders selected? Literature has suggested that new board members will be 
recruited using rational criteria to increase diversity on a board (Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003). Thus, a board should be comprised of individuals with a range of 
different types of human and social capital that complement one other (Clarysse et 
al., 2007). Furthermore, a social network perspective suggests that board members 
will be recruited from the social network of the stakeholders in power. These 
considerations could suggest that a board with a large number of outside directors 
can improve the level of control over top management team and  increase the 
possibility of discovering and exploiting new opportunities to increase the level of 
Corporate Entrepreneurship. However, some doubts have been raised concerning 
whether outsiders are, in fact, in good position to make real contributions to 
                                                                                                                                                              
“indipendenti”, ossia: -non devono avere relazioni economiche con la società, con le sue 
controllate, con gli amministratori esecutivi o con gli azionisti di controllo, di rilevanza tale da 
influenzare l’autonomia di giudizio; -non devono essere titolari di partecipazioni azionarie che 
consentono loro di esercitare il controllo o un’influenza notevole sull’azienda; -non devono 
partecipare a patti parasociali per il controllo dell’azienda; -non devono essere stretti familiari di 
amministratori delegati o di soggetti che si trovano in posizioni previste dai punti precedenti”, La 
Governance delle Società Quotate, Milano, Franco Angeli. Concerning the USA context, Stuart 
and Kamensky (2002) wrote: “To be independent under the Act, an audit committee member may 
not accept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the company, except in his or 
her capacity as a member of the board or a board committee. Further, no member of the audit 
committee may be affiliated with the company, presumably meaning, subject to SEC rulemaking, 
that no one may be a member of the audit committee who has an influence, direct or indirect, over 
the management of the business or the affairs of the company or any subsidiary, or who is 
affiliated with a controlling shareholder”, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Imposes New Rules for 
Corporate Governance and Reporting, Bankruptcy Bulletin Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, September. 
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Corporate Entrepreneurship (Ruigrok et al., 2006). First, we argue that if  outside 
board members have human and social capital that are too different from the 
capabilities, skills, and knowledge within the firm, their contributions to 
Corporate Entrepreneurship may be limited49. Most importantly, outside board 
members have only limited time that they can invest in any individual board 
mandate (Ruigrok et al., 2006). They consequently lack the intimate knowledge 
and expertise concerning firm procedure and decision making. This is aggravated 
by the existence of board norms that make many topics problematic to discuss 
publicy(Lorsch and McIver, 1989). Given these informational disadvantages, 
outside directors could be more oriented toward measures of financial control; this 
orientation might reinforce executive behaviour that is short-term and low-risk 
oriented (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990).  
These considerations are reflected in the finding that firms with higher 
growth opportunities have fewer outsiders on their boards (Denis and Sarin, 
1999). Studies that focused on strategic choice perspective (Judge and Zeithaml, 
1992) have shown that boards tend to be more effective when insiders50 are better 
represented because they have better information flow within the boardroom. 
Prior researchers have found that insider representation is positively associated 
with strategy innovativeness (Hill and Snell, 1988) and the level of corporate 
R&D spending (Baysinger et al, 1991). Insiders have firm-specific knowledge and 
familiarity with the firm’s markets and established networks (Tuggle et al., 2010). 
They have useful information about the firm, its history, its strategy and its 
                                                          
49
 Concerning this point, the Corporate Governance Core sets: “(3.C.3) The number and 
competences of independent directors shall be adequate in relation to the size of the Board and the 
activity performed by the issuer; moreover, they must be such as to enable the constitution of 
committees within the Board, according to the indications set out in the Code”. Despite this norm 
we retain the problem mentioned in the text still relevant. 
50
 The Corporate Governance Code defines insider (or executives): “(2.C.1) -the managing 
directors of the issuer or a subsidiary having strategic relevance, including the relevant chairmen 
when these are granted individual management powers or when they play a specific role in the 
definition of the business strategies;- the directors vested with management duties within the issuer 
or in one of its subsidiaries having strategic relevance, or in a controlling company when the office 
concerns also the issuer; - the directors who are members of the executive committee of the issuer, 
when no managing director is appointed or when the participation in the executive committee, 
taking into account the frequency of the meetings and the scope of the relevant resolutions, entails, 
as a matter of fact, the systematic involvement of its members in the day-to-day management of 
the issuer”. 
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management style. Evidence suggests that insider directors are key elements in 
wealth creation as well. 
Therefore, in order to create new wealth, a board should achieve a balance 
between inside and outside directors. This balance is an important condition for 
real effectiveness of a board. Literature has suggested that outsiders are able to 
protect shareholders’ interests, given their independence from the CEO and top 
management team; they are also providers of new resources and skills that can 
help firms explore new entrepreneurial opportunities51. However, a large number 
of outsiders, without sufficient inside directors, will not be able to convert new 
skill and capabilities into real opportunities given their lack of firm information 
and trust of the CEO and top management team. Thus, insiders could be 
considered catalysts of knowledge and opportunities provided by outsiders. This 
suggests that to support and improve the level of Corporate Entrepreneurship 
within a firm a majority of insiders is desirable.  
2.2.2. Board characteristics: demographic traits and board personality 
We now concentrate our attention on the second board attribute, as 
suggested by Zahra and Pearce (1989). According to literature, board 
characteristics consists of two components: demographic characteristics of the 
board and its personality. Both are important in terms of board involvement on 
Corporate Entrepreneurship. For instance, previous scholars have highlighted a 
positive link between these characteristics and greater willingness to share 
concerns about strategy in board meetings (Westphal and Bednar, 2005). 
Furthermore, these characteristics reflects a board's disposition to focus on 
internal issue, rather than external issues (Pearce, 1983). 
Demographic characteristics 
A board’s cognitive frames and its directors’ traits play an important role in 
an organization as well as in a number of organizational outcomes (Lorsch and 
                                                          
51
 Concerning the role of outsiders Andrews wrote: “Independent directors are supposed to 
introduce ideas and perspectives from the outside, serving as a window to the word”, K. Andrews 
(1981), Corporate Strategy as a Vital Function of the Board, Harvard Business Review, 
November-December. 
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MacIver, 1989). However, it is the heterogeneity or homogeneity of these traits 
among board members that affects how they work  individually and together.  
Homogeneity is linked to a propensity to maintain the status quo, and can 
contribute to strong consensus and strategic continuity (Murray, 1989; Tuggle et 
al., 2010). However, homogeneous groups can exhibit conformity and a lack of 
openness to new information (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). A homogeneous 
board may be less inclined to introduce new ideas and discuss entrepreneurial 
issues but it can promote comfort among similar individuals, leading to the 
development of greater trust in a short period of time. In this view, homogeneity 
may enhance rather than restrict the openness of boardroom discussion. Thus, 
homogeneity may play an important role in integrating a team or reducing conflict 
(Tuggle et al., 2010). Demographic similarities between group, top management 
team, and board members has been linked to interpersonal attraction and their 
tendency to like, trust and interact more frequently and effectively with others 
they perceive to be similar to themselves (Williams and O’Reilly, 1998; Li and 
Hambrick, 2005; Petrovic, 2008). Generally, similar members are more likely to 
predict each other’s behaviour, which, in turn, contributes to less misjudgment, 
greater trust, more effective communication and, ultimately, faster consensus 
(Adobor, 2004). Westphal and Bednar (2005) found a positive link between 
directors’ demographic similarity and their interpersonal trust, which resulted in 
more open communication among board members, more frequent informal, social 
interaction among them, and greater willingness by individual directors to share 
concerns about strategy in board meetings. Additionally, attraction among board 
members has been considered to influence an individual member’s behaviour 
because it leads to higher levels of commitment to the board, which in turn affects 
the board’s ability to work together, that is, its effort norms (Petrovic, 2008).  
Heterogeneity, on the other hand, represents diversity in a team’s cognitive 
bases. Diversity on a board suggests a broader set of perspectives on decision 
making (Sawyer et al., 2006). The heterogeneity of demographic traits can lead to 
greater diversity of information sources and perspectives, as well as to more 
creative or innovative discussion (Murray, 1989; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). 
However, heterogeneity can also lead to group conflict and difficult decision 
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making (Cannella et al., 2008). Literature has suggested that an effective board of 
directors will be composed of a group of professionals who bring a range of skills, 
experience and diversity to the company, and the competing views that different 
directors can bring to board discussions can result in creative solutions (Hill and 
Jones, 1998; Petrovic, 2008). 
Tuggle et al., (2010) observed that heterogeneity on a board of directors 
affects discussion on entrepreneurial issues. Heterogeneity considers the age, 
educational background, value and experience of directors. Zahra and Pearce 
(1989) highlighted the board characteristics that can influence a director’s role. A 
board should be composed of people with the right mix of personalities, 
education, skills, and connections to encourage Corporate Entrepreneurship (Van 
Den Berghe and Levrau, 2004; Zahra et al., 2009). Directors should have a certain 
degree of accountability, and a certain level of knowledge on low and industry of 
the firm, and experience in directing a company (Van Den Berghe and Levrau, 
2004). A board that includes different skills, capabilities, knowledge and 
information can become a strategic resource to distinguish firm in the competitive 
environment. A heterogeneous board can provide useful resources to explore and 
exploit new entrepreneurial opportunities. Such a board can also provide valuable 
information for making entrepreneurial decisions and suggest innovative 
initiatives that will allow shareholders to improve their wealth (Fiegener, 2005; 
Zahra et al., 2009). From this perspective, a board with diverse backgrounds can 
enhance Corporate Entrepreneurship activities.  
Furthermore, a board’s heterogeneity also influences the monitoring 
function and the protection of shareholder wealth. A board with different 
knowledge and capabilities can better control the validity and truthfulness of the 
information from the top management team. Such a board can also ensure that 
management has the necessary resources to pursue entrepreneurial activity and 
encourage top management team risk taking. From this perspective, a board with 
diverse backgrounds can promote Corporate Entrepreneurship within a firm. 
However, diverse backgrounds and beliefs about an issue that a board must debate 
may generate conflict. Moderate amounts of cognitive conflict can, in turn, 
enhance board effectiveness because cognitive conflict results in the use of a 
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critical and investigative interaction process that may require CEOs to explain, 
justify, and possibly modify their positions on important strategic issues (that 
means wealth protection) and in processes such as the consideration and more 
careful evaluation of alternatives, which contribute to the quality of strategic 
decision making (that means wealth creation) (Forbes and Milliken, 1999, 
Petrovic, 2008). Consequently, companies have in recent years been increasingly 
pressured to appoint directors with diverse backgrounds and expertise to provide 
the variety of perspectives that modern businesses are purported to require (Ingley 
and Van der Walt, 2003)52. Therefore, it seems that directors’ diverse 
backgrounds are positively associated with a board’s ability to promote and 
enhance Corporate Entrepreneurship. The literature suggests that highly diverse 
groups are negatively associated with group cohesiveness but positively 
associated with cognitive conflict, whereas highly homogenous groups are 
positively associated with group cohesiveness but negatively associated with 
cognitive conflict. Consequently, the studies that focus on effective board 
functioning recommend a “balanced” approach (Petrovic, 2008). This entails, 
having enough diversity to encourage the sharing of information and active 
consideration of alternatives, but enough collegiality to sustain mutual 
commitment and make consensus-reaching practicable within the tight time 
frames in which boards operate (Langevoort, 2001). This last consideration 
suggests that a board’s heterogeneity influence Corporate Entrepreneurship in a 
nonlinear way; the relationship is initially positive as the heterogeneity of a board 
increases but becomes negative as the heterogeneity of the board becomes 
excessive. 
Personality of the board 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) wrote that the second dimension of board 
characteristics is the “personality” of the board. A strong, independent and 
                                                          
52
 In Comment section of the Corporate Governance Code, the Committee maintain: “The 
Committee wishes that the shareholders, when preparing the lists and subsequently appointing 
directors, evaluate, also in light of the opinion expressed by the Board on such an item, the 
professional characteristics, the experience, including managerial competencies, and the gender of 
the candidates, in relation to the size of the issuer, the complexity and specificity of the business 
sector in which the issuer operates, as well as the size of the Board of Directors.” 
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collaborative board is important to promote and enhance Corporate 
Entrepreneurship within a firm (Zahra 1996). Agency theory suggests that a board 
with these characteristics can better monitor and encourage managers to support 
and pursue entrepreneurial activities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A strong and 
independent board is objective and interested in the protection of wealth 
(Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). A strong board also serves as a sort of discipline 
for top management team because increase their responsibility in the strategy 
formation process (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Gabrielsson and Winlund, 2000).  
Forbes and Milliken (1999) claimed that boards that have standards and 
expectations for promoting high-effort behaviors among members such as 
devoting sufficient time to the role, actively seeking information, and actively 
participating in board discussions, are more likely to perform their monitoring and 
entrepreneurial roles effectively. Nadler (2004) proposed that on an effective 
board, members are expected to be honest, constructive, willing to ask questions 
and challenge others, willing to actively seek out other directors’ views and 
contributions, and spend appropriate time on important issues53. These norms – 
the board’s social systems or “board culture” as Nadler (2004) termed it – come 
from the directors’ shared beliefs about active preparation and participation, as 
well as from their shared values concerning the directors’ respect for one another 
and personal responsibility and accountability for the company’s prosperity. 
Nadler (2004) further argued that each board’s distinct culture is why directors 
doing the same work with identical structures and similar composition perform 
differently. For example, “passive boards”, which are governed by formality and 
reserve, perform differently from “engaged boards,” whose culture is 
characterized by directors’ willingness to challenge and which reflect the 
dynamics of a high-performance team (Nadler, 2004; Petrovic, 2008). 
                                                          
53
 The Corporate Governance Code set: “(1.C.2) The directors shall accept the directorship when 
they deem that they can devote the necessary time to the diligent performance of their duties, also 
taking into account the commitment relating to their own work and professional activity, the 
number of offices held as director or statutory auditor in other companies listed on regulated 
markets (including foreign markets) in financial companies, banks, insurance companies or 
companies of a considerably large size. The Board shall record, on the basis of the information 
received from the directors, on a yearly basis, the offices of director or statutory auditor held by 
the directors in the above-mentioned companies and include them in the Corporate Governance 
Report.” 
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To enhance Corporate Entrepreneurship it is important for a board of 
directors to work as a team. Board members should collaborate, respect each other 
and be positive. A board must attempt to stimulate dialogue and interaction 
among its members. A board of directors should follow a common vision or 
interest, and must work to develop the right chemistry and encourage 
cohesiveness. The moral principles and values of board members should be 
indisputable. Moreover, trust between members is essential. Finally, directors 
should have a sense of humour and should meet outside the boardroom at 
informal occasions (Van Den Berghe and Levrau, 2004). A collaborative board 
allows directors to spend more time discussing valuable entrepreneurial 
opportunities using their mix of knowledge and skills (Huse, 1998; Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999) to maximize shareholder wealth. Thus, a board’s strong 
personality is positively associated with its ability to promote and enhance 
Corporate Entrepreneurship. 
2.2.3. Board structure: composition and number of committees 
The third attribute identified by Zahra and Pearce (1989) is board structure. 
The contribution of this element to board performance is relevant because we 
believe that the effectiveness of a board may be affected not only by its 
composition and size but also by its internal administrative structure. Board 
structure concerns a board’s organization (Zahra and Pearce, 1989) and involves 
the rules that exist to make the board more efficiently (Huse, 1995; Gabrielsson 
and Winlund, 2000). It covers the number and types of committees as well as 
committee membership54 (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Demb and Neubauer 1992; 
Huse 1995). 
                                                          
54
 The Corporate Governance Code maintain: “An organizational procedure that may increase the 
efficiency and effectiveness of its works is represented by the establishment among its members of 
specific committees having consultative and proposing functions. Such committees, as it appears 
from the best Italian and international practices, far from replacing the Board in the performance 
of its duties, may usefully carry out a preliminary role - which is represented by the formulation of 
proposals, recommendations and opinions - for the purpose of enabling the Board to adopt its 
decisions with a better knowledge of the facts. Such role may be particularly effective in relation 
to the handling of matters, which appear to be delicate also because they are a source of potential 
conflicts of interest.” 
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Board committees work toward the more effective operation of the board 
(Van Den Berghe and Levrau, 2004). Committees are important tools to monitor 
corporate activities, and play a valuable role in the protection of shareholder 
wealth (Kesner, 1988). Klein (1995) evaluated the effects of the committee 
structure of boards and directors' roles within these committees on board 
effectiveness. She proposed a committee structure with specialized roles to 
enhance board performance in productivity and monitoring. Thus, she identified 
two different categories of committee: productivity and monitoring committee. 
Here, productivity can be assimilated to the entrepreneurial role of the board, and 
includes board involvement in decision-making processes about strategic and 
entrepreneurial issues and the decisions that affect the creation of new wealth for 
shareholders.  
Monitoring refers to board involvement in the evaluation and control of the 
activity of senior management, particularly in ensuring that senior management is 
engaged in the pursuit of entrepreneurial activities, even if these are high-risk 
activities. Thus, each board committee should specialize in either entrepreneurial 
(Uhlnaer et al., 2007) or monitoring issues, and these committees should be 
staffed by the board members most likely to achieve these goals. Thus, boards 
should use committee structures to facilitate, evaluate, and confirm long-term 
investment decisions and to monitor the performance of senior management55.  
Given these considerations, we can hypothesize a strong relationship 
between the presence of committees and the level of Corporate Entrepreneurship 
within a firm. In particular, from an agency perspective, board committees can 
allow directors to better perform their control role. The specialization of 
committees and the large amount of information that directors can share during 
meetings increase the potential to monitor executives and protect shareholder 
wealth56. Furthermore, from a resource-based perspective some board committees 
                                                          
55
 A. Zattoni (2006) wrote: “In risposta alle crescenti responsabilità che gli vengono attribuite dalla 
noramtiva e dai codici di autodisciplina, molti consigli hanno creato dei comitati a cui delegano 
l’analisi e la formulazione di proposte alternative in merito ad un particolare problema,” Assetti 
proprietari e corporate governante, Milano, Egea. 
56
 An example of this perspective can be represented in the implementation of the Audit 
Committee; “Quest’ultimo ha compiti e responsabilità che possono essere classificati secondo due 
ottiche: una di tipo organizzativo, relative alla valutazione dei piani e dell’azione dell’Internal 
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can enhance the involvement of directors in entrepreneurial activities57 (Harrison, 
1987). Directors must be well prepared to participate in committees (Huse, 1995; 
Gabrielsson and Winlund, 2000) so they can better inform the whole board about 
the resources they can provide for the growth of the firm. They can also suggest to 
the top management team how to utilize the resources to exploit new 
entrepreneurial opportunities, create new wealth for shareholders and enhance 
Corporate Entrepreneurship58. Thus, we can hypothesize that the number of board 
committee is positively associated with that board’s ability to promote and 
enhance Corporate Entrepreneurship59. In particular, the monitoring committees60 
                                                                                                                                                              
Audit; l’altra informativa, ossia di comunicazione, almeno ogni semestre, sull’adeguatezza del 
sistema [dei controlli interni] nel suo complesso.” F. Fortuna (2002), Corporate Governance, 
Milano, Franco Angeli. 
57
 A. Melis (2002) wrote: “Migliorando il funzionamento degli organi di governo e di controllo 
direzionale delle grandi imprese, il sistema di corporate governance può favorire una maggiore 
efficacia del processo decisionale a livello direzionale verso l’obiettivo della creazione di valore, 
favorendo l’individuazione delle scelte migliori circa gli investimenti da compiere e diminuendo il 
rischio che il soggetto economico scelga determinate investimenti che perseguono 
fondamentalmente solo il proprio interesse personale, anche quando quest’ultimo va a scapito del 
perseguimento della creazione di valore.” Creazione di valore e meccanismi di corporate 
governance, Milano, Giuffrè Editore. 
58
 We refer in particular to the productivity committees (Klein, 1995). Concerning this point, 
Zattoni (2006), for example, wrote: “L’executives committee […] ha il compito di contribuire 
attivamente alla formulazione e alla realizzazione della strategia aziendale.” Assetti proprietari e 
corporate governance, Milano, Egea. 
59
 The regulation and Corporate Governance Code, provide, especially for the listed firms, the 
possibility of implement some committees. In particular, the Corporate Governance Code 
maintain: “For this reason, in the articles below, the Code recommends the establishment of a 
nomination committee (Article 5), a remuneration committee (Article 6) and a control and risk 
committee (Article 7), defining their composition and competences. (5.C.1.) The committee to 
propose candidates for appointment to the position of director shall be vested with the following 
functions: a) to express opinions to the Board of Directors regarding its size and composition and 
express recommendations with regard to the professional skills necessary within the Board as well 
with regard to the topics indicated by articles 1.C.3. and 1.C.4.; b) to submit the Board of Directors 
candidates for directors offices in case of co-optation, should the replacement of independent 
directors be necessary. (6.P.3.) The Board of Directors shall establish among its members a 
remuneration committee, made up of independent directors. Alternatively, the committee may be 
made up of non executive directors, the majority of which to be independent;; in this case, the 
chairman of the committee is selected among the independent directors. At least one committee 
member shall have an adequate knowledge and experience in finance or remuneration policies, to 
be assessed by the Board of Directors at the time of his/her appointment. (6.P.4.) The Board of 
Directors shall, upon proposal of the remuneration committee, establish a policy for the 
remuneration of directors and key management personnel. (7.C.2.) The control and risk committee, 
when assisting the Board of Directors shall: a) evaluate together with the person responsible for 
the preparation of the corporate financial documents, after hearing the external auditors and the 
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(audit, compensation and nomination) can have a positive effect on promoting 
Corporate Entrepreneurship, while productivity committees61 (finance, investment 
and strategic) can have a positive effect on enhancing Corporate Entrepreneurship 
within the firm.  
The second important aspect of board structure is committee membership, 
which refers to the composition of each committee. Prior researchers have 
principally investigated committee membership in terms of type, gender and 
occupation of directors (Kesner, 1988; Klein, 1995; Spira and Bender, 2004). In 
particular they found that the presence of outside directors in committees 
facilitates the strategic and monitoring roles of a board because they can provide 
their experience, external associations and knowledge, and can be more 
objective62. Klein (1995) observed that productivity-oriented committees are 
staffed primarily by insiders, whereas monitoring-oriented committees are 
comprised primarily of outside directors. Her findings also suggest the following: 
(i) Monitoring committees (audit, compensation and nominating) are 
disproportionately comprised of directors independent of management. On the 
other hand, productivity committees (finance, investment and strategic issues) are 
disproportionately comprised of directors employed by the firm. (ii) There is a 
positive relationship between the percentage of outsiders on monitoring 
                                                                                                                                                              
Board of statutory auditors, the correct application of the accounting principles, as well as their 
consistency for the purpose of the preparation of the consolidated financial statements, in any; b) 
express opinions on specific aspects relating to the identification of the main risks for the 
company; c) review the periodic reports of the internal audit function concerning the assessment of 
the internal control and risk management system, as well as the other reports of the internal audit 
function that are particularly significant; d) monitor the independence, adequacy, efficiency and 
effectiveness of the internal audit function; e) request the internal audit function to carry out 
reviews of specific operational areas, giving simultaneous notice to the chairman of the Board of 
statutory auditors; f) report to the Board of Directors, at least every six months, on the occasion of 
the approval of the annual and half-year financial report, on the activity carried out, as well as on 
the adequacy of the internal control and risk management system. Sometimes, the firms can create 
other committee to execute the tasks that the normative provide. They are the executives 
committee, the strategic or ethic committee, the corporate governance committee, the compliance 
committee, see A. Zattoni (2006). Assetti proprietari e corporate governance, Milano, Egea. 
60
 Concerning this classification see Klein (1995). 
61
 Concerning this classification see Klein (1995). 
62
 Actually, the normative and the Corporate Governance Code set that some committees (in 
particular the audit commit) have to be composed of non executive directors, some of which 
independent directors. 
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committees and the factors associated with the benefits of monitoring, such as the 
firm's outstanding debt and free cash flow. (iii) There is a positive relationship 
between the proportion of insiders on productivity committees and measures of 
firm productivity such as relative net income, productivity of capital expenditures, 
and stock market returns (John and Senbet, 1998). In terms of composition, 
Kesner (1988) maintained that major board committees are composed of directors 
with business experience to facilitate the monitoring role of the board.  
Considering these prior findings we believe that the presence of one or two 
members of the management team in board committees can help directors perform 
their roles in the protection and creation of shareholder wealth63. Despite the fact 
that prior research has found a negative relation in the interaction between a board 
and the top management team (Kor, 2006)64, we consider that having members of 
                                                          
63
 Actually, this sentence requires a clarification. The normative refuse the presence of executive 
directors in some committees, especially the monitoring committees. Despite this point, our 
research seems suggest that the presence of one or two executives in the committees rooms can 
facilitate their role in term of monitoring and productivity. However, the topic is quite relevant and 
can open some interest question for further research. This because it can be true that the presence 
of executives in the committees can enhance directors’ involvement in Corporate 
Entrepreneurship, but the presence of executive in the committee room may also raise a certain 
level of embarrassment. We refer, for example, to the situation in which a committee must 
evaluate the actions of the CEO. The executive in the committee can feel embarrassed to take 
decision about his or her chief and thus limit the decision-making ability of the committee. This 
aspect can originate a different perspective on the role of executive in the committees that can be 
deepened in future research. Concerning the composition of committees, see the articles 5, 6 and 7 
of the Corporate Governance Code. 
64
 Kor (2006) highlighted two kind of interaction: “The first interaction effect concerns situations 
where highly tenured executives work with an outsider-rich board, which may result in the 
emergence of two groups with opposing views on R&D strategy. Managers with high firm tenure 
may be reluctant to invest heavily in R&D as these investments may pay off in the long term, 
whereas the board of directors, guarding the interests of shareholders, may advocate a high R&D 
intensity with expectations of superior returns. The polarized views of managers and outsider 
directors may result in conflicts and hostility in management-board interactions. Especially, when 
both the top management team and the board are powerful because managers are long tenured in 
the firm and the board is rich with outsiders representing the shareholders’ interests, rival factions 
may develop at the upper ranks (Pearce and Zahra, 1991). Rising tensions and the polarization of 
views may weaken the communication between the board and the team (Sundaramurthy and 
Lewis, 2003), leaving outsiders with a bigger information disadvantage. In response to outsider 
directors’ attempts to promote R&D investments, managers may withhold information (Walsh and 
Seward, 1990) and engage in interpersonal tactics (e.g., persuasion) to control these investments 
(Westphal, 1998). […] Managers may use their superior firm-specific knowledge to justify to the 
board their preference in moving some of the R&D funds to other functions and investments 
which may be inherently less risky. Also, tenure driven strong managerial power limits the board’s 
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the management team in committees allows directors – especially external 
directors – to become more familiar with information about day-by-day operations 
and make decisions and valuations on executive activity and entrepreneurial 
opportunity for growth.  
Thus, we can hypothesize that the presence of one or more members of the 
management team in the committees is positively associated with the board’s 
ability to promote and enhance Corporate Entrepreneurship. However, if this 
presence becomes too elevated, the power of the management team increases, as 
does the possibility of prejudice, and the board may be able to protect the interest 
of firm shareholders (Kor, 2006).  
2.2.4. Board process: modes of operation  
The last attribute that we want to analyze to understand the board 
involvement in Corporate Entrepreneurship is board process. 
Board process refers to the board's organization (Zahra and Pearce; 1989) 
and focuses on the rules that exist to make the board work more efficiently (Huse, 
1995). As mentioned above, mechanisms that can help the board work more 
                                                                                                                                                              
ability to control managerial actions (Pearce and Zahra, 1991; Shen, 2003). The board may want to 
promote potentially profitable, but risky, R&D investments; however, tenured managers who have 
become increasingly powerful and entrenched in the firm may be able to constrict the board’s 
efforts at the expense of shareholders’ interests (Cannella and Shen, 2001; Singh and Harianto, 
1989; Zajac and Westphal, 1996). […] Thus, as management teams with high firm tenure interact 
and negotiate with outsider-rich boards, firm’s R&D investment intensity will be compromised”. 
The second interaction refers to the shared-team specific experience: “Shared experience in the top 
management team provides managers with in-depth knowledge of each other’s abilities and 
idiosyncratic habits and strengthens the team’s collective confidence (Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1990; Penrose, 1959). However, the top management team’s collective confidence 
also empowers managers to more easily pursue goals that serve their interests instead of those of 
shareholders. When a powerful and confident management team interacts with a board with a high 
percentage of outside directors, certain conflicts become unavoidable (Pearce and Zahra, 1991). 
Even though these conflicts may concern agency issues such as executive compensation and 
excessive firm growth rather than R&D decisions, they may produce negative spillover effects on 
a firm’s R&D investments. When the management team and the board do not get along and cannot 
maintain a healthy dialogue due to power struggles, the firm may abandon its dominant logic of 
developing and renewing innovative capabilities. In the midst of conflicts and power struggles, 
managers may not be able to keep their eyes on the ball and carry on a high R&D strategy to 
sustain the innovativeness of the firm. Therefore, bringing together managers with high levels of 
shared team-specific experience and a board with a high percentage of outsiders can constrain 
R&D investments,” Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 27, Issue 11, p. 1081-1099:1086, 1087. 
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efficiently include the frequency and length of meetings, CEO-board interface, the 
level of consensus among directors on issues at hand, the formality of board 
proceedings, and the extent to which the board is involved in self-evaluation 
(Mueller, 1979; Vance, 1983). In this section, we will concentrate our attention on 
formal board routines, the existence of a formal evaluation of boardroom 
performance and the frequency of board meetings  (Demb and Neubauer, 1992; 
Huse, 1995).  
Formal board routines include rules concerning board agenda, the 
convocation of the meetings, accurate protocols, and formal work divisions 
among the various directors (Gabriellson and Winlund, 2000). All these rules can 
help the board to achieve control over a business situation and make the right 
strategic decisions. The main tool that can facilitate performance of the board’s 
role is good information (Demb and Neubauer, 1992). Thus, it is important that 
board agenda and the rules applied for the convocation of meetings provide all the 
information that directors need (Demb and Neubauer, 1992). An alert board with 
well-established reporting routines is the best preventer of the outright 
manipulation of data (Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Huse, 1995). It is also 
important to consider that the time available for outside directors can be limited 
(McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999); thus, director contact with the board should 
maximize opportunities to contribute to monitoring and entrepreneurial issues 
(Gabriellson and Winlund, 2000). Providing the right information to outsiders is 
an important part of making dialogue efficient. It is also important to distribute 
required written information in a timely manner to facilitate fast and accurate 
decision making (Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Gabriellson and Winlund, 2000). 
Thus, from an agency perspective formal board routines can help a board of 
directors perform its monitoring role, protect shareholder wealth and ensure a high 
level of Corporate Entrepreneurship. From a resource based perspective formal 
board routines can be opportunities to increase involvement in the strategic 
decision making process, as, if directors receive appropriate information in a 
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timely, they can take time to consider different and complementary opportunity 
that can be suggested during the meeting65.  
Another important component of the board process is the existence of any 
system to evaluate board performance (Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Huse, 1995). 
However, empirical evidence about the evaluation of board performance shows 
that this is not common practice among boards, despite the fact that a formalized 
system for board evaluation is one of the main requirements in many corporate 
governance codes66 (Minichilli et al., 2007). Moreover, board members are 
increasingly becoming involved in setting company objectives, hiring, firing, 
compensating the CEO and asking discerning questions (Lorsch, 1995; Conger et 
al., 1998). Thus, board members are seen as strategists more than as controllers, 
and the board of directors is a highly valued organizational resource that has the 
potential to contribute to entrepreneurial development (Huse, 2005; Minichilli et 
al., 2007). Through an evaluation process, board members can develop a better 
                                                          
65
 The Code of Corporate Governance sets: “(1.C.5.) The chairman of the Board of Directors shall 
ensure that the documentation relating to the agenda of the Board are made available to directors 
and statutory auditors in a timely manner prior to the Board meeting. The Board of Directors shall 
provide information in the Corporate Governance Report on the promptness and completeness of 
the pre-meeting information, providing details, inter alia, on the prior notice usually deemed 
adequate for the supply of documents and specifying whether such prior notice has been usually 
observed.” 
66
 The Italian Corporate Governance Code sets: “(1.C.1.) [the board of directors] g) perform at 
least annually an evaluation of the performance of the Board of Directors and its committees, as 
well as their size and composition, taking into account the professional competence, experience 
(including managerial experience) gender of its members and number of years as director. Where 
the Board of Directors avails of consultants for such a self-assessment, the Corporate Governance 
Report shall provide information on other services, if any, performed by such consultants to the 
issuer or to companies having a control relationship with the issuer; h) taking into account the 
outcome of the evaluation mentioned under the previous item g), report its view to shareholders on 
the professional profiles deemed appropriate for the composition of the Board of Directors, prior to 
its nomination; i) provide information in the Corporate Governance Report on (1) its composition, 
indicating for each member the relevant role held within the Board of Directors (including by way 
of example, chairman or chief executive officer, as defined by article 2), the main professional 
characteristics as well as the duration of his/her office since the first appointment; (2) the 
application of article 1 of this Code and, in particular, on the number and average duration of 
meetings of the Board and of the executive committee, if any, held during the fiscal year, as well 
as the related percentage of attendance of each director;; (3) how the self-assessment procedure as 
at previous item g) has developed.” A. Zattoni (2006), wrote: “una valutazione periodica del 
consiglio potrebbe aiutare gli stessi consiglieri a prendere coscienza del proprio ruolo e delle 
proprie responsabilità, facilitando così la creazione di un organo maggiormente efficace.” Assetti 
proprietari e corporate governace, Milano, Egea. 
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understanding of what is expected from them individually and from the board 
collectively (Atkinson and Salterio, 2002; Cascio, 2004). In this sense, evaluation 
can have the potential to enhance board effectiveness. The adoption of board 
evaluations might also activate a mechanism of external accountability, which is 
likely to contribute to the dynamic processes of building trust and reputation 
(Daily and Dalton, 2003). A formal and regular board evaluation practice could, 
therefore, be a means of advertising the fairness, transparency and quality of the 
board’s work (Minichilli et al., 2007). Thus, the existence of any system of 
performance evaluation can help directors perform their control role as it can 
stimulate their sense of responsibility. At the same time, board performance 
evaluation can help the board perform its entrepreneurial role, increasing 
members’ inclination to suggest and promote new initiatives to the CEO and to 
participate with more involvement in the strategic decision-making process. 
Finally, board directors need adequate time to make effective decisions 
(Conger et al., 1998). Thus, the frequency of board meetings is important for the 
board to perform its functions and satisfy its legal responsibilities (Demb and 
Neubauer 1992; Huse, 1995). Board meetings are the key means of informing and 
involving directors (Tuggle et al., 2010). The boardroom is also the place where 
directors can discuss the firm’s opportunities and evaluate management 
operations. The frequency of board meetings is also important for the board to 
perform its control and entrepreneurial roles (Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Huse, 
1995). The board cannot be expected to monitor firm performance and suggest 
innovative initiatives if they are not given sufficient opportunities (Demb and 
Neubauer, 1992; Huse, 1995). It is also important that information be accessible 
to all members of the board (Andrews, 1981) and that board meetings be a way to 
inform all directors, both inside and outside. Board meetings should be frequent 
enough to let the board issue continuous reports concerning the firm's situation. 
From an agency perspective frequent meetings allow the board to better control 
management activities to protect shareholder value (Gabrielsson and Winlud, 
2000). From a resource based perspective frequent meetings enable outside 
directors to interact with insiders and to become well-informed about firm 
activities. This can stimulate the entrepreneurial thinking of outsiders, enabling 
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them to better direct the resources provided to exploit new opportunities and 
enhance Corporate Entrepreneurship. Thus, we hypothesize that the frequency of 
board meetings may have an influence on the board’s ability to promote and 
enhance Corporate Entrepreneurship. 
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Chapter 3. The influence of a major shareholder on the 
board’s role in sustaining Corporate Entrepreneurship 
3.1. The impact of ownership structure on Corporate Entrepreneurship 
According to agency theory, as shown in Zahra and Pearce (1989), one of 
the most important antecedents to the monitoring and entrepreneurial roles of a 
board of directors is ownership concentration. This is because distribution of 
ownership has important implications for the efficiency and strategic development 
of a firm (Williamson, 1964)67. Literature has shown that when shareholders are 
concentrated, information asymmetries are low68, shareholder ability to remove a 
management team is high, and managers are likely to feel constrained to pursue 
initiatives that are in the shareholders' interest (Hill and Snell 1989). Thus,  
executives' support of Corporate Entrepreneurship may be higher when a 
significant shareholder who appreciates the value of long-term investments 
monitors and encourages executives to emphasize Corporate Entrepreneurship 
activities (Zahra et al., 2000). 
Prior research has focused particular attention on the relationship between 
ownership structure and identity69 and R&D investment (Lee and O’Neill, 2003; 
Tribo et al., 2007; Munari et al., 2010). R&D investment is a specific types of 
firm expenditure on outcomes that are neither immediate nor certain. R&D is 
                                                          
67According to Hoskisson et al. (2002), “We focus on equity holders because their interests with 
regard to innovation differ from those of debt holders. Debt-holders have a low interest in 
investing in R&D projects because they involve firm-specific resources. Research has shown that 
firm leverage has a negative relationship with investments in R&D (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993; 
Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989). Alternatively, equity holders have a residual claimant status and 
therefore generally have a stronger interest in projects using firm-Specific resources (Kochhar & 
Hitt, 1998),” Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 45, No. 4, 697-716: 697. 
68
 Hill and Snell (1989) wrote “If information asymmetries exist between managers and 
stockholders, stockholders may lack the data necessary to pass judgment on the desirability of 
certain strategies. They may be unable to know when management is acting in their interest. This 
inability gives managers leeway to pursue strategies that are not in stockholders’ best interest,” 
Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 25-46: 27. 
69
 We refer to identity in term of identity of the owners and the stakes they hold in a company. We 
must underline that the aims of this study is investigate only the major shareholder of a firm to 
understand the relationship between type of owners and board’s attribute. Thus, the analysis of the 
ownership structure will refer just to a first level of participation in a company, without try to 
investigate who is the final owner of the firm. 
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characterized by high levels of uncertainty, in terms of both goals and means. 
R&D generates negative cash flows for several months and in certain industries 
for several years, is highly contingent on human capital, and depends on both 
market and technology-based complementary assets for success (Teece, 1986; 
Munari et al., 2010) Despite this uncertainty, investment in R&D is crucial for  
the survival and growth of a firm. Thus, decisions regarding the allocation of 
R&D spending are very important for the future of the corporation. As these 
decision are made by management and are often in the interests of the 
shareholders, they are particularly indicative of the divergence between managers 
and shareholders’ interests and highlight how ownership structure can affect 
managerial discretion. According to agency theory, shareholders might benefit 
from the high-risk strategies associated with aggressive R&D investment, as these 
strategies are associated with a high-return. Moreover, a firm can diversify the 
risk associated with innovation initiatives through a diversified portfolio of 
investments. However, managers’ risk is inherently tied to the single firm in 
which they work and they cannot diversify this risk. Managers are thus naturally 
modeled as risk-averse and usually prefer short-term results through efficiency-
seeking strategies (Munari et al., 2010).  
Three main issues make these problems particularly severe in R&D 
investment decisions (Baysinger et al., 1991; Lee, 2005; Tihanyi et al., 2003). 
First, even though a firm’s innovation is expected to generate high profits 
(Hirschey, 1985; Jose et al., 1986), R&D activities are inherently risky as they can 
result in a wide variety of outcomes and may fail despite the best efforts of 
managers (Baysinger et al., 1991; Tribo et al., 2007). Second, R&D activities 
require long-term investments that may have a negative impact on more 
immediate performance (Hoskisson et al., 1993). Consequently, risk averse 
managers may be reluctant to invest in risky R&D projects. Third, R&D activities 
generally require high managerial autonomy to be effective (Hambrick and 
Finkelstein, 1987; Tribo et al., 2007). However, risk-averse managers with a good 
level of discretion may use their power to pursue low-risk strategies, avoiding 
R&D initiatives and damaging firms’ innovation output (Billings et al., 2004; 
Tribo et al., 2007). Thus, the information asymmetry derived from the complexity 
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of innovative attempts combined with the large degree of managerial discretion 
needed to guide these projects may be used by risk-averse managers to avoid high 
risk and uncertain initiatives, even if they are in the best interests of shareholders 
(Tribo et al., 2007). According to agency theory adequate governance 
mechanisms, lsuch as ownership concentration, can help a firm reduce agency 
costs and ensure an appropriate level of R&D investment, as governance 
managers’ propensity to avoid R&D investment-heavy strategies (Tribo et al., 
2007; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus,  researchers 
have found a strong relationship between ownership structure and investment in 
R&D. 
Other scholars have focused their attention on the effects of ownership on 
corporate innovation strategies. For example Hoskisson et al. (2002) argued that 
different shareholders can have different beliefs and preferences about investment 
and strategic decisions. Thus, these differences can negatively affect corporate 
strategy initiatives as they can create confusion in the minds of top management 
and can affect the direction of investment decisions. To confirm this perspective 
Hoskisson et al. argued that owners typically perform two main functions. First, 
they allocate scarce resources to competing investments on the basis of their 
evaluation of the future outcomes. Second, they ensure the efficiency of 
investments, in terms of performance, by pressuring those who manage the 
investments to do better. After investing in a firm, investors can increase 
efficiency in two ways: exit and voice (Hirshman, 1970). Investors can exit selling 
their shares to indicate their non-alignment with management or their policies. 
However, exiting is expensive because selling large blocks of stock reduces the 
share price. Therefore, large shareholders have an incentive to exercise their voice 
through activism (Pound, 1992), which is primarily a matter of campaigning and 
voting at shareholder meetings (Hoskisson et al., 2002). However, incentive and 
preference differences among owners may divide their voices and expectations. 
As a consequence they can lose their power and see the control that they exercise 
on management actions decrease. The interests of shareholders and managers can  
become increasingly misaligned; if this happens the exploration of new 
entrepreneurial initiatives can become a matter of secondary importance. 
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Thus, literature on this topic has highlighted a strong link between corporate 
innovation strategies and ownership structure. Corporate Entrepreneurship 
activities, R&D investment and corporate innovation strategies share the same 
characteristics in terms of risk and expected outcomes. All three share the 
uncertainty of results, the need for a long term view, an high willingness for risk 
activities, and the creation of information asymmetry between inside and outside 
participants in the corporate governance system. As some Corporate 
Entrepreneurship initiatives are invisible to external observers, managers can be 
encouraged to avoid investment in them because the risk to the firm and their 
position is too great70 (Zahra, 1996). Thus, as agency theory has suggested, 
corporate ownership can affect managers’ willingness to take risks (Jones and 
Butler, 1992). In particular, a major shareholder can monitor the CEO and 
encourage the pursuit of Corporate Entrepreneurship within the firm (Zahra, 1996; 
Zahra et al., 2000).Studies on this field have focused on the influence of 
institutional ownership on the level of Corporate Entrepreneurship (Zahra 1996, 
2000). Institutional investors usually include banks, pension funds, charitable 
organizations, universities, and insurance and investment companies (Blair, 1995). 
Agency theorists have proposed that large investors have a major incentive to 
monitor CEOs' decisions and commitments to Corporate Entrepreneurship, as the 
amounts of stock that these institutions usually hold gives them power over 
corporate managers (Davis and Thompson, 1994; Barclay and Holderness, 1991). 
According to Zahra et al. (2000) the challenge in this topic is to understand 
whether institutional owners actually perform this monitoring function and 
promote Corporate Entrepreneurship. Researchers have reported conflicting 
findings on the associations between institutional stock holdings and indicators of 
                                                          
70
 Zahra (1996) wrote: “Despite the potential contributions of entrepreneurial activities to value 
creation, executives may not support them. Such managerial risk aversion is a widely suspected 
cause of the perceived decline of the competitiveness of U.S. companies (Franko, 1989; Hoskisson 
& Hitt, 1994). Careerism and short term-based reward systems may discourage executives' 
pursuits of corporate entrepreneurship (Jacobs, 1991). Although investors can usually reduce their 
risk by holding diversified stock portfolios, executives cannot always diversify their risk, and 
some entrepreneurial activities have a high probability of failure (Zahra & Covin, 1995), a factor 
that can depress a company's short-term performance and lower executive compensation. As 
entrepreneurial failures can also damage executives' reputations and increase their risk of 
unemployment, they may induce managerial risk aversion. To counter this aversion, shareholders 
should use boards of directors to monitor executives to ensure a focus on long-term value 
creation,” Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 39, No. 6, pp. 1713-1735: 1715. 
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high risk/high return investments (Bushee, 1998). These conflicting findings may 
be attributed to the fact that researchers have considered institutional owners as a 
homogeneous group (Bushee, 1998). In reality, different institutional investors 
can have different investment objectives and can originate significant variations in 
institutions' investment horizons, which can influence institutions' willingness to 
use their power to challenge managers and encourage Corporate Entrepreneurship 
(Zahra et al., 2000). The different types of institutional shareholder are 
highlighted by the different kinds of relationships they have with the business and 
they influence managers’ behavior71. Thus, the effect of institutional ownership on 
managers' support for Corporate Entrepreneurship may be better understood by 
considering the nature of the relationships between institutional investors and the 
companies in which they invest (Zahra et al., 2000). 
Similarly, we believe that to better understand how ownership structure 
affects Corporate Entrepreneurship within the firm, the different types of 
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 Zahra et al. (2000) wrote: “Stock ownership can encourage and empower institutions to monitor 
the companies in their portfolios (Davis & Thompson. 1994). These powers can be used to 
promote managers' interest in and support for long-term value-creating activities such as CE. 
Institutional owners, however, may not be able to exercise their ownership power in all cases. 
Some institutions have business relationships with the companies in their investment portfolios. 
Executives can use these business relationships to co-opt institutions (David et al., 1998), thereby 
reducing the institutions' willingness and ability to exercise their ownership-based powers. Such 
business relationships, therefore, can constrain the ability of institutions to influence managers.” 
Moreover, they wrote, “Brickely et al. (1988) identified three groups of institutional investors: 
pressure-sensitive, pressure-resistant and pressure-indeterminate. As defined by Brickley et al. 
(1988), pressure-sensitive institutions include insurance companies, banks, and nonbank trusts. 
These institutions usually have business relationships with the companies in which they hold 
stock. The profitability and success of these institutions often depend on maintaining strong 
relationships with the companies in which they invest. This dependence makes these institutions 
susceptible to the influence of company managers. These institutions, therefore, may not use their 
ownership power to promote long-term strategic initiatives (Kochbar & David, 1996), such as 
CE.” […] “Pressure-resistant institutions, however, do not have close business relationships with 
firms in which they hold stock and, therefore, are not susceptible to being influenced by managers. 
These institutions usually include public pension funds, mutual funds, foundations, and 
endowments”. […] “As such, pressure-resistant institutional investors are more apt to support 
long-term value-creating activities such as R&D (Kochhar & David, 1996) and CE (Zahra, 1996)”. 
[…] “Pressure-indeterminate institutions (i.e., corporate pension funds, brokerage houses, and 
investment counselors) have some relationships with the firms in which they hold stocks but the 
nature of these relationships is hard to define (Brickley et al., 1988). Consequently, these 
institutions will behave differently from one issue to the next, making it difficult to predict their 
overall influence on a company's strategic initiatives such as CE,” Journal of Management, Vol. 
26, No. 5, pp. 947-976: 951, 952. 
  
92 
 
shareholders that have power to influence management behaviour and 
entrepreneurial decisions should be analyzed. This is because significant 
differences between principals might affect the agency problems discussed above. 
Corporate Entrepreneurship, in particular, is a field where differences in owner 
characteristics can affect objectives and the time horizon of expected results 
(Bushee, 1998; Hoskisson et al., 2002; Porter, 1992). Confirmation on this 
perspective is provided by the institutional literature. For example, Whitley (1999) 
emphasized how the direction and management of firms can be analyzed in terms 
of the nature and interests of the major shareholder. The distinctions between 
types of shareholders and control can thus be linked to the characteristics required 
to perform innovation, such as direct involvement in managing businesses, 
knowledge of the business, risk-sharing and the  scope of objectives (Munari et 
al., 2010). Additionally, we believe that, as discussed in the previous chapter, one 
of the factors in innovating is the board of directors. According to social network 
theory and resource dependency theory, the board of directors is the expression of 
the network of the major shareholder and a consequence of the configuration of 
firm’ resources. Thus, types of ownership affect Corporate Entrepreneurship 
activity both directly and indirectly through the board of directors. Shareholder 
identity affects the composition, characteristics, structure and process of a board. 
As a consequence, a board of directors may change its influence on Corporate 
Entrepreneurship activity if the major shareholder is family, another corporation, 
or the state. In the next section, we discuss how different shareholder identities 
influence the role that a board plays in Corporate Entrepreneurship.  
3.2. The effects of interaction between ownership and the board on 
Corporate Entrepreneurship 
According to Uhlaner et al. (2007), owner type72 can influence the quality 
of two functions of the board of directors. Different shareholder types can have 
different effects on the monitoring and enterprise of the board, both directly and 
                                                          
72
 We define ownership types in terms of identity of the owners and the stakes they hold in 
companies, according to the study of La Porta et al. (1999, p. 491), which identifies six main 
ownership types of publicly-traded companies around the world: widely-held, family controlled, 
state-controlled, controlled by a widely-held financial institution, controlled by a widely-held 
corporation, and a miscellaneous category. 
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indirectly, depending on board composition and characteristics. Thus, the issue is 
who selects board members, and by what standard (Clarysse et al., 2007). We can 
identify three different perspectives that might explain the selection of board 
members. According to agency theory, the board of directors should be formed to 
monitor managers on behalf of shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, this 
perspective suggests that members of the board have monitoring as their principal 
task and that shareholders may select as directors people who are better able to 
preserve the interests and wealth of shareholders. In other words, shareholders 
should select directors who have the capacity to promote Corporate 
Entrepreneurship within the firm. According to resource dependency perspective, 
new board members should be recruited using rational criteria to increase 
diversity on the board (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). In order for the board to 
monitor a venture effectively, it should be comprised of individuals with a range 
of human and social capital that complement one another. Moreover, different 
skills and capabilities can be considered a source of Corporate Entrepreneurship. 
Thus, shareholders that want to protect existing wealth and create new wealth, 
should select board members who have skills that complement the firm’s 
capabilities. Finally, according to social network theory, the composition of the 
board may reflect the social networks of the principal stakeholders, such as the 
CEO and external financiers (Lynall et al., 2003). The recruitment of individuals 
from existing social networks may reflect a desire by major shareholders to attract 
individuals similar to themselves (Forbes et al., 2006) and with whom they can 
foster a high level of trust. These individuals are likely to have embedded 
relationships with firm shareholders because of the need for good working 
relationships for acting in the stakeholders’ interests (Clarysse et al., 2007; Uzzi, 
1997). Thus, this theory suggests that shareholders should select board members 
from among their relationship networks to protect their interests and ensure that 
executives effectively pursue and enhance Corporate Entrepreneurship within the 
firm.  
All these perspectives suggest that the type of major shareholder can 
influence board attributes and the way in which the board performs its two main 
roles. For instance, a firm where the major shareholder is a family may have 
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different requirements in terms of the composition and tasks of the board of 
directors, than a firm in which the major shareholder is another corporation. 
Moreover, major shareholder identity can also affect the working style and 
behavior of a board. For instance we suppose that members of a board who are 
representative of family shareholders may perform their roles with a different 
level of responsibility than those who represent state shareholders. In the next 
section we will investigate how family shareholders, shareholders from another 
corporation and state shareholders can affect the role of the board in Corporate 
Entrepreneurship. 
Figure 4. The influence of a board’s attributes and type of major shareholder on Corporate 
Entrepreneurship 
 
3.2.1. When the major shareholder is a family 
Family-controlled companies are the most common type of business around 
worldwide73 (Bammens et al., 2008). Despite their importance in economic 
development and the multitude of such businesses in many countries, studies on 
this issue have produced conflicting results. Agency theory suggests that family 
firms may either mitigate or exacerbate agency problems (Atmaja et al., 2009). 
A number of researchers have expressed worries about the problems 
associated with family control, and have highlighted the increased potential for 
the abuse of managerial power. Some researchers have shown evidence of a 
                                                          
73
 In an attempt to explain this phenomenon, La Porta et al. (1999) claimed the popularity of 
family controlled companies results from inadequate protection of investor rights by national 
institutions. 
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negative influence by a controlling family on corporate performance. In addition, 
strategy research has identified family firms to be altruistic in the relationship 
between parents and their children (Schulze et al., 2001), which may have an 
impact on the effective succession process when the founder retires (Filatotchev et 
al., 2005). Moreover, family interests may dominate those of non-family 
shareholders. This is because the concentration of personal and family wealth in 
owner-managed firms usually generates a preference for income and wealth 
preservation over other dimensions of firm performance such as the maximization 
of dividend payments to outside shareholders (Carney and Gedajlovic, 2003). 
Finally literature has shown that families can also have a powerful incentive to 
expropriate wealth from minority shareholders (Atmaja et al., 2009). Faccio et al. 
(2001), for example, suggested that families tend to expropriate wealth when their 
control is greater than their cash flow rights. Villalonga and Amit (2006) found 
that families have a greater incentive to expropriate wealth from minority 
shareholders than from other blockholders, as their private benefits of control are 
not shared among independent owners. Anderson and Reeb (2004) similarly 
suggested that founding families may engage in self dealing by reducing firm risk, 
enriching themselves at the expense of minority investors, engaging in non-profit 
maximizing objectives, misusing the firm’s resources, and generally representing 
their interests over those of the firm’s other stakeholders. These arguments imply 
that the agency problem might be more prevalent in family firms (Atmaja et al., 
2009)74. 
However, other researchers have suggested different perspectives. The 
current prolonged recession, corporate scandals, and the collapse of stock markets 
have rekindled interest in the values prevalent in family-owned companies. 
Family businesses that survive their own internal succession dramas tende to take 
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 L. Del Bene (2005) wrote, “La strutturazione ed il funzionamento del sistema di governance 
[nelle aziende familiari] si pongono come problema rilevante perché tali imprese sono 
caratterizzate da un’elevata influenza delle dinamiche familiari ed in questo senso un’adeguata 
progettazione dei sistemi e del funzionamento degli organi di governo può risultare funzionale al 
miglioramento delle performance. […] Allorquando si verifichi una distinzione tra proprietà e 
management si ripropongono dal punto di vista concettuale, per le aziende familiari, alcune delle 
problematiche tipiche delle aziende ad azionariato diffuso, nel senso che operano nell’impresa 
dirigenti diversi dai soci, e sono coinvolti nella gestione solo una parte di soci.” Aziende familiari: 
tra imprenditorialità e managerialità, Torino, Giappichelli Editore. 
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a longer-term view rather than focus on the short-term stock market evaluation of 
their performance (Bruton et al., 2003). Moreover, the family system is 
characterized by the extension of altruism to the firm, as owners one current 
generation are inclined and obligated to reserve wealth for the next. As a result, 
family firms often have longer lifespans than non-family firms (James, 1999). 
Family firms, therefore, correspond to a special class of major shareholders that 
may have a unique incentive structure, a strong voice in the firm, and the ability to 
powerfully motivate managers (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Anderson et al. (2003) 
suggested that these characteristics can moderate agency conflicts between the 
firms’ debt and equity actors, along with agency behavior within the firm. Thus, 
because family wealth is so closely linked to firm welfare, families may have 
greater incentive to monitor managers and ensure that they are working to protect 
and create new wealth as more than other large shareholders or widely held 
corporations (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Filatotchev et al., 2005). And, as 
monitoring generally requires knowledge and information about the firm’s 
technology and processes, families may be superior in this respect because of their 
lengthy involvement with the firm75. Indeed, La Porta et al. (1999) indicated that 
families are almost always involved in the management of the firm, which might 
be more likely to result in a good alignment between the interests of shareholders 
and managers. For this reason, scholars working from this perspective have 
argued that family firms are one of the most efficient forms of organizational 
governance; family firms have even been used as the zero agency cost base in 
finance research (Ang et al., 2000).  
Research on board roles and attributes in family firms, has focused on the 
significant role of the board in controlling agency problems to protect minor 
shareholders of the firm76. Indeed, Westphal (1998) suggested that since 
                                                          
75
 Filatotchev et al. (2005) wrote: “In economies with immature capital markets and few 
professional managers, many family firms are established by obtaining capital and human 
investments from families and personal networks (McConaughy, Matthews, Fialko, 2001). 
Furthermore, through business networks, uncertainties and complexity are reduced because 
information is shared and circulated among the participants in the network, resulting in better 
monitoring of activities both within and between firms,” Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 
Vol. 22, Issue 3, pp. 257-283. See also L. Del Bene (2005). Aziende familiari: tra 
imprenditorialità e managerialità, Torino, Giappichelli Editore. 
76
 In this kind of firm is strong the conflict named “principal-principal”. 
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governance mechanisms in family firms are limited, minority shareholders than to 
rely on their boards to monitor and control the family’s opportunism. Anderson 
and Reeb (2004) found that the interests of minority shareholders are best 
protected when independent directors have greater power relative to family 
shareholders (Atmaja et al., 2009). Thus, founding-family shareholders may be 
considered important stakeholders whose interests may not always align or 
overlap with outside shareholders. When the divergence between family and 
outside-shareholder interests becomes large and costly, independent directors can 
intervene to protect the interests of all shareholders.  
Andreson and Reeb (2004) found that effective board structure in firms with 
family ownership requires a balance between family directors' interests and 
independent directors' objectivity. The implication is that family influence can 
provide some benefits to minority shareholders, but too much influence creates 
the potential for moral hazard conflicts between the family and outside 
shareholders. The literature has suggested an alternative explanation of the 
board’s role within family firms. According to stewardship theory founding-
family members may identify closely with the firm and view the firm's health as 
an extension of their own interests (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003). Acting as 
stewards, families may place outside directors on the board to provide specific 
knowledge and objective advice or act as counsel for corporate health and 
viability (Lee and O’Neill, 2003). Thus, this perspective suggests that the board of 
directors in a family firm can be effective in monitoring and providing advice and 
new ideas on entrepreneurial development.  
However, prior research has generally hypothesized that the board's 
effectiveness depends on directors being independent from senior managers. 
Independent directors provide expertise and objectivity that can minimize 
managerial entrenchment and expropriation (Dalton et al., 1998), especially when 
members of a family firm are the managers of the company. Bacon (1985) argued 
that independent directors provide greater candor in evaluating firm projects, in 
acquiring other firms, and in assessing intra and inter firm business relationships. 
Thus, in family firms, independent directors remain one of the primary lines of 
defense that outside shareholders can employ in protecting their rights against the 
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influence and power of large, controlling shareholders. To enhance firm 
performance, independent directors can potentially prevent families from directly 
expropriating firms' resources via excessive compensation, special dividends, or 
unwarranted perquisites (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). Independent directors can 
also impose structural constraints on the family by limiting their participation in 
important board subcommittees such as the audit , investment, nominating, and 
compensation committees. Perhaps one of the largest impacts that independent 
directors make in protecting outside shareholders from self-dealing families 
occurs when the board prevents an unqualified or incompetent family member 
from assuming the CEO post (Shieifer and Vishny, 1997). Given this, independent 
directors can play an influential role opposing family opportunism and protecting 
the rights of all shareholders, not just those of the dominant shareholder 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2004). 
 Thus, the literature on board role in family firms suggests that a board must 
focus on monitoring more than entrepreneurial tasks. The most important attribute 
that can influence the way in which board performs its role is composition. A 
sufficient number of outsiders on the board allows the interests of minor 
shareholders to be protected. Moreover, the presence of outside directors can also 
ensure that the firm focuses its attention on opportunities that, despite the high 
risk, could improve firm growth and wealth. This is very important in family 
firms, where the family-founding team can be oriented toward the maintenance of 
current wealth for future generations and away from entrepreneurial opportunity 
because entrepreneurial failure can compromise firm performance and value. 
These considerations suggest that the board of directors can play an important role 
in establishing a high level of Corporate Entrepreneurship within the firm. Indeed, 
directors can protect and create shareholder wealth, ensuring that family members 
act in the interest of the company. Thus, the board should ensure that 
entrepreneurial opportunities are pursued and that the wealth these opportunities 
generate will not be expropriated by the family. For this reason we believe that the 
characteristics, structure and process of the board can influence its role in family 
firms.   
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A board with a heterogeneous group of directors that is not necessarily 
comprised of members of the network of the major shareholder can better protect 
and create new wealth for the firm’s shareholders. In the same way, a board in 
which there are a high number of committees with members independent of the 
major shareholder can better pursue Corporate Entrepreneurship.  Finally, we 
believe that a board characterized by formal board routines, the existence of 
formal evaluation of boardroom performance, and a good frequency of board 
meetings can help directors monitor management operations and ensure that a 
high level of entrepreneurship will be pursued within the firm. 
3.2.2. When the major shareholder is another corporation 
The second type of major shareholder that we have to consider is corporate 
investors. This kind of ownership is characterized by the presence of one or more 
established firms among the shareholders. In many countries, corporations are 
among the largest blockholders (Claessens et al., 2000). These shareholders 
usually have a great deal of investment experience and can provide significant 
benefits to firms involved in certain business agreements by reducing the costs of 
monitoring alliances or ventures between firms and their corporate blockholders 
(Allen and Phillips, 2000; Duoma et al., 2006). 
 Understanding the influence that this type of shareholder can have on a 
board’s role in Corporate Entrepreneurship requires, first of all, recognition of the 
reasons that drive the decision of an established firm to invest in another firm. The 
literatures has shown two main explanations for this sort of decision.  
The first is a simple collateral investment for financial gain (Dushnitsky and 
Shaver, 2009). This suggests that a firm where the major shareholder is another 
company is characterized by a system of corporate governance in which the board 
has broad power over top management to protect and create shareholder wealth. 
Indeed, a major shareholder that lacks knowledge and expertise must rely on the 
board of directors to evaluate decisions of the top management team. Thus, in this 
kind of firm, the board of directors becomes the most important mechanism of 
corporate governance to protect shareholders from management’s opportunistic 
behavior. Moreover, in this kind of firm, the board of directors is one of the most 
important instruments in supporting and pursuing entrepreneurial activities 
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(Zahra, 1996; Zahra et al., 2000). For this reason, board attributes assume a great 
deal of importance in term of enabling the board of directors to perform their 
monitoring and entrepreneurial roles. Literature has showed that four board 
conditions - the size of the board, representation of outside directors, outside 
directors' stock ownership, and the separation of the CEO and chair positions - are 
believed to affect the board's ability to monitor and evaluate management and 
encourage Corporate Entrepreneurship within the firm (Zahra et al., 2000)77. 
The second explanation suggested by literature to understand which factors 
drive an established firm to invest in another firm is that companies often decide 
to invest in other companies with related business. This choice allows the 
investing firm to develop knowledge, skills, and competencies that can improve 
its performance and growth (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). Under some 
conditions, this “corporate venture capital” (Gompers and Lerner, 2001) might 
lead the investing firm to pursue its own interests and undertake actions that 
adversely affect the firm being acquired. Thus, the relationship between a 
corporate investor and an entrepreneur is sensitive to the venture’s overlap with 
the corporate parent’s existing businesses (Hardymon, DeNino, and Salter, 1983; 
Hellmann, 2002). This consideration suggests that the firm acquired might well 
consider the corporate investor’s participation in the firm’s activity with 
suspicion. In particular, the acquired firm can identify opportunistic behavior in 
the corporate investor based on whether it appropriates the innovative ideas of the 
firm or develops its projects internally (Dushnitsky and Shaver, 2009). Thus, the 
board of directors plays a very important role in coordinating and balancing the 
interests of major shareholders and the firm’s top management team. Directors 
must ensure that managers are working in the interest of the firm and its 
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 Tribo et al., 2007 wrote: “Those block holders that are keener to stimulate R&D investment will 
have more incentives to extract superior returns from these investments in comparison with others 
less interested in these investments. Specifically, given the above considerations concerning 
different types of block holders, we expect corporate owners to be more efficient in channeling 
R&D investment into productive outcomes. They have more experience in taking part of different 
R&D projects, either in the same firm or in other companies. This improves the skills of corporate 
owners (learning-by-doing) in managing R&D-intensive projects which should translate into 
superior returns from these investments,” Corporate Governance, Vol.15, N. 5 pp. 828-842: 833. 
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shareholders and are undertaking activity that can improve firm value and wealth. 
If top management in the firm lacks trust in the board and the firm’s ownership 
structure, it may decide to avoid high-risk/high-return opportunities to discourage 
and dissuade investment by corporate shareholders. The right mix of outsiders and 
insiders, a good structure and a formalized process seem to be the most important 
board attributes to ensure a firm’s involvement in Corporate Entrepreneurship  
activities. Indeed, outside directors, who may belong to the major shareholder’s 
network, can monitor management activity and commitment to innovative 
activities. If outside directors have extensive knowledge and business expertise, 
they can evaluate and suggest different development opportunities. Furthermore, a 
board characterized by the presence of committees, by the possibility of having 
more meetings and summits, by good levels of information and communication 
among different members of board  and with different key functional managers of 
the firm can better ensure a balance between the interests of shareholders and 
operations of management. 
However, literature has widely recognized the importance of ownership 
structure and the identity of the major shareholder in shaping how a board is 
involved in Corporate Entrepreneurship (Baysinger et al., 1991; Brunninge et al., 
2007; La Porta et al., 1999; Uhlaner et al., 2007; Zahra, 1996; Lynall et al. 2003). 
Despite this, the literature has not extensively investigated what can happen in 
terms of corporate governance when a major shareholder is another corporation. 
Future research in this field may better clarify this. 
3.2.3. When the firm is state controlled 
The last shareholder identity we study is the state. This includes firms that 
have in their ownership structure the state or an institution that can be ascribed to 
the state (e.g. regions, provinces, etc.). La Porta et al. (1999) considered firms 
under state control in a separate category because it is a form of concentrated 
ownership in which the state uses firms to pursue political objectives while the 
public pays for the losses (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Other researchers have 
discredited this argument, showing that principles of good management and 
governance can be applied to state-controlled firms to serve the public interest 
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(Onida, 1965; Anselmi, 2001)78. However, state and public entities comprise one 
of the principal groups of owners around the world. La Porta et al., 1999 found 
that 70 percent of the largest traded firms in Austria, 45 percent of those in 
Singapore, and 40 percent of those in Israel and Italy are state-controlled. Massive 
post-war state ownership around the world.  
However, the state cannot be considered the final shareholder of firms. 
Rather, the state is the agent of the last true shareholder, the citizenry (Guthrie et 
al., 2008). This perspective suggests that in state-controlled firms, the agency 
problem is enhanced. First of all, in this kind of firm, control of both management 
and shareholders is important. The problem here is that citizens, the final 
shareholders, cannot have the same instruments and knowledge to evaluate the 
activity of the state and of management. Moreover, the aims that  incentivize the 
State can be quite different from the interests of the final shareholders. These 
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 See: AA.VV (a cura dell’accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale), Pubblica 
amministrazione. Prospettive di analisi e di intervento, Milano Giuffrè, 1984, and E. Borgonovi, 
L’impresa Pubblica, Milano, Giuffrè, 1979, and G. Bruni, Le imprese pubbliche in economia 
d’azienda, Verona, Libreria Dante Editrice, 1968. S. Sabetta (2007) wrote: “Le public utilities 
sono passate nell’arco di un decennio dalla forma di azienda municipalizzata alla società per azioni 
con crescente autonomia dall’ente locale, questo in un ambiente sempre più competitivo e pertanto 
imponendo un funzionamento sempre più rassomigliante alle imprese private. La contemporanea 
quotazione alla borsa valori di molte di esse (AMGA, AEM, ACEA, ASM, ecc.) ha comportato un 
radicale cambiamento nei rapporti con l’ente locale favorendo sia l’autonomia dall’ente che la 
massimizzazione del valore del titolo azionario in termini sempre più staccati da logiche politico-
sociali. Se la letteratura sostiene la necessità di ridurre la quota in forza degli azionisti pubblici o 
disegnare sistemi di corporate governance che amplino i margini di discrezionalità del 
management al fine di ridurre l’influenza del pubblico, tale risultato non è stato facilmente 
raggiunto considerando anche il fallimento di alcune privatizzazioni dal punto di vista della 
soddisfazione dell’interesse pubblico. E’ sorta la necessità di porre in equilibrio una maggiore 
autonomia ed esigenze di tutela dell’interesse pubblico, tale risultato lo si può ottenere attraverso 
un sistema di corporate governance che garantisca una accresciuta autonomia del management e 
mantenendo contemporaneamente una presenza forte dell’interesse pubblico nell’assetto 
proprietario. L’intervento di terzi nel capitale ha comportato una accresciuta complessità 
gestionale a fronte di una aumentata concorrenza. La mancata autonomia del management nella 
gestione viene a compromettere la sopravvivenza dell’impresa in un contesto liberalizzato, 
d’altronde gli attori pubblici non sono orientati di per sé alla massimizzazione del profitto. Analisi 
hanno evidenziato che vi è una relazione positiva tra il livello di concentrazione della proprietà e la 
performance di impresa, un’azionista di maggioranza è infatti più impegnato nella gestione che 
nell’ ipotesi di una notevole dispersione azionaria, tuttavia tale osservazione conduce a riflettere 
sulle dinamiche di una forte concentrazione della proprietà pubblica, con i propri obiettivi sociali, 
senza un altrettanto forte correttivo sul sistema di governance che favorisca l’autonomia 
gestionale. 
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differences can create conflicts of interest and collusion that may have 
consequences on firm performance and growth.  
Furthermore, in this kind of firm, is the “public subject” that nominates the 
members of top management and not the final shareholders. Thus, the typical 
form of control over top management activity is lost, as the interest of the agent is  
not necessarily increasing firm performance and removing managers who act 
against the interests of the firm and the shareholders.  
These considerations suggest that the board of directors may play an 
important role in the protection and creation of shareholders’ wealth. When the 
state is a major owner, it is especially important for the board of directors to 
appear legitimate and accountable to the public. For this reason, when the 
government owns major stakes in the firm, the firm tends to have more outside 
directors on the board. The more outside directors on the boards, the more state-
owned firms appear to be legitimate and accountable to the public. Moreover, 
from an agency theory perspective, because shareholders of state-owned firms are 
citizens, who are dispersed and have little incentive to monitor management, more 
outside directors are needed to monitor management and resolve the agency 
problem (Li, 1994). Thus, the composition of the board seems to influence how 
the board can perform its role.  
Considering the field of Corporate Entrepreneurship within the firm, we 
believe that state-controlled firms are not involved in innovative activities, in 
terms of their political and social functions (Caves, 1990). However, as we have 
argued above, the aim of these firms is the economic equilibrium (Giannessi, 
1979), just as in other firms with a different ownership structure. As innovation 
and entrepreneurship are the main sources of new wealth and firm value, we can 
argue that the involvement of these firms in Corporate Entrepreneurship activity 
should be high. Indeed, some researchers have focused on the relationship 
between firm R&D investment and state-ownership (Munari et al., 2010). These 
authors have suggested that R&D activities within state-controlled firms should be 
oriented to the fulfillment of the general national goals of generating and 
disseminating the public good of knowledge. (Molas-Galart and Tang, 2006; 
Munari et al., 2002). More precisely, it is possible to identify specific interrelated 
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targets for R&D activities within this kind of firm (Munari and Sobrero, 2003). 
First of all, R&D investments should be directed toward specific business 
objectives, as in any other company, particularly when government intervention 
occurs in industries and areas of strategic relevance to the country. More generally 
R&D can be leveraged into a second objective: strengthening the nation’s 
scientific and human infrastructure on both the supply and demand sides. At an 
even more general level, a third goal for R&D activities within state controlled 
firms might be to foster the production of the public goods of basic research to 
qualify and steer the national levels of investment in R&D (Munari et al., 2010). 
Thus, literature seems to suggest that entrepreneurial initiatives are 
important for State-controlled firm. Thus, a board of directors should ensure that 
the state and top management in this kind of firm act in the interest of the firm, 
pursuing Corporate Entrepreneurship activities that will improve firm 
performance.  
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Chapter 4. Empirical analysis  
4.1. The method 
The research79 approach I used in this study is based on multiple 
case studies. I selected this research method because it allows replication 
logic and I treated the different cases as a series of experiments. I 
deliberately selected four different cases because they offered contrasting 
situations; I was not looking for a direct replication (Eilbert and Lafronza, 
2005; Yin, 2009). Indeed, our research question was “How do board 
attributes and major shareholder type influence the role of a board of 
directors in promoting and enhancing Corporate Entrepreneurship within 
a firm?”. Moreover, Yin (2009) suggested that case study research should 
be used when the research question has the form of “how/why” and when 
the investigation concerns behavioral events. Both elements are presented 
in our research. Furthermore case study research enables us to describe 
and illustrate a particular phenomenon that originated from a presumed 
casual link that has yet to be explained. 
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 Ferraris Franceschi wrote: “La metodologia è da considerare come una delle variabili chiave 
della ricerca. Possiamo definirla una variabile strategica poichè è in grado di incidere 
direttamente sulla qualità del processo di indagine ponendolo al passo con i tempi del sapere 
scientifico e allineandolo con le circostanze spaziali e temporali con le quali si trova collegato.” 
Moroiver, she has added: “Naturalmente la metodologia nella ricerca ha una valenza analitica ed 
euristica ed in questo aspetto può essere intesa come il complesso delle procedure logiche 
generalizzabili e delle componenti intuitive non codificabili che costellano un processo 
d’indagine” Ferraris Franceschi R., Problemi attuali dell’economia aziendale in prospettiva 
metodologica, Giuffrè Editore, Milano, 1998, p. 3. She also wrote: “Se per metodologia s’intende, 
secondo l’uso filosofico, esclusivamente l’indagine circa i metodi usati dalla scienza può darsi che 
ad un primo sguardo questa, che peraltro riflette la concezione ortodossa dell’indagine di cui ci 
occupiamo, appaia esaurire in breve il suo compito nei confronti dell’economia aziendale”. And 
also:“A fondamento dell’impostazione che vede la metodologia come teoria unitaria del metedo 
sta la convinzione che per giungere alla conoscenza scientifica, qualunque sia il settore reale a 
cui la stessa si rivolge, si percorrono le stesse vie.” Sembra importante evidenziare che 
“considerando in assoluto quest’ultimo scopo può sembrare che il compito assegnato all’indagine 
metodologica si possa riassumere in un tentativo di imporre un ordine al mondo delle idee.” 
Ferraris Franceschi R., Introduzione all’indagine metodologica e conoscitiva in economia 
aziendale, Libreria scientifica Giordano Pellegrini, Pisa, 1974, p. 80. 
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Thus, the research design used was descriptive-exploratory, as it 
allows, the use of case studies to explain the different phenomena 
investigated. Indeed, this approach enables the acquisition of a great deal 
of information, without limitation. Van Maanen, discussing this research 
method,  argued, “The label qualitative methods has no precise meaning in 
any of the social sciences. It is at best an umbrella term covering an array 
of interpretive techniques which seek to describe, decode, translate and 
otherwise” (Van Maanen; 1979: 520). Literature has also highlighted the 
fact that qualitative research allows the description of a phenomenon 
(Kidder, 1982), the testing of a theory (Pinfled; 1986) and the construction 
of a new one (Harris and Sutton, 1986)80. 
In the past, the qualitative research method has been criticized for 
poor scientific and methodological rigor. In particular some scholars have 
argued that case study research does not follow systematic procedures, 
provides little basis for scientific generalization, is too long and results in 
massive and unreadable documents. Despite this, recently, many authors 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Stake, 1995; Jensen and Rodgers, 2001; Remenyi et al., 
2002) have attempted to highlight its principal merits and value. 
Eisenhardt and Graebner (1989: 25) argued, “Building theory from case 
studies is a research strategy that involves using one or more cases to 
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 See also: Yin R., The case study crisis: some answers, in Administrative Science Quarterly, 26, 
1981; Turrini A., Lo studio di casi come metodologia di ricerca in economia aziendale, in Azienda 
pubblica, 1, 2, 2002; Ferraris Franceschi R., L’indagine metodologica in economia aziendale, 
Milano, Giuffrè Editore, 1978; Lincoln Y. S., Emerging criteria for quality in qualitative and 
interpretative research, Qualitative inquiry, n. 1, September 1995, pp. 275.289, Berg B. L., 
Qualitative research methods for the social sciences, 2001; Gillham B., Case study research 
method, Continuum, London, 2000; Price D. - Bannister F., The creation of knowledge through 
case study research, Irish Journal of Management, vol. 23, n.2, 2002, pp. 1-17; Shavelson R. - 
Townes L., Scientific research in education, National Academy Press, Washington DC, 2002; 
Dubois A. – Gadde L.E., Systematic combining: an adductive approach to case research, Journal 
of Business Research, vol. 55, n. 7, 2002, pp. 53-560; Riege A.M., Validity and reliability tests in 
case study research: a literature review with "hands-on" applications for each research phase, 
Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal, vol. 6, n. 2, 2003, pp. 75-86; Stoner G. - 
Holland J., “Using case studies in finance research,” in Humphrey C. - Lee B., The real life guide 
to accounting research: A behind-the-scenes view of using qualitative research methods, Elsevier, 
Oxford, 2004; Miles, M., Qualitative data as an attractive nuisance: The problem of analysis. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 24, 1979; Miles, M., & Huberman, A. M., Qualitative data 
analysis, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1984. 
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create theoretical constructs, propositions and/or midrange theory from 
case-based, empirical evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989b). Case studies are rich, 
empirical descriptions of particular instances of a phenomenon that are 
typically based on a variety of data sources (Yin, 1994)”. Moreover, the 
qualitative approach allows strong interaction between data collection and 
analysis. 
One of the most popular frameworks for case study research was 
proposed by Yin (2009), who suggested that the first step in empirical 
research is to clarify the research design, the logical sequence that 
connects the empirical data to a study’s initial research questions and 
ultimately to its conclusions. Thus, five components of research design are 
especially important for case studies. The first component, as mentioned 
above, is the study question and its form. The case study method is most 
likely to be appropriate for “how” and “why” questions. The second 
component is study propositions. Propositions help direct attention to 
something that should be examined within the scope of study and, in 
addition to reflecting an important theoretical issue, suggest where to look 
for relevant evidence. The third component is unit of analysis, which is 
related to the problem of defining what the case is and whether the case 
selected are right for the scope of the study. Moreover, the study question 
and propositions can help identify the relevant information to be collected 
about the unit of analysis. In case study research data can be qualitative 
(e.g., words) and quantitative (e.g., numbers). The fourth and fifth 
components are the logic linking the data with the propositions and the 
criteria for interpreting the findings, respectively. After data are collected, 
they must be elaborated and formalized. Some scholars have highlighted 
the need for tests to establish the quality of research based on case studies. 
These tests evaluate: (i) construct validity, identifying the correct 
operational measures for the concepts being studied; (ii) internal validity, 
establishing a causal relationship; (iii) external validity, defining the 
domain to which a study’s findings can be generalized; and (iv) reliability, 
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demonstrating that the operations of a study can be repeated with identical 
results. 
Indeed, our study began with a literature analysis, the discovery of a 
gap in the literature and the formalization of a research question. As our 
research question take the form of “how,” we decided to use a qualitative 
research method that allows us to better explain the phenomenon. The next 
step was the selection of the units of analysis. We have chosen four firms. 
Each firm was selected considering our research scope. As we are 
interested in understanding the role of boards of directors in firm with 
different ownership structures and thus, different major shareholders we 
have identified firms that correspond to these characteristics. Thus, we 
have a firm in which the major shareholder is a family, one in which the 
major shareholder is a public entity, and two in which the major 
shareholder is another corporation. For this category we selected two firms 
because, in one the major shareholder is a corporation with a related 
business, and in the other, the major shareholder is a corporation with a 
non-related business. We decided to consider these conditions separately 
because in our literature review we supposed that the different aims that 
drive corporate venture decisions can influence the role of a board in 
Corporate Entrepreneurship in different ways. 
For each firm, we collected data from the investor relations section 
of each firm’s web site, from the web site of the Italian Stock Exchange 
and from each firm’s Balance Sheet and Sustainability Report. From the 
Corporate Governance Report we selected members of the boards of 
directors for interviews in order to understand each board’s involvement in 
Corporate Entrepreneurship. In particular, for each firm, we chose one 
inside director and one outside director. The directors were contacted by e-
mail and asked to collaborate with academic research by participating in 
interviews. 
 The interview is a typical instrument of qualitative research because 
it allows more specific and comprehensive information to be obtained 
(Corbetta, 2003; Rubit, 1995). Interviews are a highly efficient way to 
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gather rich, empirical data, especially when the phenomenon of interest is 
highly episodic and infrequent (Eisenhardt, 2007). Moreover, it can be 
used to gather descriptions of the life-world of interviewees with respect to 
the interpretation of the meaning of the described phenomena (Kvale, 
1983). 
Interview were conducted using a semi-structured questionnaire. The 
questionnaire is organized in two parts (see Attachment 1). The first one 
investigates the level of Corporate Entrepreneurship within a firm. For 
this, we used Miller and Friesen's (1982) index. This Corporate 
Entrepreneurship measure has been widely used in past research because 
of its reliability and validity (e.g., Jennings and Lumpkin 1989; Zahra 
1991). The measure follows a seven-point scale ranging from 1 = very 
untrue to 7 = very true. Scores on the items were averaged to produce an 
overall Corporate Entrepreneurship index; a high score on the index 
indicates high involvement in Corporate Entrepreneurship activities, while 
a low score indicates low involvement. The decision to use this index can 
be considered a variable for the control of the sample of the case studies 
selected, as the level of Corporate Entrepreneurship should be quite high in 
each case considered. Indeed, the aim of this study is to understand how a 
board of directors can support and promote entrepreneurial activities 
within a firm. If the level of Corporate Entrepreneurship in the case 
selected is low, it becomes difficult to understand board involvement in the 
entrepreneurial process. However, different types of board involvement 
can correspond to different high values for Corporate Entrepreneurship. 
Moreover, the literature has suggested that the integration of qualitative 
sources with other quantitative information can add value to research (Yin, 
2009). 
The second part of questionnaire involves the analysis of board 
involvement in strategic and entrepreneurial issues. We have individuated 
fourteen questions to help us understand, according to our literature 
review, the structure and process that characterizes each board of directors 
and their involvement with innovation activities. In particular, we focused 
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on the proclivity of each board, on the level of information that they use to 
evaluate top management activities, and on the opportunities for different 
directors, other key functional managers, and Business Units directors to 
meet. These questions are also scored using a seven-point scale ranging 
from 1 = very untrue to 7 = very true. The attribution of an overall index 
enables us to compare the firms in terms of their mechanisms of 
governance and board involvement in Corporate Entrepreneurship 
activities. 
Once all the interviews were conducted, the data were integrated 
with other information collected from each firm’s published documents 
(e.g. size of the board, number of insiders and outsiders, etc.). Finally we 
summarized all interview transcripts and other data into individual case 
reports. 
We believe that the findings from these case studies cannot be 
generalized to the whole population, even if there are different interest 
considerations. Thus, while this study cannot be considered 
comprehensive, it can offer a preliminary understanding and the possibility 
for future studies to deepen and extend the research. 
 
4.2. Case studies and data 
We used four different data sources: (1) interviews with two directors of 
each firm, one insider and one outsider; (2) archival data, including company web 
sites, business publications, and other materials provided by the informants; (3) e-
mail and phone calls; (4) attendance at conferences where a business leader 
presents the company and its business plan for future development.  
The primary source was semi-structured interviews with individual 
respondents, which were conducted over a period of two months. The interviews 
were typically 50-80 minutes in length. We described the topic and purpose of the 
research to each informant prior to the interview. We also provided some basic 
information about the concept of Corporate Entrepreneurship and board 
involvement. Before each interview, we reviewed information about the company 
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profile, ownership structure and corporate governance from published sources and 
previous interviews. 
Table 2. Type of information and relative sources 
Type of Information Source 
Company profile Web site, Company presentation in 
academic Conference 
Ownership structure Corporate Governance Report 
Board composition Web site, Corporate Governance section 
Board characteristics  Web site, Corporate Governance section 
and interviews with directors 
Board process  Interviews with directors  
Board structure Interviews with directors and Corporate 
Governance section 
Corporate Entrepreneurship Interviews with directors 
 
We now introduce each object of study, selected, as mentioned above, based 
on their ownership structure.  
The first firm (firm A) is one world leader in the tissue paper industry. With 
more than 1 billion euro in sales in 2010, this firm is the second largest company 
in Europe and the fourth-largest in the world in production capacity in the 
industry. This firm is characterized by the presence of two large family 
shareholders who are also the family founders. Both families are represented on 
the board of directors; the CEO is from one family and chairman is from the other. 
The other shareholders are on the board as non executives.  
Based on the interviews, the level of Corporate Entrepreneurship in this firm 
is quite high (4.99). The index was calculated as an average of the evaluation that 
each interviewee provided in the first part of the questionnaire. We calculated the 
average of the two evaluation and calculated the mean. In this way we obtained a 
value with which to estimate the level of Corporate Entrepreneurship within the 
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firm. Both the interviewees indicated that the firm is characterized by a high level 
of continuous innovation and several investment projects to enter new markets. 
The second firm (firm B) is a medical biotechnology company established 
in 1996 that focuses on the research, development, and clinical validation of 
innovative therapies to cure cancer. Since March 2008, the firm has been a public 
company listed on the Milan Stock Exchange Standard segment, class I of the 
MTA managed by Borsa Italiana. The company was created as a spin-off of an 
Italian Hospital, and has became an established product company with a primary 
focus on new anti-cancer therapies. The major shareholder of this firm is another 
corporation that operates a business unrelated to the biotech industry. The major 
shareholder does not have the control of the firm. The directors of this firm 
represent the first five shareholders because shareholders’ agreement signed in 
2007.  
The level of Corporate Entrepreneurship within this firm, calculated as 
above, is quite high (4.14). If we consider a broad time frame, the value of the 
index would be higher. Indeed, the core business of the firm, the development of 
anti-cancer therapies, requires more time to introduce new product to the market. 
One of the directors interviewed said that the innovation is part of the firm’s 
mission. 
The third firm (firm C) is listed in the STAR segment of the Milan Stock 
Exchange and is an international leader in community and entertainment services 
for web and mobile devices, domain and hosting services, and advanced online 
advertising solutions. Company sales in 2010 were about 150 million euro. 
Moreover, in the last few months the firm has enacted a refocusing strategy, 
selling its consumer-oriented business, which includes the production and 
distribution of digital music, entertainment and online gaming via web and mobile 
devices. Thus, the core business of the company is now professional services for 
online presence and digital advertising. The major shareholder of this company is 
another corporation that operates in a related business. In this firm the major 
shareholder has also the control of the company. Most members of the board of 
directors belong to the network of the major shareholder, as indicated by the CV 
of each member. 
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 The level of Corporate Entrepreneurship in this firm is the highest of all 
firms studied (5.71). One of the directors maintained that this high value is due to 
the recent refocusing process in which the firm was involved and its strong 
investment strategy in new geographic markets. The level and number of 
innovations introduced in terms of products and processes are similar to those of 
the firm’s industry competitors. 
The fourth firm (firm D) was recently listed in the Italian Stock Exchange 
(2007) and operates in the aviation industry. The major shareholder of this firm is 
a public entity. There is a shareholders’ agreement between the most important 
public entities that own 55.31 percent of the firm’s stocks. Two-thirds of board 
members are nominated by these shareholders, while the other third is nominated 
by minority shareholders.  
The level of Corporate Entrepreneurship within this firm is high (4.28). The 
board members indicated that over the last four years, this company has been 
involved in a substantial development process big. It has introduced several new 
services and has invested in a number of important projects to reposition itself 
nationally and internationally. 
The following table summarizes these firms’ characteristics. 
Table 3. Firm characteristics 
Firm Location Industry Major Shareholder Level of Corporate 
Entrepreneurship 
Firm A Lucca Tissue Family 4.99 
Firm B  Milano Biotech Another corporation 
(unrelated business) 
4.14 
Firm C Firenze IT Another corporation 
(related business) 
5.71 
Firm D Pisa Aviation Government 4.28 
 
From the interviews and the analysis of the corporate reports and 
documents, we obtained other relevant information concerning the corporate 
governance mechanisms adopted by these firms. 
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To analyze the governance mechanisms adopted by these firms we follow 
the framework proposed in the second chapter of this work, focusing on the four 
board attributes. The first attribute that we highlighted is board composition. As 
discussed in the chapter 2.2.1, the attribute of composition mostly concerns the 
size of the board and the mix of director types.  
In terms of board composition, interviews and data suggest that firms in 
which the major shareholder is a firm have a larger boards than the firms in which 
the major shareholder is a family or a public entity. However, for all case studies 
considered, membership in the network of knowledge of the major shareholders is 
one of the dominant criteria for the selection of individual board members. 
Indeed, analysis of the CVs of the directors highlights how the majority of a 
board’s members have a professional or educational background close to the large 
shareholders of the firm. For example, considering the professional experience of 
the directors of firm C, more than 50 percent of directors had professional 
experience in either a corporation that owns an important block of firm stock or in 
one of its subsidiaries81. Considering the mix of types of directors, the data shows 
that the number of outsiders is high in firms in which the major shareholder is 
another corporation or a public entity. These firms are also listed in the Italian 
Stock Exchange, although there are not legal provisions that require the presence 
of such a large number of outside directors for listed companies. 
Table 4. Board composition 
Firm Number of 
board members 
Number of insiders Number of outsiders 
Firm A 6 3 3 
Firm B 13 2 11 
Firm C 14 2 12 
Firm D 9 1 8 
 
 
                                                          
81
 Evidently, the professional experience is referred to a period prior to the three years set by the 
law. 
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The second attribute discussed in the chapter two (2.2.2) is board 
characteristics. According to literature (Zahra and Pearce, 1989), board 
characteristics consists of two components: demographic characteristics of the 
board and its personality82. We argued that both are important in terms of board 
involvement on Corporate Entrepreneurship.  
In terms of board characteristics, interviews and data suggest that 
heterogeneity in a boardroom is typical when the major shareholder is another 
corporation. Indeed, in this type of firm, directors tend to have a variety of types 
of professional experience and educational backgrounds. The personality of the 
board appears stronger in the family firm. One interviewee from the family firm 
reported that more than once, the board of directors have changed or refused an 
entrepreneurial opportunity proposed by the CEO, because it was considered too 
risky or unfitting for the historical period of the firm. In the other firms, the 
personality of the board seems weaker. Indeed, the interviewees from the other 
firms stated that often, their boards were involved in entrepreneurial opportunities 
proposed by the management, but and did not refuse any proposal.  
The third attribute introduced in chapter two (2.2.3) is board structure. 
Board structure concerns a board’s organization (Zahra and Pearce, 1989) and 
involves the rules that exist to make the board more efficiently (Huse, 1995; 
Gabrielsson and Winlund, 2000). It covers the number and types of committees as 
well as committee membership (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Demb and Neubauer 
1992; Huse 1995). 
In terms of board structure, in addition to the committees required by law, 
firms A and B also have a Scientific Committee. However, firm A’s is not a true 
Scientific Committee, as it is composed only of firm executives and managers. 
However, the aim of this committee is to challenge and create agreement for new 
projects the firm would implement. The Scientific Committee of firm B is 
                                                          
82
 We remember that the heterogeneity or homogeneity of board’s cognitive frames and its 
directors’ traits we believe affect how they work  individually and together. In terms of 
personality, we refers to those norms – the board’s social systems or “board culture” as Nadler 
(2004) termed it – that come from the directors’ shared beliefs about active preparation and 
participation, as well as from their shared values concerning the directors’ respect for one another 
and personal responsibility and accountability for the company’s prosperity. These norms can 
make the board more strong and indipendent. 
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composed of the CEO and other skilled members who are able to provide specific 
knowledge on the firm’s innovative projects. The aim of this committee is to 
evaluate and suggest development opportunities for new products and services. 
The last attribut discussed in chapter two (2.2.4) is board process. The 
mechanisms that can help the board work more efficiently include the frequency 
and length of meetings, CEO-board interface, the level of consensus among 
directors on issues at hand, the formality of board proceedings, and the extent to 
which the board is involved in self-evaluation (Mueller, 1979; Vance, 1983). In 
the chapter 2.2.4, we concentrated our attention on formal board routines, the 
existence of a formal evaluation of boardroom performance and the frequency of 
board meetings  (Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Huse, 1995).  
In terms of board process, the number of board meetings is higher in the 
firm in which the large shareholder is a family. Moreover, the possibility of 
having meetings between outsiders and key functional company managers is more 
frequent in this firm, although there are not formalized meeting agendas. The 
other firms have a different perpsective concerning insiders and outsiders. Indeed, 
the outsiders interviewed underlined the need for more frequent and formalized 
meetings, while insiders belivied that this practice could damage the effectiveness 
of the board of directors, which should have trust in the CEO and other 
executives.  
Table 5. Board process 
Firm Number of 
meetings 
Timeliness of 
information 
Completeness of 
information 
Firm A 3083 5 5 
Firm B 9 6 6 
Firm C 6 6 5,5 
Firm D 5 5 5 
 
                                                          
83
 Concerning the high number of meeting in firm A we must highlight that the internal policy of 
the firm sets that the board of directors have to deliberate on every corporate decision. The 
outsiders interviewed suggest that the number of meeting in which board evaluate and discuss the 
entrepreneurial development of the firm are no more than six. 
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4.3. Discussion 
How can a board of directors support and enhance Corporate 
Entrepreneurship within a firm? Prior research has shown that a board of directors 
can ensure the existence of safeguards against managerial opportunism, evaluate 
manager activity, and exploit entrepreneurial opportunities. At the same time, a 
board of directors can serve as a provider of resources that are essential for a firm 
to exploit new opportunities (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Lynall et al., 2003; Zahra et 
al., 2009). According to the literature (Filatotchev and Wright, 2005) we argued 
that a board of directors has two main roles: protecting and creating new wealth 
for shareholders. As Corporate Entrepreneurship can be considered a source of 
wealth because it involves high risk/high return activities, a board of directors 
should monitor executives to ensure the exploration and exploitation of 
entrepreneurial opportunities and should suggest new entrepreneurial innovation 
activities (March, 1991). We also argued that board attributes can influence the 
role of a board in Corporate Entrepreneurship, making monitoring and 
entrepreneurial roles easier (Uhlaner, et al., 2007). The case studies considered 
support this argument, although with certain differences that we have traced back 
to major shareholder type. Indeed, on one hand, prior scholars have argued that 
ownership structure can influence the levels of R&D investment and innovation in 
firms (Lee and O’Neill, 2003; Tribo et al., 2007; Munari et al., 2010). On the 
other hand, other scholars have found that one of the most important antecedents 
to board role is ownership structure and concentration (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; 
Uhlaner, et al., 2007).  
As described above, the role of a board in Corporate Entrepreneurship can 
differ depending on whether the major shareholder is a family, a corporation or a 
public entity. In particular analysis of the case studies suggests that board 
involvement in Corporate Entrepreneurship depends on the network of the major 
shareholder and his interest in the business of the firm. The data and interviews 
collected for firm A, in which the major shareholder is a family, seem to confirm 
the theory that family firms last longer than non family firms (James, 1999). Thus, 
firm A seems to have great incentive to monitor managers and ensure that they are 
working to protect and create new wealth (Filatotchev et al., 2005), in large part 
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because the CEO is a member of the founding family. In such a firm, the CEO is 
the main leader of business innovation. Although board composition reflects the 
network of the major shareholder, some boards of directors has altered or refused 
innovation opportunities that the founder/CEO has proposed. One of the directors 
interviewed said:  
“When board of directors has to discuss an ambitious project, two different 
board personalities emerge: one more entrepreneurial and one more 
conservative. Sometimes undertaking a bold project is approved, but sometimes it 
is refused because it is considered too risky for the firm.” 
Moreover, concerning board structure and process, the analysis seems 
confirm the idea that family members view their firm’s health as an extension of 
their own interests (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003). For this reason the board of 
directors has frequent opportunities to met with key functional managers of the 
firm, with Business Units directors and with the members of Board of yhe 
Statutory Auditors84. In this way, a firm can increase board involvement in the 
pursuit of Corporate Entrepreneurship activities and create commitment among 
firm employees, managers and the CEO on new entrepreneurial projects. 
Firm B is representative of a situation in which the major shareholder is 
another corporation that operates in an unrelated business. Literature has 
maintained that in this kind of firm, the board should have broad influence over 
top management to protect and create shareholders’ wealth. This is because major 
shareholder that lacks knowledge and expertise must rely on the board of directors 
to evaluate decisions of the top management team. Prior research has shown that 
the size of the board, the representation of outside directors, outside directors’ 
stock ownership, and the separation of the CEO and the chair position affect a 
                                                          
84
 “The Board of statutory auditors has a central role in the supervisory system of an issuer. The 
Committee believes that the supervisory duties of the Board of statutory auditors have to be carried 
out in a preventive manner and not merely ex post, essentially verifying the procedures developed 
and reporting findings to the directors, in order for them to adopt the necessary remedies, if any. 
The subsequent coordination with the management bodies, including the delegated ones, shall be 
deemed consistent with supervisory role on compliance (with the law, the by-laws, the internal 
procedures) typically entrusted to the Board of statutory auditors. Such a role distinguishes it 
sharply from the Board of Directors and control and risk committee, that basically assess, also 
from a substantive viewpoint, the adequacy of the organization and the performance of the 
management process.” The Corporate Governance Code, pag. 37. 
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board’s ability to monitor and evaluate management and encourage Corporate 
Entrepreneurship within the firm (Zahra 1996; Zahra et al., 2000). The data and 
interviewes for Firm B suggest that the presence of outside directors in the 
boardroom can help the board’s monitoring function and ensure the protection of 
shareholder wealth. However, this may not be sufficient. Outsiders should have 
the right mix of competencies and skills to challenge and evaluate management 
activities. Indeed both members interviewed said that to ensure shareholder 
wealth and propose other entrepreneurial opportunities, the board of directors 
should be heterogenous. The outside directors said, 
“We need a board that is more competent. The board is very active with the 
monitoring function. However, the board’s service role is still lacking” 
To resolve this problem, the firm established a Scientific Committee to 
evaluate and suggest development opportunities for new products and services. 
However, only recently has the board of directors began meeting with members of 
this Committee, to involve directors in generation of new ideas and projects.  
Moreover, the interviewees said that a board with a strong personality can 
help directors perform their roles. Indeed, the literature has suggested that a 
strong, independent and collaborative board is important to promote and enhance 
Corporate Entrepreneurship (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Strong directors can make 
a board stronger and more collaborative. 
In firm C, the major shareholder is another corporation that operates in a 
related business. Literature has shown that the decision of an established firm to 
invest in another firm with a related business can allow the acquiring firm to 
develop knowledge, skills and competencies that can improve its performance and 
growth (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). However, the firm being acquired may 
regard the corporate investor with suspicion, as the aim of the major shareholder 
may be to appropriate the innovative ideas that firm developed internally 
(Dushnitsky and Shaver, 2009). Thus, in this firm, directors play a crucial role in 
coordinating and balancing the interests of the major shareholder and the top 
management team. Analysis of this case study suggests that the corporate investor 
tends to have a large number of directors in the boardroom. Moreover, although 
there is not a formalized focus group or task force that relates directly to the 
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board, the firm usually organizes summits before each meeting to discuss issues 
with strategic relevance. At these summits, directors can have discussion with key 
functional managers and directors of Business Units, given the approval of the 
CEO or another executive. Through these opportunities, directors can evaluate top 
management’s pursuit of Corporate Entrepreneurship activities and provide 
counsel on development opportunities. On this topic, one of the directors 
interviewed said: 
“For outsider directors, it is important to have meetings with the top 
management team. This can help us evaluate the validity of the project we have to 
discuss and approve during the board meeting.” 
In Firm D the major shareholder is a public entity. Literature has suggested 
that, although the state is a particular category of shareholder because it can use a 
firm to pursue political objectives (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994), a high level of 
Corporate Entrepreneurship in this type of firm is important. Munari et al. (2010) 
highlighted three different situations in which this is particular important: (i) when 
the firm operates in a business of strategic relevance for the country and 
innovation can ensure superior performance; (ii) when entrepreneurial 
opportunities can be used by the firm to strengthen the nation’s scientific and 
human infrastructure; (iii) when innovation can encourage and support the 
production of public goods. Thus, in this kind of firm, the board of directors 
should ensure that shareholders and top management act in the interest of the 
community. The analysis of this case study supports this idea. In particular, the 
board of directors supports and enhances the innovation process and strategic 
renewal that the firm has been undergoing. Although the board’s composition and 
characteristics reflect the network of the major shareholder, the board’s structure 
and process highlight the strong commitment of the board of directors and top 
management team to ensuring that entrepreneurial opportunities are exploited. In 
particular, given the strategic importance of this business for the community, 
Corporate Entrepreneurship activities can help the firm in acquire national and 
international assets and thus improve firm survival and growth (Zahra et al., 
2009). 
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Our findings suggest that a board of directors can pursue and enhance 
Corporate Entrepreneurship within a firm by monitoring and encouraging the top 
management team in the pursuit of high risk/high returns project. The level of 
information and the ability to meet with different members of the organization are 
important elements that can help a board of directors perform its role. Moreover, 
case studies suggest that the role of a board in Corporate Entrepreneurship can 
differ in terms of attributes and means of performing its role depending on the 
major shareholders of the firm. However, our case study research provides only a 
preliminary explanation of this latter perspective. We are aware that more specific 
and broad empirical investigation is necessary to understand how a major 
shareholder can impact a board’s role in Corporate Entrepreneurship. 
Furthermore, it could be useful to replicate the study, considering firms that are 
different in terms of major shareholders but operate in the same industry to 
eliminate any causal link from different industries. However, we selected firms 
operating in different industries to increase the reliability of our findings. 
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Conclusion 
Corporate Entrepreneurship is important for company survival, profitability 
and development. It refers to entrepreneurial behavior and the pursuit of 
entrepreneurial opportunities by existing firms. The main traits generally 
associated with entrepreneurship in start-up a firm, growth, profitability, and 
innovation, have become desirable for large corporations as well. Given these 
important contributions to firm growth and performance, One of the most 
important factors to support and enhance Corporate Entrepreneurship within firms 
is the involvement of the board of directors. We can better understand the 
importance of a board’s contribution to the improvement of entrepreneurship 
within a firm if we consider the main characteristics of Corporate 
Entrepreneurship activities, which are characterized by high risk and uncertain 
and which require a strong, supportive organizational structure. However, 
careerism and short-term base reward systems may discourage top management's 
pursuit of Corporate Entrepreneurship. The high probability of failure of some 
entrepreneurial activities can depress a company’s short term performance and 
damage executives’ reputation, increasing their risk of losing their employment. 
As a result, top management may have strong risk aversion and may be induced to 
avoid entrepreneurial opportunities for development and growth. The 
consequence is decrease in firm performance and thus in shareholder wealth. 
Agency theory has suggested that corporate ownership and governance systems 
can affect managers’ willingness to take risks. Thus, a board of directors, the apex 
of corporate governance, can encourage managers to support and pursue 
Corporate Entrepreneurship within the firm. In particular, a board can ensure the 
existence of safeguards against managerial opportunism and evaluate managers'  
exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities. A strong and vigilant board is able to 
monitor executives’ strategic decisions and align the interests of top management 
and shareholders. The board can also serve as a provider of resources that are 
essential for the firm to exploit new opportunities. Boards are a potential source of 
cognitive resources that may be valuable in strategic decision processes. Outside 
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directors, because of their backgrounds in other firms and industries, can bring 
new knowledge, fresh perspectives, and different problem-solving styles to 
decision-making tasks. Thus, a board can help top management gain access to 
external resources, combine these resources with those within the firm, and use 
these new combinations to explore and exploit new entrepreneurial opportunities. 
The boardroom is a potential source of creative thinking about new opportunities 
for growth. We propose to encapsulate all these functions in two main board roles 
the monitoring and the entrepreneurial roles, to indicate how a board of directors 
should support and enhance Corporate Entrepreneurship within a firm and protect 
and create new shareholders’ wealth. A should protect shareholders’ wealth by 
ensuring manager accountability and minimizing agency cost, and create new 
wealth by providing new knowledge and resources, giving advice to executives to 
promote innovative activities, aiding in strategy formulation, and focusing on 
Corporate Entrepreneurship. Thus, a board of directors should achieve a balance 
between wealth protection and wealth creation in order to assure, encourage and 
promote Corporate Entrepreneurship within the firm. This is the first theoretical 
contribution of our dissertation.  
However not all boards are structured in the same manner, and different 
board attributes can influence the way a board performs its monitoring and 
entrepreneurial roles. Board attributes include composition, characteristics, 
structure and process.  Board composition includes the size of the board and the 
mix of inside and outside directors; board characteristics include the age, 
educational background, value and experience of directors. Board structure 
includes the number and types of committees, committee membership, the flow of 
information among these committees and board leadership. Process includes the 
mode of operation that a board takes in making decisions, the frequency and 
length of meetings, the formality of board routines and the extent to which the 
board evaluats itself. The capability of a board to perform its roles depends on its 
characteristics, structure, composition, and process. The investigation of how 
these different attributes can influence the role of a board in Corporate 
Entrepreneurship is the second theoretical contribution of this work. 
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Executives’ support of Corporate Entrepreneurship may also be influenced 
by the presence of a significant shareholder who appreciates the value of long 
term investment and who monitors and encourages executives to emphasize 
Corporate Entrepreneurship activities. However the means by which a major 
shareholder can do this is the board of directors. Thus, different shareholder types 
can have different effects on the monitoring and entrepreneurial functions of 
boards, both directly and indirectly, and may effect the board's composition or 
characteristics. When the major shareholder is a family, another corporation or the 
government, the board's attributes can change, and as can its influence on 
Corporate Entrepreneurship. The investigation of the relationship between major 
shareholders, boards of directors and Corporate Entrepreneurship is the third 
theoretical contribution of our thesis. 
The case study analysis seems to confirm our propositions. The four firms 
investigated highlight how the level of Corporate Entrepreneurship within a firm 
depends on that firm's corporate governance mechanism and type of major 
shareholder. The board of directors plays an important role in pursuing and 
enhancing Corporate Entrepreneurship within the firm and monitoring and 
encouraging the top management team in its pursuit of high risk/high return 
projects. The level of information and the ability to meet with different members 
of the organization are important elements that can help a board of directors in 
performing these roles. Moreover, case studies suggest that the role of a board in 
Corporate Entrepreneurship can differ, in terms of its attributes and the way it 
performs its role according to the type of major shareholder of the firm. For 
instance, in terms of board composition, the firms with an ownership structure in 
which the major shareholder is a firm tend to have larger boards than firms in 
which the major shareholder is a family or a public entity. However, for all case 
studies considered, membership in the network of knowledge of the major 
shareholder is one of the dominant criteria for the selection of individual board 
members. Thus, social network theory seems to be the most important perspective 
from which to describe the influence of a major shareholder on board attributes. 
However, our findings suggest that agency theory and, in particular, resource 
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based theory, are also key in indicating how a board should be composed, 
structured and characterized to best perform its role.  
Future research may clarify the relationships between social network theory, 
agency theory and resource based theory to investigate how major shareholder 
type can influence board attributes. Moreover, future research can repeat this 
study considering firms in the same industry, to eliminate possible industry 
effects. Finally, future studies can investigate this research interest using a cross-
country approach, as there are many differences shareholder types, board 
attributes and Corporate Entrepreneurship roles from country to country. 
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Appendix A 
Firm  
Interviewee   
Role  
Date  
 
Corporate entrepreneurship 
(1) Our company has introduced many new products or services over the past 
three years. 
Very untrue 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  Very true 
Comments:___________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
(2) Our company has made many dramatic changes in the mix of its products 
and services over the past three years. 
Very untrue 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  Very true 
Comments:___________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
(3) Our company has emphasized making major innovations in its products and 
services over the past three years. 
Very untrue 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  Very true 
Comments:___________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
(4) Over the past three years, this company has shown a strong proclivity for 
high-risk projects (with chances of very high return). 
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Very untrue 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  Very true 
Comments:___________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
(5) This company has emphasized taking bold, wide-ranging actions in 
positioning itself and its products (services) over the past three years. 
Very untrue 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  Very true 
Comments:___________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
(6) This company has shown a strong commitment to research and development 
(R&D), technological leadership, and innovation. 
Very untrue 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  Very true 
Comments:___________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
(7) This company has followed strategies that allow it to exploit opportunities in 
its external environment. 
Very untrue 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  Very true 
Comments:___________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
(8) Who were the leaders of the business ideas? 
Comments:______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________ 
(9)  How the business ideas have been implemented? 
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Comments:___________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
(10) The business idea leader has been involved in the exploitation of 
entrepreneurial idea? Which with role? 
Comments:___________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
(11) The leader of business idea has been rewarded? How? 
Comments:___________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
Board involvement 
(1) The board has refused o has changed innovation opportunities proposed by 
top management. 
Very untrue 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  Very true 
Comments:______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
(2) The board has accepted and enforced innovative ideas that have found their 
origin in the mind or in the work of the firm’s employees. 
Very untrue 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  Very true 
Comments:______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
(3) There are focus groups or task forces composed of employees and managers 
from different organizational functions, that relate directly to the board. 
Very untrue 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  Very true 
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Comments:______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
(4) In addition to board meeting, there are different opportunities for outsider 
directors to have meetings. 
Very untrue 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  Very true 
Comments:___________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
(5) In which occasion outside directors have the possibility to have a meeting 
with other key function managers (e.g. HR manager, legal expert, CFO, etc.)? 
o Board meeting; 
o Committees meeting; 
o Other meeting: __________ 
Comments:___________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
(6) Outside directors have meetings with Chairman or CEO         YES    NO 
Comments:______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
(7) Outside directors have the right flow of information before board meeting, in 
order to perform their role, in terms of: 
 Timeliness 
Very untrue 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  Very true 
 Completeness 
Very untrue 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  Very true 
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Comments:______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
(8) Describe the position of executive directors in the firm: 
Name                                                          Function  
Name                                                          Function  
Name                                                          Function  
(9) Business Unites Directors are members of the board of directors  YES    NO 
If they are not members, are they invited to attend to board meeting?        YES   NO 
Comments:_________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
(10) Which kind of board evaluation system does the board adopt?  
Comments:______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
(11) Is there a Scientific or Ethics Committee?         YES             NO 
If yes, can the committee relate to the board and suggest new initiatives or 
provide counsels about issue under discussion?                   YES             NO   
Comments:______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
(12) Are there some mechanisms of incentives for employees, managers or 
directors that suggest new entrepreneurial opportunities?    YES             NO 
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Comments:______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
(13) Are shareholders with much more than 10% of capital represented 
within the board of directors?                                                   YES      NO 
(14) Are minor shareholders represented within the board?  YES      NO 
Comments (e.g. number of directors that represent minor shareholders and who 
have nominated these directors): 
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
